David K. Chan

The Simple View (SV) holds that for someone to intentionally A, he must intend to A. Critics of SV point to intentional actions which, due to belief‐conditions or consistency constraints, agents cannot intend. By recognizing species of intention which vary with the agent’s confidence in acting, I argue that the stringency of consistency constraints depends on the agent’s confidence. A sophisticated SV holds that the species of intending is related to the degree of intentionality of the action. Finally, I show that where agents do what they believe impossible, without intending to do so, the action is not intentional.

This volume features original essays on the ethics of ending wars (jus ex bello). It fills a significant gap in just war theory and sets the stage for other thinkers to engage with the topic. What makes questions about jus ex bello especially difficult for ethicists to answer is that the just war tradition has neglected to develop principles for ending wars justly. Until recently, debates have primarily focused on justice in going to war (jus ad bellum), justice in fighting a war (jus in bello), and justice after war (jus post bellum). Additionally, many contemporary conflicts are unconventional and not the kind that the traditional principles of just war theory are designed to address. The chapters in this volume address the question of how and when wars can end justly. Part 1 approaches jus ex bello from different theoretical angles, including just war theory, virtue ethics, pacifism, and feminism. Part 2 discusses specific aspects of recent wars: the United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan after 20 years of military involvement in the country, and the war that began with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, that is so difficult to end despite the escalating human cost. Ending Wars Justly is an essential resource for scholars and advanced students working in just war theory, the ethics of war and peace, international relations, and military and strategic studies.

I evaluate one intuitive argument for, and one against, the use of lethal drones by the United States in its War on Terror. The Lesser Evil Argument appeals to those who think it perverse to reject weapons that enable a more limited use of force. But if harms on all sides and longer-term consequences are considered, the argument is much less persuasive. The Targeted Killing Argument is intuitive to those who consider drone strikes against terrorist suspects named in intelligence reports to violate the rules of war. I reject the claim that it would be acceptable to carry out targeted killings because of necessity. Finally, I consider how radical asymmetry encourages terrorism against civilians, and how drone operators have the status of executioners, not warriors.

The problem of the nature of action is to say what else there is to action besides the occurrence of the event brought about in acting. My approach is to distinguish action from non-action on the basis of a special mental cause of the physical event brought about in acting. ;I begin with accounts that make do only with reasons, i.e. beliefs and desires, as the mental causes sought. But the belief-desire model of action does not give the necessary condition for action because non-intentional actions are actions done for no reason whatsoever. Sufficiency is ruled out by cases of deviant causality. Intentions do not escape the problems that prevented beliefs and desires from serving as the mark of action. Volitionalist theories of action need to avoid the dilemma posed by Ryle, one horn of which is the infamous problem of a regress of volitions needed to explain volitions. The accounts of volition that evade Ryle's dilemma do so at the cost of leaving the property of being an action as something sui generis and unanalysable. ;I isolate a special notion of trying which has as its object only the performing of teleologically basic actions. I argue that an agent has an immediate awareness that he is trying when he is trying. But trying is physical as well as mental. One of the distinctive functions of trying is that of control. It is a deep metaphysical truth about agents as we know them that the control they exercise over the physical actions they perform goes by way of a physical mechanism. To avoid the problem posed by causal deviance, I argue that any causal route from trying to movement is admissible so long as the agent is immediately aware that he is trying when the mechanism is activated and it is this trying that is the cause of the movement. To complete the case for trying being the mark of action when it causes the requisite events, I show that when one performs non-intentional actions, one always tries and the trying is causally related to the events one brings about.

In this paper, I discuss virtue ethics in relation to the rejection of the use of lethal violence. I argue that, given how I apply virtue ethics, a person of good character will have a very strong intrinsic desire to avoid the killing of another human being, so that only in rare circumstances where the alternative to violence is immensely evil would the use of violence to prevent the evil be the morally appropriate choice for the person to make. I first give a brief summary of a neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics. Then I explain why I think that a virtuous agent would be strongly averse to killing human beings. I go on to show that this does not mean that such an agent would never use violence on others, only that she would be very reluctant to do so. The circumstances in which she would do so are rare, but cannot be ruled out. For instance, virtuous agents may in very limited cases kill in self-defense despite a strong aversion to killing. The circumstances in which killings take place are found most of all in war, so I close by discussing where the virtue ethics approach to war is positioned in relation to just war theory and pacifism.

In this paper, I examine the difference between decision-making by soldiers and commanders, compared with leaders of the nation. Decision-makingin the armed forces is prudential reasoning concerned with the best means to achieve given military objectives. I argue that those in the military cannot rationally make the moral choice to risk the lives of their own soldiers or jeopardize their mission in order to protect the lives of enemy civilians. This does not vindicate the realists who deny that morality applies to war. Moral constraints set out in war conventions foster the illusion that by following rules of war, soldiers and their leaders have done all anyone needs to do in terms of moral choice concerning war. Political leaders should instead engage in moral reasoning by considering other means besides war, even the option of changing objectives. Such reasoning differs from prudential reasoning not in scope but in type.

In this paper, I discuss an example from Buchanan of active voluntary euthanasia (AVE). I first refute objections to the intuitive permissibility of the killing described in the example. After explaining why the killing is intentional, I evaluate Buchanan's solution to the ‘problem of intending death’. According to Buchanan, what justifies a physician in intentionally bringing about a patient's death by AVE is a principle that embodies the values of patient self-determination and well-being. I argue that these two considerations are not sufficient for justifying AVE. The motive of the physician matters, but it is his desire rather than his intention that is relevant. An ethical physician may bring about intentionally the death of his patient if in forming his intention, he began with an appropriate desire to keep the patient alive as well as a legitimate desire to prevent prolonged suffering, with the latter outweighing the former. The ethical physician also desires to respect the choice of his patient wherever possible. On my account, the physician should be guided by the virtues and goals of his profession rather than by strict ‘all-or-nothing’ principles. I defend my account by describing the advantages of my account, and dismissing possible objections.

The supreme emergency exemption proposed by Michael Walzer has engendered controversy because it permits violations of the jus in bello principle of discrimination when a state is faced with imminent defeat at the hands of a very evil enemy. Traditionalists among just war theorists believe that noncombatants should never be deliberately targeted in war whether or not there is a supreme emergency. Pacifists on the other hand reject war as immoral even in a supreme emergency. Unlike Walzer, neither just war traditionalists nor pacifists make a special case for supreme emergencies. In this paper, I borrow Walzer’s concept to provide support for a different ethics of war that limits war to supreme emergencies. In non-supreme emergency situations, I agree with pacifists in rejecting war even if just war requirements are satisfied. But in supreme emergencies, I agree with just war traditionalists that war can be legitimately fought provided that moral constraints that protect noncombatants are respected.

The Simple View (SV) holds that for someone to intentionally A, he must intend to A. Critics of SV point to intentional actions which, due to belief-conditions or consistency constraints, agents cannot intend. By recognizing species of intention which vary according to the agent's confidence in acting, I argue that the stringency of consistency constraints depends on the agent's confidence. A more sophisticated SV holds that the species of intending is related to the degree of intentionality of the action. Finally, I show that where agents do what they believe impossible, without intending to do so, the action is not intentional.

Warren Quinn and Philippa Foot have given versions of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing justifying a moral distinction between doing something to bring about harm, and doing nothing to prevent harm. They argue that it is justified to allow one person to die so that one can save a larger number of people, but not to kill one person to achieve the same purpose. In this chapter, I show that the examples typically used to support the DDA do not in fact do so. Contrary to the deontological ethics supported by the DDA, I argue that it can be justified to minimize harm by killing a smaller number of people, in preference to letting a greater number die. But unlike for the consequentialist, my position is that the distinction between killing and letting die does have moral significance. I shall examine what other non-consequentialist considerations, besides the appeal to positive and negative rights, could account for the distinction; and suggest a middle position between the deontological and consequentialist approaches to the ethics of killing.

Philosophical problems with the concept of wronging someone in bringing the person into existence, especially the non-identity problem, have been much discussed in connection with forms of assisted reproduction that carry risks of harms either greater than or not otherwise present in natural reproduction. In this essay, I discuss the meaning of claims of wrongful life, distinguishing them from claims of wrongful disability. Attempts to conceptualize wrongful disability in terms of either the harmed existence of the offspring, or the possibility of less harmful alternatives, are found unsatisfactory. A contractualist approach that provides an account of wronging that is independent of harming is considered. Finally, I present a new approach that necessitates an account of reasons for procreation that could justify harm to the offspring. These reasons are not the kind that require or prohibit actions of certain types, but reflect what the agent sees as intrinsically valuable in acting.

The aim of the paper is to show that there are actions which are non-intentional. An account is first given which links intentional and unintentional action to acting for a reason, or appropriate causation by an intention. Mannerisms and habitual actions are then presented as examples of behavior which are actions, but which are not done in the course of acting for a reason. This account has advantages over that of Hursthouse's "arational actions," which are allegedly intentional actions done for no reason at all. Finally, one consequence of neglecting non-intentional action is discussed to illustrate its importance.

Despite criticism that dignity is a vague and slippery concept, a number of international guidelines on bioethics have cautioned against research that is contrary to human dignity, with reference specifically to genetic technology. What is the connection between genetic research and human dignity? In this article, I investigate the concept of human dignity in its various historical forms, and examine its status as a moral concept. Unlike Kant's ideal concept of human dignity, the empirical or relational concept takes human dignity as something that is affected by one's circumstances and what others do. I argue that the dignity objection to some forms of genetic research rests on a view of human nature that gives humans a special status in nature – one that is threatened by the potential of genetic research to reduce individuals to their genetic endowment. I distinguish two main philosophical accounts of human nature. One of these, the Aristotelian view, is compatible with the use of genetic technology to help humans realize their inherent potential to a fuller extent.

I compare the distribution of jobs and research opportunities in academic philosophy with how American society distributes economic rewards. In both cases, there is gross inequality and lack of upward mobility. Luck always plays a role in hiring decisions and the acceptance of papers by journals, but the entrenchment of luck has led to elitism which is unhealthy for the profession of philosophy, just as it is for the capitalist economy. I suggest some revolutionary steps to bridge the gap between the two tiers of philosophers.

Are today’s wars different from earlier wars? Or do we need a different ethics for old and new wars alike? Unlike most books on the morality of war, this book rejects the ‘just war’ tradition, proposing a virtue ethics of war to take its place. Like torture, war cannot be justified. This book asks and answers the question: “If war is a very great evil, would a leader with courage, justice, compassion, and all the other moral virtues ever choose to fight a war?” A ‘philosophy of co-existence’ is proposed which is much more restrictive than just war theory but not pacifist. War can be correctly chosen by a virtuous leader only in rare ‘supreme emergencies’ when faced with enemies as evil as Hitler. This virtue ethics approach to war is used to find new answers to difficult issues such as humanitarian intervention, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

Ralph Ellis has written about how we have a fundamental need for ‘inspiration’ that can help us come to terms with human finitude. Arguing against the self-deceptive path of religious fundamentalism, Ellis discusses how the experience of a transcendent object of intrinsic value through love enables us to break out of a ‘circle of egocentricity.’ In this paper, I explore the problem of finitude in the movie Stranger Than Fiction, faced by someone who has to make choices knowing that he is merely a character in someone else’s novel. I show how philosophy is also needed, alongside a loving relationship, for moral choice and motivation. I then suggest that Aristotle’s ethics is an example of how both philosophical knowledge and experience of life can be combined in dealing with our lack of moral certainty.

What do philosophers have to say about war beyond appeal to the just war doctrine? I suggest that they should concern themselves with the harmful consequences of war for the people who experience it. The ancient Greek tragedian Euripides was a moral philosopher of his time who wrote the plays Hecuba and The Trojan Women from the perspective of the losers in the Trojan War. There are striking parallels to the U.S. war in Iraq that began in 2003. Lessons that can be learned from Euripides include how good people learn to hate, how aggression has its own logic of necessary brutality, how each side is unable to recognize how much they are like their enemies, how the desire to end a war quickly disregards the cost to civilians, and how irrational the fear of the enemy can be.