David Matias Paaske

In recent years, the field of animal ethics has taken a political turn, with scholars arguing that sentient nonhuman animals should be included in the political sphere. This article explores two key challenges arising from this turn towards the political inclusion of animals: the Conflict Problem and the Numbers Problem. The Conflict Problem highlights the difficulty of resolving conflicts between humans and animals, and amongst individual animals, who often have competing interests (such as predators and prey). The Numbers Problem arises because animals vastly outnumber humans: if animals were to be fully included in political decision-making processes, their representatives would form majorities that would likely predominate, potentially to the detriment of human interests. We assess four potential responses to these two problems: (i) discounting animal interests; (ii) revisiting principles of political inclusion; (iii) granting group-differentiated rights; and (iv) adopting a bicameral system. Each response, we argue, involves significant ethical trade-offs. Ultimately, we conclude that proponents of sentientist political equality may need to bite the bullet with respect to the Conflict Problem and Numbers Problem. For those who think otherwise, we claim that the onus is on them to develop more viable solutions.

In this paper, we argue that the All Affected Principle generates a puzzle when applied to carbon tax referendums. According to recent versions of the All Affected Principle, people should have a say in a democratic decision in positive proportion to how much the decision affects them. Plausibly, one way of being affected by a carbon tax referendum is to bear the economic burden of paying the tax. On this metric of affectedness, then, people who pollute a lot are ceteris paribus more affected than people who don’t, because the former stands to pay more in carbon taxes than the latter. Consequently, people who pollute a lot receive large voting power, while people who pollute a little receive little voting power. This is a puzzling distribution of voting power for several reasons. First, it is instrumentally counterproductive if the goal is to rectify damages to the climate. Second, it introduces prudential incentives for everyone to pollute more to gain voting power. Third, the relative difference in voting power between people who pollute a lot and people who don’t is puzzling from a desert-based point of view, since the former often make a serious effort to avoid polluting, while the latter don’t.