David Kubíček

In 2017, Matti Eklund coined the term "ardent realism" to denote normative realist theories that assert the existence of objective normative facts that serve as the measure of all normative judgments. Ardent realists emphasize that the normative difference between someone who acts badly for bad reasons and someone who acts well for good reasons is not merely a difference in attitudes or emotions. Instead, they argue that this distinction is primarily grounded in objective normative facts. To date, the debate around ardent realism has focused mainly on the metasemantic issues raised by Eklund, leaving its metaphysical foundations insufficiently addressed. In this paper, I aim to define the key terms involved in discussions of ardent realism and clarify the commitments of what I refer to as “metaphysically well-grounded ardent realism” by distinguishing it from possible forms of “non-ardent realism.” I conclude that there are three interlinked metaphysical conditions for ardent realism: (1) Normative facts are stance-independent truth-makers of our normative assertions. (2) Deeply stance-independent normative facts hold authority over all other facts in determining what ought to be done. (3) This sum of deeply stance-independent normative facts is consistent. Therefore, a theory that fails to meet these three conditions cannot be considered ardently realist.

The essay examines the possible meanings of the term "meaning" in the phrase "meaning of life." The authors explain the frequent ambiguities in discussions about the meaning of life by pointing to the ambiguity of the term "meaning of life" itself. Instead of a classical conceptual analysis based on essential characteristics, they propose analyzing the term "meaning of life" as a cluster of intertwined, interdependent concepts. Using a number of examples, they show that in everyday discourse, the concept of the meaning of life is used in at least eight different meanings: purpose, impact, value of life, positive value, sense of fulfillment, comprehensibility, narrative, and personal essence. They argue that satisfying one of these seems not sufficient for having a meaningful life, but satisfying more of them in some combinations may be sufficient.