In Kant's Inferentialism: The Case Against Hume (Routledge: 2015, paperback 2017), I present a systematic interpretation of Kant’s replacement of Hume’s theory of mental representation with an account of concepts as inferential rules. I recast Kant’s understanding of human experience as an essentially normative enterprise aimed at producing a representation of a world of causally-governed material objects.
In Hume's Science of Human Nature: Scientific Realism, Reason, and Substantial Explanation (Routledge: 2017) I investigate the philosophical commitments underlying Hume's methodology in pursuing the science of human nature. I there argue t…
In Kant's Inferentialism: The Case Against Hume (Routledge: 2015, paperback 2017), I present a systematic interpretation of Kant’s replacement of Hume’s theory of mental representation with an account of concepts as inferential rules. I recast Kant’s understanding of human experience as an essentially normative enterprise aimed at producing a representation of a world of causally-governed material objects.
In Hume's Science of Human Nature: Scientific Realism, Reason, and Substantial Explanation (Routledge: 2017) I investigate the philosophical commitments underlying Hume's methodology in pursuing the science of human nature. I there argue that Hume understands scientific explanation as aiming at explaining the inductively-established universal regularites discovered in experience via an appeal to the nature of the substance underlying manifest phenomena.
My research also extends to the work of figures other than Hume and Kant, most seriously Wilfrid Sellars and Mary Shepherd.
