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3Principles of Conversation, Speech Acts, and Radical InterpretationIn Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding, W. De Gruyter. pp. 184-203. 1981.
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493The Variety of RationalityAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59 (1): 139-176. 1985.I discuss the connections between rationality and intentional action, emphasising that different kinds of action are rational an intentional in different ways.
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39Saying and Understanding: A Generative Theory of IllocutionsPhilosophical Quarterly 27 (106): 82. 1977.
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6Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar By P. F. Strawson Methuen, 1974, vii + 144 pp., £3.50 cloth, £1.50 paper (review)Philosophy 50 (194): 481-483. 1975.
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14Book Reviews (review)History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (2): 233-263. 1984.Albert Menne and Niels Öffenberger, Zur modernen Deutung der aristotelischen Logik. Band I:Über den Folgerungsbegriff in der aristotelischen Logik. Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1982. 220 pp. DM 48.Klaus Jacobi, Die Modalbegriffe in den logischen Schriften des Wilhelm von Shyreswood und in anderen Kompendien des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts. Funktionsbestimmung und Gebrauch in der logischen Analyse. Leiden and KÖln: E.J. Brill, 1980. xiii + 528 pp. HFL 140.Nineteenth – Century Contrast…Read more
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7Reviewed Work(s): Symposium: Entailment. I by C. Lewy; Symposium: Entailment. II by John Watling; Symposium: Entailment. III by P. T. Geach; On a Recent Account of Entailment by Jonathan Bennett (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 25 (4): 334-336. 1960.
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2Schlick and the verification theory of meaningRevue Internationale de Philosophie 37 (1): 47. 1983.
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6Grammar in Philosophy By Bede Rundle Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1979, viii + 491 pp., £14.00 (review)Philosophy 58 (226): 554-555. 1983.
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12NotebookPhilosophy 51 (n/a): 376. 1976.//static.cambridge.org/content/id/urn%3Acambridge.org%3Aid%3Aarticle%3AS0031819100019483/resource/name/firstPage-S0031819100019483a.jpg.
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65A Plea for Excuses?Philosophy 44 (170). 1969.In ‘A Plea For Excuses’ Austin observes that there are many situations in which a person accused of doing an action A wishes to protest that it is not altogether accurate or fair to say that he did A. The person may wish to excuse himself from an accusation of doing A on the grounds that what happened was inadvertent, or the result of an accident, or done by mistake etc. etc. Moreover if he really has an excuse, then it will no longer be possible simply to say that he did A, because it will be s…Read more
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University of LeedsRetired faculty
Leeds, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Law |