•  39
    Causation, Transitivity, and Causal Relata
    Journal of Philosophical Research 15 263-277. 1990.
    I consider an alleged example of a non-transitive causal chain, on the basis of which J. Lee has argued that causation is non-transitive. I show that his analysis of the example rests on too coarse-grained an approach to causal relata. I develop a fine-grained analysis of events which owes much to Dretske’s notion of an allomorphic event, and I use this analysis to show that in the example all the genuine causal chains are indeed transitive. It emerges that when fine-grained analyses of events a…Read more
  •  37
    Teleological explanation: A species of causal explanation
    Philosophical Psychology 1 (3): 313-325. 1988.
    Abstract The thesis that teleological explanations are best understood as causal explanations is defended (contra Valentine). I shift the focus of debate from behavior simpliciter to allegedly rational behavior. Teleological explanation, in the case of rational agents, involves reason?giving; and the reasons agents give for acting must be causative of that action if those agents are to be rational in practice. I argue initially that to abandon the claim that reasons are causes of action is to ab…Read more
  •  20
    Conceptual frameworks and realism
    with Melvin Ulm
    Metaphilosophy 13 (1). 1982.
  •  13
    Recent experimental work by T.D. Wilson et al. indicates that a consequence of asking subjects to reflect on their attitudes is that they not only reduce the consistency between their attitudes and behavior, but they perform actions which they come to regret. Wilson interprets this work via intra-psychic concepts, and arrives at the conclusion that it is rational to avoid deliberating about a wide range of attitudes and behaviors. This consequence has objectionable implications for philosophical…Read more
  • Austin and The Real
    with Melwin Ulm
    Indian Philosophical Quarterly 9 (4): 411. 1982.
  • Conceptual Frameworks and The Real
    with Melwinulm Holt
    Indian Philosophical Quarterly 10 (3): 373. 1983.