David Miller

Political theory promises guidance about how we ought to organize our political lives. For example, how do we fairly share resources in contexts of scarcity? What are the proper limits to democratic authority? Who should bear the costs of tackling climate change? These topics - the subject matter of normative inquiry in political theory - are commonly also the focus of social scientific research that explains and describes the political world. This raises challenging questions about the place of empirical evidence in political theory. Should theories of distributive justice reflect popular beliefs about fairness? Does evidence about what happens in real world deliberations disrupt deliberative democratic theory? If political theorists should take empirical evidence seriously, what kinds of data should they be most interested in? How deeply does this evidence enter into normative inquiry, and what are the challenges involved in bringing it to bear? This volume brings together scholars working at the intersection of political theory and social science to address these questions. It combines detailed discussion of examples of interdisciplinary research with a wider reflection on the normative significance of empirical evidence. In Part One, contributors explore the role of different forms of social scientific inquiry, including ethnography, qualitative interviewing, and survey research. Part Two shows how work on specific topics in contemporary political theory either has been or should be informed by empirical evidence. By presenting diverse models of data-sensitive political theory, the authors aim to generate new insights into why, and how, empirical evidence matters to normative thinking about politics.

It is a simple, though ancient, mistake in the theory of knowledge to think that justification, in any degree, is central to rationality, or even important to it. We must cut forever the intellectual apron strings that continue to offer us spurious and unneeded security, and replace the insoluble problem of what our theories are based on by the soluble problem of how to expose their shortcomings. The paper will outline the critical rationalism of K. Popper, taking account of some recent criticism. A brief discussion of the status of the laws of logic provides an illustration of the power of the critical approach.Key words RATIONALITY, POPPER, LOGIC

This book was written with three aims in mind. The first was to provide a reasonably concise account of Hume's social and political thought that might help students coming to it for the first time. The second aim was to say something about the relationship between philosophy and politics, with explicit attention to Hume, but implicit reference to a general issue. The third is to offer an integrated account of Hume's thought. The book accounts for the varying interpretation of the conservative and liberalist traditions by arguing that the distinction between liberalism and conservatism had little application in mid-18th-century Britain. Hume's ideology contained elements that we should now identify as ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ respectively, and so by selective emphasis it is possible to make him seem a thoroughbred conservative or liberal according to choice. These two problems – the relationship between Hume's philosophy and his politics, and the ideological character of his thought – are pursued through the first and second parts of the book respectively.

The essays in this book by a group of leading political theorists assess and develop the central ideas of Michael Walzer's path-breaking Spheres of Justice. Is social justice a radically plural notion, with its principles determined by the different social goods that men and women allocate to one another? Is it possible to prevent the unequal distribution of money and power from distorting the allocation of other goods? If different goods are distributed by different mechanisms, what (if any) kind of social equality is possible? Are there universal principles of justice which apply regardless of context? These and other related questions are pursued in depth by the contributors. The book concludes with an important new essay by Walzer in which he reflects on the positions taken in his original book in the light of the critical appraisals presented here.

Karl Popper’s Objective Knowledge stands at the threshold of his last major philosophical phase, the period from his retirement from the London School of Economics in 1969 until his death in 1994. The two great books that he wrote before he came to London, Logik der Forschung and The Open Society and Its Enemies, contain much more than the innovations in the theory of scientific method and the theory of democracy for which they are famous. Logik der Forschung, translated into English as The Logic of Scientific Discovery, is by no means just a tract, even a revolutionary one, on the methods of science, since about one third of the text is devoted to searchingly original treatments of the frequency theory of probability and of the interpretation of quantum mechanics, whilst the unpublished manuscript on which the book was based, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie, at whose content it often hints, presents a wealth of significant material on the psychology of human learning and its biological context. Popper had, after all, been a student of Karl B¨uhler, and had absorbed the theories of problem solving developed within the W¨urzburg School. The Open Society and Its Enemies, for its part, is not so much a book defending democratic liberalism as a defence of democratic liberalism nestling within a book that discusses every other topic under the sun. It offers profound and provocative studies of the thought of Plato and Marx, an abundance of scholarly, if often controversial, historical interpretations of the work of Heraclitus, Aristotle, Hegel, J. S. Mill, Wittgenstein, Mannheim, and others, the elements of a new theory of rationality, and many elucidations of the workings of science that go beyond what is explicit in Logik der Forschung. One insight worth mentioning, since it is little known, is the clear recognition in section II of Chapter 11 that most important advances in science are revolutionary, not cumulative; a commonplace today perhaps, but one that many philosophers attribute to Kuhn. Another insight, also often forgotten, is the emphasis in Chapter 23 on the social character of science, which acts as the main custodian of its claim to objectivity.

Contesting the common opinion that, unlike the problem of induction, the problem of demarcation is of little significance, the paper maintains that Popper’s criterion of falsifiability gives an irresistible answer to the question of what can be learnt from an empirical investigation. Everything follows from the rejection of inductive logic, together with the recognition that, before it can be empirically investigated, a hypothesis has to be formulated and accepted. Scientific hypotheses emerge neither a posteriori, as inductivists hold, nor from some immaculate a priori source, but from sheer guesswork. Empiricists who reject apriorism have therefore enlisted too zealously in the unphilosophical ranks of epistemological naturalism. The paper concludes with a summary of Popper’s objectivism, and with brief responses to some fashionable arguments that objective truth is not an attainable objective.

Ultra-high isotropic resolution imaging of retinal structures was made possible with an adaptive optics system using dual deformable mirrors and a Fourier-domain optical coherence tomography system with correction for longitudinal chromatic aberration. This system was used to image microscopic retinal structures of healthy as well as diseased retinas in vivo. The improved resolution and contrast enhanced visualization of morphological structures in the retina can be clearly seen. The benefits of this instrument are apparent from comparison of new images with those acquired using a previous generation AO-OCT instrument. Big change in the appearance of speckle field can be observed as well. Additionally, further improvements in volumetric data acquisition and image representation will be discussed. This includes creation of large Field of View AO-OCT volume from multiple sub-volumes and its visualization. Also techniques and results of reducing speckle contrast by averaging multiple B-scans will be presented.

The liberal conception of the state is marked by an insistence upon the equal civil and political rights of each inhabitant. Recently, though, a number of writers have argued that this emphasis on uniform rights ignores the fact that the populations of most states are culturally diverse, and that their inhabitants have significant interests qua members of particular cultures. They argue that liberals should recognize special, group-based cultural rights as a necessary part of a theory of justice in multicultural societies. In this thesis I examine the idea of special cultural rights. In the first part, I begin by setting out some of the different conceptions of culture and multiculturalism that are involved in the debate over cultural rights. I then discuss three claims made by supporters of special cultural rights: that having culture is an essential part of individual autonomy; that people have morally significant interests qua members of particular cultures; and that these interests are inadequately protected by existing liberal conceptions of human rights. Although I conclude that is correct, I argue that both and are mistaken. Among other things, I suggest that the version of culture relied upon by supporters of special cultural rights is an implausible one and I outline what I take to be a more plausible, cosmopolitan conception of culture. In the second part, I begin by looking at specific instances of cultural rights-claims, and analyzing the concept of cultural rights qua rights. I consider the practical and conceptual difficulties with special cultural rights at great length. But the core of my thesis is that our interest in culture lies in its contribution of worthwhile goals and options, and that this interest lies in culture generally rather than in particular cultures. Hence, adopting a special or group-based distribution of any right to culture would seem to be inconsistent with liberal egalitarian principles. If there are such things as cultural rights, I argue, they are general rather than special rights. I conclude by offering a very preliminary account of what a cosmopolitan conception of cultural rights might involve in the case of the right to free association and language rights.

Kant is invariably read by his followers as antipathetic to all forms of nationalism. Yet he was interested in differences of national character and used an organic metaphor to explain why states should not be broken up or annexed (unfortunately he never commented explicitly on the dismemberment of Poland by Prussia and its allies). He favoured a plural world in which national differences of language and religion prevented the emergence of despotic world government. So his acknowledgement of a limited obligation to provide refuge to vulnerable people should not be amplified into an acceptance of culturally disruptive mass migration.

1. Despite the plain fact that there is nothing in this world that can be proved without reliance on some assumption or another, there is an inalienable difference between an argument that begins by assuming what it is designed to establish and one that begins by assuming the contradictory of what it is designed to establish. Arguments of the first kind are uncontroversially acknowledged to be circular, or question-begging; though valid they achieve nothing. Those of the second kind conform to the classical pattern of reductio ad absurdum or indirect proof. A typical example is the proof of the irrationality of √2, which begins by assuming that for some integral m, n the identity m2/n2 = 2, and arrives at a contradiction. Nothing whatever is established or justified by arguments of the first kind, even granted the truth of all the other assumptions, and the validity of the rules of inference; while the second may establish that, if those assumptions are true, then the additional assumption is false.