David Holdcroft

Albert Menne and Niels Öffenberger, Zur modernen Deutung der aristotelischen Logik. Band I:Über den Folgerungsbegriff in der aristotelischen Logik. Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1982. 220 pp. DM 48.Klaus Jacobi, Die Modalbegriffe in den logischen Schriften des Wilhelm von Shyreswood und in anderen Kompendien des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts. Funktionsbestimmung und Gebrauch in der logischen Analyse. Leiden and KÖln: E.J. Brill, 1980. xiii + 528 pp. HFL 140.Nineteenth – Century ContrastsAnthony Manser, Bradley's Logic. Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1983. x + 220 pp. £17.50.Gregory Currie, Frege. An introduction to his philosophy. Brighton: Harvester Press; Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books; 1982. xi + 212 pp. £18.95.Eike-Henner W. Kluge, The metaphysics of Gottlob Frege. An essay in ontological reconstruction. The Hague. Boston, and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980. 296 pp, Dfl. 80/$35.00.Philosophy and LogicGeorg Henrik Von Wright, Practical reason. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. x + 214 pp. £15.00.Patrick Shaw, Logic and its limits. London and Sydney: Pan Books, in association with Heinemann Educational Books, 1981. 255 pp. £2.95.William S. Hatcher, The logical foundations of mathematics. Oxford, Toronto, Sydney, Paris and Frankfurt: 1982. x + 320 pp. £19.00/$38.00.E.N. Zalta,objects. An introduction to axiomatic metaphysics Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster: Keldei, 1983, xiil + 193 pp. $39.50.MiscellaneousR. Schacht, Nietzsche. London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. xxii + 546 pp. £18.50.V. Biryukov and A.G. Spirkina, Voprosy kibernetiki. Kibernetika i logicheskaya formalizatsiya. Aspekty istorii i metodologii. Moscow: Akademiya Nauk SSSR, ‘Kibernetika’1982. 191 pp. 2 rubles.

In ‘A Plea For Excuses’ Austin observes that there are many situations in which a person accused of doing an action A wishes to protest that it is not altogether accurate or fair to say that he did A. The person may wish to excuse himself from an accusation of doing A on the grounds that what happened was inadvertent, or the result of an accident, or done by mistake etc. etc. Moreover if he really has an excuse, then it will no longer be possible simply to say that he did A, because it will be seen that either it is not true that he did anything at all, or that whatever he did it was not A but something else, or that he did A in such a manner that simply to say that he did it would be misleading in the extreme

It has been proposed by Dawkins, Dennett and others that memes are the units of cultural evolution. We here concentrate on Dennett's account because of the role it plays in his explanation of human consciousness - which is our principal target. Memes are claimed to be replicators that work on Darwinian principles. But in what sense are they replicators, and in what way are they responsible for their own propagation? We argue that their ability to replicate themselves is severely limited, particularly in the case of language-borne memes. We contend, too, that the theory has unacceptable consequences for the role of design in accounting for cultural change, unless we seriously want to entertain the thought that design has as little relevance to cultural evolution as it does to the evolution of species. Finally, we argue that the account fails to do justice to the complexities of social practices