David Mitchell

Recently, the term ‘aphantasia’ has become current in scientific and public discourse to denote the absence of mental imagery. However, new terms for aphantasia or its subgroups have recently been proposed, e.g. ‘dysikonesia’ or ‘anauralia’, which complicates the literature, research communication and understanding for the general public. Before further terms emerge, we advocate the consistent use of the term ‘aphantasia’ as it can be used flexibly and precisely, and is already widely known in the scientific community and among the general public.

Near the beginning of the last chapter of Life's Dominion, Ronald Dworkin expounds the following problem. Margo has Alzheimer's disease. She suffers from ‘serious and permanent dementia’. It transpires that some years ago, at a time when she was mentally fully competent, Margo executed an advance directive. In this formal document she expressed her wishes concerning what should happen to her if she were to develop Alzheimer's. Should those wishes now be acceded to? For instance, suppose that in her document Margo directed that she should not receive treatment for any life-threatening illness she might contract. Should a doctor therefore now refrain from such treatment? What if, more than this, Margo indicated in her will that after the definitive onset of Alzheimer's ‘she should be killed as soon and as painlessly as possible’? Could it possibly be right to grant that request?

The literature on ‘institutional corruption’ has paradoxically missed what seems a central application of this expression, its application to institutions that are corrupt. In this article, I defend a view of what it is for an institution to be corrupt, in terms of the motivation of the institution’s rules. If an individual office-holder or role-occupant is corrupt when their actions are improperly motivated by private gain, then an institution is corrupt when the same can be said of its rules: the institution’s rules are improperly motivated by private gain. Or if we should prefer a narrower account of corrupt conduct by individuals, as necessarily involving transactions with third parties, a correspondingly narrower account of an institution’s corruptness can also be given. Under either of these versions of my view, an institution’s being corrupt is to be distinguished from something else that might be called ‘institutional corruption’, namely the corruption of institutions, in the sense of their being degraded or undermined. I argue that some of the literature’s best-known accounts of ‘institutional corruption’ are best interpreted as being about the degrading of institutions, rather than about what it is for an institution to be corrupt.