David McNaughton

Are evil acts forgivable? This question lies at the intersection of theories about the nature of evil and theories about the nature of forgiveness. Since evil acts seem to be the most plausible candidates for unforgivability, we start with a brief defense of the secular deployment of the idea of evil, and then move to an overview of various theories of evil. After providing an outline of what forgiveness involves, we consider what being unforgivable might actually amount to. Four possible accounts of being unforgivable are canvassed—psychological impossibility, psychological difficulty, lack of reasons for forgiveness, and a moral prohibition on forgiveness—and their implications for the opening question are considered. We conclude that nothing so far considered rules out the moral permissibility of forgiveness for evil acts. Finally, the question of whether forgiveness would enable the evildoer’s slate to be wiped clean at last is briefly considered.

Jonathan Dancy is renowned both for his moral particularism and his reasons holism. In certain formulations the two positions are closely related, if not identical. We focus on holism, as extended to practical reasons generally. According to this view any feature might count as a practical reason; and (almost) any feature that can count as a reason in favour of (or against) some action might be practically irrelevant, or even count against (for), such action in other circumstances. This, however, would hardly be radical if we could specify the circumstances under which features count in these ways. The radical holist, however, claims that we cannot codify matters in this way. But doesn’t this leave the practical landscape implausibly lacking in structure? We canvas two remedies. First, perhaps holism is limited in scope. Second, perhaps practical reason can be structured by reference to value and benefits.

This book introduces the reader to ethics by examining a current and important debate. During the last fifty years the orthodox position in ethics has been a broadly non-cognitivist one: since there are no moral facts, moral remarks are best understood, not as attempting to describe the world, but as having some other function - such as expressing the attitudes or preferences of the speaker. In recent years this position has been increasingly challenged by moral realists who maintain that there are moral facts; there is a truth of the matter in ethics, which is independent of our views, and which we seek to discover. Unfortunately much of this interesting debate found in the work of McDowell, Wiggins, Putnam, Blackburn and others is not easily accessible to undergraduates. McNaughton presents many of the major issues in ethics by way of a clear exposition of both sides of this argument and assumes no prior knowledge of philosophy. Topics discussed include: moral observation, moral motivation, amoralism and wickedness, moral weakness, cultural relativism and utilitarianism. The book concludes that a convincing case can be made out for a radical form of moral realism in which moral virtue is found, not in the following of correct moral principles, but rather in the development of moral sensitivity. _Moral Vision_ is a clear and engaged introduction to an important, and often troubling, debate.

This paper comprises three sections. First, we offer a traditional defence of deontology, in the manner of, for example, W.D. Ross (1965). The leading idea of such a defence is that the right is independent of the good. Second, we modify the now standard account of the distinction, in terms of the agent‐relative/agent‐neutral divide, between deontology and consequentialism. (This modification is necessary if indirect consequentialism is to count as a form of consequentialism.) Third, we challenge a value‐based defence of deontology proposed by Quinn (1993), Kamm (1989, 1992), and Nagel (1995).

Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism Translated by Julia Annas & Jonathan Barnes Cambridge University Press 1994 ISBN‐0–521–30950–6 Hardback (£32.50) ISBN 0–521–31205‐X Paperback (£10.95) Republicanism, Liberty and Commercial Society 1649–1776 David Wootton (ed) Stanford University Press, 1994 viii, 497 pp. £35 ISBN 0804723567 John Marshall: John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility Cambridge University Press, 1994 Pp. xxi + 485. ISBN 0–521–44380–6 (hardback) £55 0–521–44687–3 (paperback) £22.95 Ian Harris: The Mind of John Locke: A Study of Political Theory in its Intellectual Setting Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 Pp. xv + 429. ISBN 0–521–35603–2 Lawrence E. Klein: Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness Cambridge University Press, xii, 217 pp. £30 Cahiers Montesquieu: Lectures de Montesquieu, Actes du Colloque de Wolfenbuttel (26–28 Octobre 1989) réunis par Edgar Mass et Alberto Postigliola Liguori Editore, Napoli; Universitas, Paris; Voltaire Foundation, Oxford, 1993. ISBN 0–7294–0462–5. £18.00 George Armstrong Kelly: The Humane Comedy: Constant, Tocqueville, and French Liberalism with a foreword by Stephen R. Graubard, Cambridge University Press, 1992. ISBN 0–521–41227–7. £35.00 Christopher J. Berry: The Idea of Luxury. A Conceptual and Historical Investigation Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 xiv + 271 pp., 0–521–466911 pbk Sarah Gibbons: Kant's Theory of Imagination. Bridging Gaps in Judgement and Experience Oxford Philosophical Monographs. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1994 pp. 205 plus x. £27.50 Andrew Brook: Kant and the Mind Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994. pp. 327 plus xii. £35.00 The Correspondence of John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte trans. and ed. by Oscar A. Haac New Brunswick (USA) and London: Transaction Publishers, 1995 pp. xxvi + 403. £31.95 ISBN 1–56000–148–8 Alan P. F. Sell: Philosophical Idealism and Christian Belief University of Wales Press, 1995 ISBN 0–7083–1310–8. 338 pp. £35.00 Agnosticism: Contemporary Responses to Spencer and Huxley Ed. Andrew Pyle Thoemmes Press, Bristol, 1995 (Key Issues 4), pp. xxvi + 301 ISBN (paper) 1–85506–404–9 £14.95, (cloth) 1–85506–405–7 £45.00.

Forgiveness usually gets a very good press in our culture: we are deluged with self-help books and television shows all delivering the same message, that forgiveness is good for everyone, and is always the right thing to do. But those who have suffered seriously at the hands of others often and rightly feel that this boosterism about forgiveness is glib and facile. Perhaps forgiveness is not always desirable, especially where the wrongdoing is terrible or the wrongdoer unrepentant. In this book, Garrard and McNaughton suggest that the whole debate suffers from a crippling lack of clarity about what forgiveness really amounts to. They argue that it is more difficult, complex and troubling than many of its advocates suppose. Nevertheless, they conclude, a proper understanding of forgiveness allows us to avoid cheap and shallow forms of it, and enables us to see why it is right and admirable to forgive even unrepentant wrongdoers.

Why is so much philosophy so tedious? Not, or not simply, because it is technical and complex, but because—too often—it displays mere cleverness. Implausible theories are defended against objections by ever more sophisticated technical fiddling with the details. Originality and creativity are in short supply. I argue that this is bad for philosophy, bad for philosophers, and almost inevitable given various structural features of the profession which require early and prolific publication. As a profession we are autonomous—we could change our structures if we chose.

This chapter proposes a novel form of deontology that, while it contrasts with consequentialism in defending duties of special relationship and options, is allied with consequentialism in denying that there are moral constraints. It devotes considerable attention to distinguishing between various consequentialist doctrines, and the distinction between them and deontology. The distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality plays a crucial role here. It also discusses and rejects contractualism. The same applies to particularism in its most radical form: despite the sympathy for the particularist’s skepticism concerning strict moral principles, it is argued that there are principles of a weaker, Rossian form.

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McNaughton and Rawling's anti-reductionist intentions are to be welcomed, but are not well served by their continuing adherence to a neo-Humean notion of the 'descriptive'. Their too-willing acceptance of this notion is reflected in a denial of appropriate dialectical weight to considerations about the way 'pattern' disappears from the domain of value when we try to characterize the constituent features of the latter in non-evaluative terms. The need for a satisfactory account of the immanence of value in nature is real enough, but such an account can be given without recourse to the problematic idea of a class of subvenient 'descriptive' properties. Likewise, McNaughton and Rawling's recognition of 'normative facts' is to be endorsed, but such facts are a more widespread and everyday phenomenon than they would have us think

Guy Fletcher has written an excellent and much needed book about prudence—lucid, thoughtful, and, to my mind, persuasive. He is well acquainted with all the contemporary literature on his topic, and his treatment of the contributions of others is fair, sympathetic, and helpful. While the discussion becomes increasingly subtle and complex, Fletcher remains admirably clear throughout. Signposts and reminders help the reader, as do outlines and summaries. He follows the excellent ‘rule of three’ as taught (I am informed) to prospective preachers: first you tell them what you are going to tell them; then you tell them; and then you tell them what you have just told them. In all these respects, this book is exemplary.His topic is the nature of prudential discourse, i.e., thought and talk about what benefits or harms someone, and about what someone prudentially ought to do, has reason to do, needs to do, etc. While much has been written about what makes one's life go well, or whether ‘morality and self-interest can be reconciled’, little, he claims, has been written about these meta-prudential questions, and it is this omission he seeks to rectify (p. 1). But is this project, Fletcher asks, really necessary? After all, isn’t it obvious that prudential discourse is normative in the way that moral discourse is? And since philosophers have written extensively about meta-normative issues, the matter has already been more than adequately discussed. Fletcher's response is that while many philosophers think that the answer to the question whether prudential discourse is normative is obvious; unfortunately, they do not agree about what the obvious answer is.

Simon Blackburn can be seen as challenging those committed to sui generis moral facts to explain the supervenience of the moral on the descriptive. We (like perhaps Derek Parfit) hold that normative facts in general are sui generis. We also hold that the normative supervenes on the descriptive, and we here endeavour to answer the generalization of Blackburn's challenge. In the course of pursuing this answer, we suggest that Frank Jackson's descriptivism rests on a conception of properties inappropriate to discussions of normativity, and we see reason to reject descriptivism generally. We also discuss the views of David Brink, Jonathan Dancy and Bernard Williams in this area.

Iris Murdoch has long been known as one of the most deeply insightful and morally passionate novelists of our time. This attention has often eclipsed Murdoch's sophisticated and influential work as a philosopher, which has had a wide-ranging impact on thinkers in moral philosophy as well as religious ethics and political theory. Yet it has never been the subject of a book-length study in its own right. Picturing the Human seeks to fill this gap. In this groundbreaking book, author Maria Antonaccio presents the first systematic and comprehensive treatment of Murdoch's moral philosophy. Unlike literary critical studies of her novels, it offers a general philosophical framework for assessing Murdoch's thought as a whole. Antonaccio also suggests a new interpretive method for reading Murdoch's philosophy and outlines the significance of her thought in the context of current debates in ethics. This vital study will appeal to those interested in moral philosophy, religious ethics, and literary criticism, and grants those who have long loved Murdoch's novels a closer look at her remarkable philosophy