David Lea

It is noteworthy that much of recent liberal scholarship aimed at empowering aboriginal peoples, and supporting their land rights, has often unwittingly embraced the conservative Lockean‐Nozickian tradition rather than the tradition of left‐leaning thinkers. Many of the supporters of aboriginal land rights tend to view property rights as contingently determined historical entitlements which are established independently of the state’s authority, thereby creating structures which morally bind the authority of the state. This, in fact, also represents the view of the conservative supporters of untrammelled capitalism. Secondly, there is often little discussion of the bundle of rights which are derived from these acts of original acquisition. This may lead one to the assumption that these supporters of aboriginal land rights agree with the conservative view that all the recognised components of modern liberal ownership, from the right to use, to the right to income, are acquired in the initial events associated with historical entitlement. It is my argument in this paper that basing aboriginal land claims solely on customary historical entitlement results in too close an alignment with a conservative ideology which has been used to support unrestrained capitalism.

It is often argued that multinational companies and other foreign developers have a responsibility to improve the material conditions of the people in whose territories they operate. As a matter of distributive justice it is thought that these companies should be sharing the acquired wealth with these people through the creation of ‘collective goods’ (like schools and aid posts), infrastructure development and compensation disbursements aimed at their benefit. Recently “stakeholder theory” and even legislative changes in the first world (especially in the US) have sought to impress on the corporate world the necessity to share the profits with affected “non‐shareholder” groups. Many see these developments as possible advancements for indigenous peoples, indigenous rights and the cause of distributive justice for aboriginal groups. However, it can be shown that the attribution of such ‘imperfect’ duties to corporations results in the generation of excessive costs and of unrealistic expectations on the part of stakeholders. Distributive justice is more efficiently achieved by public sector involvement at the level of policy and project management.

This paper concentrates on Schmitt’s concept of the Großraum, and its relevance to international relations and international law as perceived by some notable contemporary Chinese thinkers. I explain the general relevance of Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth for contemporary Chinese thinkers, then examine the concept of the Großraum its possible incorporation into international law and relations. I considers whether the Großraum model in which regional hegemons are recognized internationally and juridically, would help to resolve China’s conflicting relationship with the United States. I also consider whether an alleged cosmopolitanism, based on the global acceptance of human rights norms, would be incompatible with regional powers that reject the universality of liberal values.

Apologists for Christianity and Judaism have argued that their religions do not support an exploitative attitude towards the environment. L.H. Steffen, in particular, argues that it is the Hellenic rather than the (Judaeo-Christian tradition which promotes the instrumentalist view of nature. In contrast, I argue that Christianity is and has been an amalgam of the Hellenic and Hebrew traditions. In the course of this paper I indicate certain salient Hellenic influences which were prominent in medieval Christianity. I subsequently point out that, contrary to Steffen's allegations, these influences originally contributed to a non-exploitative attitude to the natural world by the very nature of their anti-materialist prescriptions. However, with the Renaissance and the Reformation, religious attitudes shifted and a new religious morality was generated, one which associated morality and spiritual achievement with intense engagement in the material world and the exploitation of this world in the end of personal prosperity. In part I demonstrate this alteration in perspective by reference to the shifting religious attitudes towards ownership and property

Communitarians have alleged a connection between according specialrights to community groupings and preserving the indigenous cultureand the social cohesion of the original community. This paperconcentrates upon special group rights associated with land tenurenow maintained by Fijian Mataqali and traditional land owninggroups in Papua New Guinea. The first section of the paper assessesand compares the social consequences of each of these systems withspecial attention to the preservation of traditional culture.However, in the case of Fiji, it is undeniable that the mataqaliland tenure system has given indigenous Fijians politicaladvantages over non-indigenous Fijians, most specifically theFijian Indians. Though special land rights can possibly bejustified on the grounds of cultural preservation, their existencedoes raise this further issue of fairness. Moral considerations basedupon the territorial sovereignty of indigenous nations, rather thancommunitarian arguments, may offer a more convincing justificationof the advantages of indigenous Fijians

Recently there has been considerable controversy over the environmental impact of Christian teaching. During the beginnings of our increased awareness of the ecological crisis, several strong papers appeared condemning Christianity for encouraging environmental exploitation. Recently a number of works have sought to defend the Judeo-Christian tradition by emphasizing different aspects of a message that allegedly promotes environmentally friendly behavior. Overall, however, these interpretations exhibit doubtful ontic significance. It is the contention of this paper that Christianity evolved profoundly after the Renaissance and the Reformation and with attendant intellectual changes encouraged an exploitative attitude towards the natural environment. These post Renaissance attitudes suppressed or supplanted the attitudes towards the created order engendered by Hellenic thought that were prominent during the Middle Ages. This change in perspective is most evident in the promotion of instrumental reason rather than a model of rationality based on contemplation, which had been the inheritance of Classical philosophy

In this paper I discuss the managerial template that has become the normative model for the organization of the university. In the first part of the paper I explain the corporatization of academic life in terms of the functional relationships that make up the organizational components of the commercial enterprise and their inappropriateness for the life of the academy. Although there is at present a significant body of literature devoted to this issue, the goal of this paper is to explain the genesis of this phenomenon through a reference to the ideology that characterizes our modern secular age. This is the subject of the second part of the paper. Most texts seek to explain this ideological development either through the ever increasing dominance of economic rationalism, perceived conservatism of collegial forms of governance, the necessity to transfer fiscal responsibility in tight budgetary periods, the decline of the Keynesian ‘welfare consensus’, or the legacy of the power regimes that began to take shape in the liberal societies of the 19th century. I trace this development to the beginnings of Modernity and the Cartesian bifurcation that separated the material world from its spiritual and intellectual source and thereby overthrew the hierarchy of related values that informed both nature and human organization. In articulating this argument I make reference to the thought of Jacques Maritain, Charles Taylor and René Guénon

It is noteworthy that much of recent liberal scholarship aimed at empowering aboriginal peoples, and supporting their land rights, has often unwittingly embraced the conservative Lockean‐Nozickian tradition rather than the tradition of left‐leaning thinkers. Many of the supporters of aboriginal land rights tend to view property rights as contingently determined historical entitlements which are established independently of the state’s authority, thereby creating structures which morally bind the authority of the state. This, in fact, also represents the view of the conservative supporters of untrammelled capitalism. Secondly, there is often little discussion of the bundle of rights which are derived from these acts of original acquisition. This may lead one to the assumption that these supporters of aboriginal land rights agree with the conservative view that all the recognised components of modern liberal ownership, from the right to use, to the right to income, are acquired in the initial events associated with historical entitlement. It is my argument in this paper that basing aboriginal land claims solely on customary historical entitlement results in too close an alignment with a conservative ideology which has been used to support unrestrained capitalism.

It is the contention of this paper that some progress in alleviating the social and environmental problems which are beginning to face Papua New Guinea can be achieved by supporting traditional Melanesian values through maintaining the customary system of communal land tenure. In accordance with this aim, I will proceed to contrast certain Western attitudes towards individual freedom, selfinterested behaviour, individual and communal interests and private ownership with attitudes and values expressed in the traditional Melanesian approach. In order to demonstrate the latter, I will briefly touch upon the phenomenon of wantokism and indicate how the Melanesian values associated with this concept find their locus in the system of customary communal ownership. Subsequently, I will describe how the emergence of a cash economy and the attachment to Western gadgetry and products have effected injury to the environment and undermined values which have previously maintained Melanesian social cohesion. While admitting that little can be done to eradicate the desire for cash and the products it can buy, I suggest that Melanesian communities and the environment itself would receive more protection if future development in Papua New Guinea embraced a system which incorporated certain of the traditional Melanesian values through the preservation of the communal form of land tenure. Ultimately, I suggest a way in which customary communal land tenure can be integrated into the established Anglo-Australian legal system.

In this paper we begin with a reference to the work of Hernando de Soto The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, and his characterization of the Western institution of formal property. We note the linkages that he sees between the institution and successful capitalist enterprise. Therefore, given the appropriateness of his analysis, it would appear to be worthwhile for developing and less developed countries to adjust their systems of ownership to conform more closely to the Western system of formal property. However, we go on to point out that property relationships within the Western system have become subject to redefinition through the expansion of Intellectual Property rights in ways that ultimately work to the disadvantage of the developing and less developed countries. We point out that this restructuring has been given global application through the implementation of the TRIPS agreement by the WTO. In the final section of the paper I suggest ways in which IP rights and relevant institutions can be reformed in order to avoid the disadvantages to the developing and less developed countries.

This paper considers the arguments that could support the proposition that intellectual property rights as applied to softwarehave a moral basis. Undeniably, ownership rights were first applied to chattels and land and so we begin by considering the moral basis of these rights. We then consider if these arguments make moral sense when they are extended to intellectual phenomenon. We identified two principal moral defenses: one based on utilitarian concerns relating to human welfare, the other appeals to issues of individual autonomy and private control. We conclude that intellectual property rights could not be defended from a moral perspective that emphasizes autonomy and individual control because copyright and patent restrict fundamental freedoms to transfer and redistribute one’s property. We also find it difficult to defend intellectual property in software from a utilitarian perspective because of the current structure of the market. We mention two characteristics of the software market that make it distinct and promote monopolistic conditions and excessive profit taking: the facility of replication, and the need for compatibility in operating systems. We conclude that there are good reasons to reverse the current market’s structure. We suggest three possible remedies. The government could rigorously enforce antitrust legislation, impose greater monitoring and price controls, or obviate the commercial aspect altogether by denying the application of intellectual property rights to software.