David Lévystone

Resumen: Entre los proverbios que Aristóteles utiliza como ejemplos en la Retórica, una fórmula ha dejado particularmente perplejos a los editores y comentaristas del texto: “es vergonzosísimo no tener perro”. Se han propuesto diferentes explicaciones del significado que podría tener este dicho común y, de ahí, del argumento de Aristóteles en este pasaje. Ninguna es completamente satisfactoria. Proponemos entender el significado de este dicho, a partir del uso popular del término κύων, “perro”, en la poesía erótica tardía y en la comedia clásica, que asocian al perro con el sexo masculino. -- Abstract: Among the proverbs that Aristotle uses as examples in the Rhetoric, one formula has perplexed editors and commentators of the text: “it is most shameful not to have a dog”. Different explanations have been proposed for the meaning of this common saying and, hence, of Aristotle’s argument in this passage. None of them is entirely satisfactory. I propose to understand the meaning of this proverb from the popular use of the term κύων, “dog”, in late erotic poetry and in classical comedy, which associate the dog with the masculine sexual organ.

If the character of Xanthippe is well known, another feminine figure of similar importance in the life of Socrates has remained hidden since antiquity: that of his “second wife”, Myrto. To solve the Myrto enigma, it is first necessary to trace its history. Since the doxography is limited – ten texts or so – it is possible to present it exhaustively. All sources agree on the fact that Socrates had a “second” wife, Myrto, descendant of Aristides the Just; they differ, however, in their intentions and in the details of the narrative: (a) the story may have been used to attack the philosopher (as in Cyril or Theodoret); it may have been recorded in a neutral way (in the Suda or Diogenes Laertius); or associated with attempts at “justification” (as in Athenaeus or Plutarch); (b) in detail, the texts diverge and a careful analysis raises various questions: what exactly was Myrto’s relationship to Aristides I (daughter, granddaughter)? What was the exact nature of her relationship with Socrates (cohabitation, marriage)? Was this relationship concomitant or not with that which the philosopher had with Xanthippe? Was Myrto the mother of some of the philosopher’s children or not? A systematic study of the sources makes it possible to trace the origin of the various traditions and even to answer all these questions with near certainty, by drawing up a coherent chronology and portrait of the character.

Among the reconstructions of the quasi-legendary figure of Pherecydes, one point of the doxography concerning possible astronomical activities of the Wise of Syros is quickly dismissed by modern commentators. The story is based on two testimonies reported by Diogenes Laertius: one attributes to Pherecydes the invention of an instrument for observing the solstices (the “heliotrope”); the other recalls the opinion of Andron of Ephesus, who distinguished between two Pherecydes of Syros: the “Wise” and the “astronomer”. The first seems to stem from a misunderstanding of Homeric poetry ; the second, if derived from the former, would have no greater value. However, the various understandings of the testimonies of Diogenes Laertius on Andron and, immediately after him, on Eratosthenes, leave open the possibility that the general issue of Pherecydes’ astronomy implied more than a simple misunderstanding of a few Homeric verses (without excluding it). It could rather depend on: (a) the confusion over the identity of Pherecyde(s) that seems to have prevailed as early as the 4th century B.C.; (b) the philosophical character that earlier doxographers were willing to attribute to his work. These neglected testimonies then became a remarkable source of information on the first reception of Pherecydes of Syros in the 4th century B.C., and on the ways in which this thinker was integrated in the history of philosophy.

The seventeen contributions constituting this edited volume focus on archaic Greek thought — Presocratics broadly understood, including Sophists, Archaic poets, or Tragedians — and its multiform reception, use or appropriation through times and lands. The first chapters deal with the direct reconstruction and understanding of early Greek thought, from the very first philosophical writings to the last Presocratic philosopher. By alternating discussions of editorial and translation issues, stylistic analysis, geographical study and history of science, these contributions question the value of the testimonies or fragments attributed to those early thinkers and challenge our understanding of the texts at the origin of western philosophy. The volume subsequently focuses on the echoes of those Archaic voices, over a long period of time from Aristotle to the 20th century. From their early reception in Greek and Roman time to their adaptation in contemporary poetry, by way of their appropriation and use in Islamic philosophy or in Latin-America colonization, the contributions gathered in this second part illustrate the large scope of influence of ancient philosophers and of their ideas in various times and places.

One usually considers that pre-Aristotelian thought had little interest in economic problems. In reality, various authors from the end of the 5th or beginning of the 4th century BC (Ps.-Xenophon, Plato, Xenophon, Phaleas of Chalcedon) paid particular attention to these questions when they developed their political thought. Although their ideas differ in detail, they all share the same distrust of trade and monetary economy. These thinkers develop, from a certain number of (aristocratic) political presuppositions, a strong and detailed critique of the economic transformations of which they are contemporary. The importance that Plato, in particular, attaches to economic realities appears in his harsh criticism of Athenian democracy, as well as in his political constructions of the Republic, the Critias and the Timaeus, or the Laws. By alternating a general approach and a detailed one (because the importance of the economy, in Plato, is also revealed in apparently minor details), we propose to show the fundamental importance of economic reflections in classical Greek thought, even before the Stagirite.

Greek poetical, judicial, philosophical, and medical texts of the classical period use the term αἴτιος, as well as several derivative terms, to indicate which persons, things, or facts are responsible for, or have caused, a state of affairs. The feminine substantive αἰτία, ‘responsibility’, seems to have appeared only in the early fifth century, as does the neuter substantive τὸ αἴτιον. The full history of this word group is still to be written, though important overviews have already cleared the path for such a study. My contribution to this volume has a far more modest aim and can only constitute a first minor step to that end: to put forth a hypothesis on the archaic meaning of the word, which slightly modifies the usual understanding of it as referring to whom or what ‘plays a part’ or ‘takes a part’ in a situation. I will do so by focusing on the Homeric texts and most especially on the Iliad.

The paper argues that the usual contemporary understanding and translation of Aristotle’s affirmation in Metaph. Λ, 1075b12-13 πάντες δ᾽ οἱ τἀναντία λέγοντες οὐ χρῶνται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐὰν μὴ ῥυθμίσῃ τις relies on a misconception of the signification of the verb ῥυθμίζω. A short survey of the meaning and uses of the verb in vth and ivth BC texts, and a careful reading of its interpretations by the ancient commentators who paid attention to this specific passage of Aristotle (Ps.-Alexander, Aquinas, Averroes, Themistius), shows that ῥυθμίζω may be taken in its technical, metaphysical sense (to ‘form’, ‘to add a form [on matter]’), as it was found also in Democritus or Antiphon. A correct understanding of the verb leads to a new interpretation of this passage of Aristotle, by revealing a more complete and accurate criticism of the theses that he intends here to denounce.

Socrates´ thought of justice and obedience to laws is motivated by a will to avoid the destructive effects of Sophistic criticisms and theories of laws. He thus requires–against theories of natural law–an almost absolute obedience to the law, as far as this law respects the legal system of the city. But, against legal positivism, Socrates would not admit that a law is just simply because it is a law: he is looking for the true Just. However, as often in Socratic philosophy, Socrates cannot accept that two equally justified and legitimate rights or moral values conflict.

The radical mean suggested by Socrates in order to carry out the program of the Republic - the relegation to the fields of all inhabitants over the age of 10 - has perplexed modern commentators who have seen in it an ironical remark, a reductio ad absurdum presented in order to establish the very impossibility of Kallipolis or, on the contrary, a sign of the totalitarian and criminal character of the Platonic city. But it is far from evident, in view of political or military events prior and contemporary with the redaction of the Republic, that this solution could offend the moral conscience of fourth-century Greeks. This practice even seems to be the logical consequence of a certain oligarchic or aristocratic ideology, common by the end of the 5th c. and at the beginning of the 4th c., which associated, on the one hand, rural organization with the ‘best regime’ and, on the other, urban centralisation with democracy. The actual practices of the Lacedaemonian city, which maintained its primitive organization in komai, and even tried to impose it to other cities, could also serve as a model for the opponents of Athenian democracy. All of Plato's political models, from the Republic to the Laws, present cities whose essential, if not exclusive, productive activity is agriculture. The displacement of the population to the countryside seems, from this perspective, a rather serious proposal of the philosopher. * * Agradezco a Héctor Zagal y a María-Elena García-Peláez por sus observaciones y sugerencias al texto en español.

In Plato’s early dialogues, the impossibility of talking to the crowd appears as a constitutive element of the opposition between rhetoric and dialectic and raises the understudied question of the role of the audience in Socratic thought. However, Xenophon’s Socrates constantly identifies public and private speech. But this likening is also found in the Alcibiades Major, which gives a key to understand the true meaning of this assimilation: one can convince an audience, by talking to each individual in the crowd. The need to address each one implies an adaptation of language that can be found in the texts of different disciples of Socrates. The rhetorical aspects of the Phaedrus’ psychagogia should then be understood, not as a new Platonic concept which allows the good orator to address the many, but rather as a new for- mulation of a well-known and shared Socratic ideal.

At the end of the fifth century B.C.E., the character of Odysseus was scorned by most of the Athenians: he illustrated the archetype of the demagogic, unscrupulous and ambitious politicians that had led Athens to its doom. Against this common doxa, the most important disciples of Socrates (Antisthenes, Plato, Xenophon) rehabilitate the hero and admire his temperance and his courage. But it is most surprising to see that, in spite of Odysseus' lies and deceit, these philosophers, who condemn steadfastly the sophists' deceptions, praise his rhetorical ability, his polutropia. The word polutropia is ambiguous: for Antisthenes, it means either "diversity of styles and discourses" or "diversity of dispositions, characters, or souls". It is argued that the same distinction is implicitly at work in Plato's Hippias Minor, where Socrates defends Odysseus' polutropia against the pseudo "simplicity" of Hippias' favourite hero, Achilles. However, whereas Antisthenes tries to clarify these different meanings, Plato's Socrates exploits the ambiguity to confuse his interlocutor. Such a distinction sheds a new light on the Hippias Minor: Odysseus is polutropos in the first (positive) sense, while the simplicity of Achilles should be understood as a bad kind of polutropia. It provides an explanation for the first paradoxical thesis of the dialogue which many commentators do not admit as an expression of the true Socratic view, on the ground of its supposed immorality: that he who voluntary deceives is better than he who errs, for falsehood is, in one case, only in words, while in the other, it is falsehood in the soul itself. It is thus proposed that Odysseus' skill in adapting his logos to his hearers was probably a model for Socrates himself. The analogy between the hero and Socrates is especially clear in Plato's dialogues, which show the philosopher in an Odyssey for knowledge

Dans l’œuvre de Platon, l’image du rêve semble d’abord servir à désigner l’état d’ignorance du commun des mortels qui « rêvent » leur vie. Cet usage métaphorique ne saurait correspondre parfaitement à la pensée platoni- cienne du phénomène onirique, particulièrement lorsqu’on l’envisage d’un point de vue éthique (qu’advient-il de la vertu de l’homme dans son sommeil ?), plutôt qu’épistémologique ou ontologique. Dans la République, le sommeil apparaît essentiellement comme l’endormissement d’une partie de l’âme – la rationnelle – au profit d’une autre – la désirante. Platon laisse pourtant entendre que, sous certaines conditions, les visions qui s’y manifestent ne sont pas nécessairement mensongères et pourraient même, pour certaines, avoir une origine divine. Le rêve doit donc être compris non seulement comme un moment de séparation de l’âme et du corps, mais aussi de différenciation des facultés ou parties de l’âme elles-mêmes qui acquièrent là leur autonomie propre et déploient, sans se limiter l’une l’autre, leur plein pouvoir. In Plato’s works the image of a dream at first seems to serve the purpose of indicating the state of ignorance of ordinary humans who « dream » their way through life. This metaphorical usage does not reflect perfectly Plato’s thought on the phenomenon of dreams, especially when it is considered from an ethical point of view (what happens to human virtue during sleep?) rather than an epistemological or ontological one. In the Republic sleep appears to be essen- tially where a part of the soul goes asleep – namely the rational part – to the advantage of the desiring part. However, Plato implies that under certain condi- tions the visions that occur in sleep are not necessarily false and could even, in some cases, have a divine origin. Dreams must therefore be understood not merely as a moment of separation of soul and body, but also of differentiation of the faculties or parts of the soul themselves, which acquire their own autonomy in dreams and deploy their full power without limiting one another (transl. J. Dudley).

Socrates ́ thought of justice and obedience to laws is moti- vated by a will to avoid the destructive effects of Sophistic criti- cisms and theories of laws. He thus requires–against theories of natural law–an almost absolute obedience to the law, as far as this law respects the legal system of the city. But, against legal positivism, Socrates would not admit that a law is just simply because it is a law: he is looking for the true Just. However, as often in Socratic philosophy, Socrates cannot accept that two equally justified and legitimate rights or moral values conflict.

The main disciples of Socrates criticise the use of city walls. However, their attacks are less grounded in a deep strategic reflexion than related to the traumatic consequences of Pericles’ strategy at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. The Lacedemonians’ opposition to the erection of surrounding walls is more likely linked to their aristo- cratic ideology and interests than to moral imperatives. Though Plato and Xenophon’s motives are to avoid political divisions in the city, their positions on fortifications reveal their aristocratic bias and the question of the walls appears to be part of a more general questioning on the spatial and political organisation of the city. On that issue, Aristotle criticises Plato from a pragmatic point of view and defends the use of walls, but under strict conditions only. The Spartan and Socratic critique of the building of the walls, as well as Aristotle reluctance to fully accept them, could be traced back to a common Greek archaic ideal.

On chercherait en vain dans l’œuvre de Platon des développements explicites sur le silence. Mais le génie littéraire de Platon lui fait une place, et la mise en scène des dialogues, comme les interactions des personnages, mettent en jeu différentes figures du silence par lesquelles se dévoilent d’autres aspects des réflexions socratico-platoniciennes sur le langage. Les silences du philosophe s’opposent, en effet, à ceux de ses interlocuteurs, autant que la pratique philosophique du dialogue aux discours sophistiques. Car le silence véritable n’est pas que l’absence de voix, ni même simplement l’attente d’une parole à venir, mais, en dernière analyse, un retour à la source du logos : la pensée et l’être même.

At the end of the fifth century B.C.E., the character of Odysseus was scorned by most of the Athenians: he illustrated the archetype of the demagogic, unscrupulous and ambitious politicians that had led Athens to its doom. Against this common doxa, the most important disciples of Socrates (Antisthenes, Plato, Xenophon) rehabilitate the hero and admire his temperance and his courage. But it is most surprising to see that, in spite of Odysseus' lies and deceit, these philosophers, who condemn steadfastly the sophists' deceptions, praise his rhetorical ability, his polutropia. The word polutropia is ambiguous: for Antisthenes, it means either "diversity of styles and discourses" or "diversity of dispositions, characters, or souls". It is argued that the same distinction is implicitly at work in Plato's Hippias Minor, where Socrates defends Odysseus' polutropia against the pseudo "simplicity" of Hippias' favourite hero, Achilles. However, whereas Antisthenes tries to clarify these different meanings, Plato's Socrates exploits the ambiguity to confuse his interlocutor. Such a distinction sheds a new light on the Hippias Minor: Odysseus is polutropos in the first (positive) sense, while the sim- plicity of Achilles should be understood as a bad kind of polutropia. It provides an explanation for the first paradoxical thesis of the dialogue which many commentators do not admit as an expression of the true Socratic view, on the ground of its supposed immorality: that he who voluntary deceives is better than he who errs, for falsehood is, in one case, only in words, while in the other, it is falsehood in the soul itself. It is thus proposed that Odysseus' skill in adapting his logos to his hearers was probably a model for Socrates himself. The analogy between the hero and Socrates is especially clear in Plato's dialogues, which show the philosopher in an Odyssey for knowledge.