•  14
    Against Sethi’s response to the Argument from Hallucination
    Philosophical Psychology 37 (4): 782-800. 2024.
    Sethi (2020) attempts to show that even if we keep Price’s intuition: the claim that having an experience as of an F make us aware of an instance of Fness, we can still block the Argument from Hallucination, and so reject the conclusion that we are aware of mind-dependent rather than mind-independent items when we undergo successful perceptions. In an attempt to demonstrate this, she formulates the Argument from Hallucination so that it relies on the principle that if the existence of a neural s…Read more
  •  364
    Against Block on attention and mental paint
    Philosophical Psychology 33 (8): 1121-1140. 2020.
    In two papers, Ned Block has argued that representationalists have trouble with the empirical discovery that differences in the degree of visual attention to an object can lead to a difference in h...
  •  491
    Against Sider on Fundamentality
    Erkenntnis 84 (4): 823-838. 2019.
    Sider’s Writing the Book of the World gives an account of fundamentality in terms of his central ideological notion ‘structure’. Here I first argue against Sider’s claim that to be fundamental to a degree is to be structural to a degree. I argue there’s a pair of properties, P1 and P2, such that P1 is the more fundamental, but Sider is committed to counting P2 as the more structural. I then argue that if relative structure and relative fundamentality can come apart in this way, then Sider is lik…Read more