•  145
    We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. David Owens focuses on the arg…Read more
  •  25
    A Simple Theory of Promising
    Philosophical Review 115 (1): 51-77. 2006.
  •  123
    The possibility of consent
    Ratio 24 (4): 402-421. 2011.
    Worries about the possibility of consent recall a more familiar problem about promising raised by Hume. To see the parallel here we must distinguish the power of consent from the normative significance of choice. I'll argue that we have normative interests, interests in being able to control the rights and obligations of ourselves and those around us, interests distinct from our interest in controlling the non-normative situation. Choice gets its normative significance from our non-normative con…Read more
  •  104
    Knowing your own mind
    Dialogue 42 (4): 791-798. 2003.
    What is it to “know your own mind”? In ordinary English, this phrase connotes clear headed decisiveness and a firm resolve but in the language of contemporary philosophy, the indecisive and the susceptible can know their own minds just as well as anybody else. In the philosopher’s usage, “knowing your own mind” is just a matter of being able to produce a knowledgeable description of your mental state, whether it be a state of indecision, susceptibility or even confusion. What exercises philosoph…Read more
  •  208
    Testimony and Assertion
    Philosophical Studies 130 (1): 105-129. 2006.
    Two models of assertion are described and their epistemological implications considered. The assurance model draws a parallel between the ethical norms surrounding promising and the epistemic norms which facilitate the transmission of testimonial knowledge. This model is rejected in favour of the view that assertion transmits knowledge by expressing belief. I go on to compare the epistemology of testimony with the epistemology of memory.
  •  88
    Williamson on Scepticism and Rationality
    Philosophical Books 45 (4): 306-312. 2004.
    We are often in no position to know whether p is true but, it is widely held, where we do know that p, we are always in a position to know that we know that p: knowledge is luminous. In Chapter 4 of Knowledge and Its Limits Williamson argues that knowledge is not luminous and with this conclusion in hand he hopes to see off the sceptic, amongst other things.
  •  113
    Deliberation and the first person
    In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 261-277. 2008.
    Philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. I agree that we have this sort of control over our actions and that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness. Bu…Read more
  •  16
    Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 93-142. 2000.
    [Brian P. McLaughlin] In recent years, some philosophers have claimed that we can know a priori that certain external world skeptical hypotheses are false on the basis of a priori knowledge that we are in certain kinds of mental states, and a priori knowledge that those mental states are individuated by contingent environmental factors. Appealing to a distinction between weak and strong a priority, I argue that weakly a priori arguments of this sort would beg the question of whether the skeptica…Read more
  •  99
    Rationalism about Obligation
    European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3): 403-431. 2008.
    In our thinking about what to do, we consider reasons which count for or against various courses of action. That having a glass of wine with dinner would be pleasant and make me sociable recommends the wine. That it will disturb my sleep and inhibit this evening’s work counts against it. I determine what I ought to do by weighing these considerations and deciding what would be best all things considered. A practical reason makes sense of a course of action by recommending it, by highlighting som…Read more
  •  13
    Normativity and Control
    Oxford University Press. 2017.
    Do we control what we believe? Are we responsible for what we believe? In a series of ten essays David Owens explores various different forms of control we might have over belief, and the different forms of responsibility these forms of control generate.
  •  32
    Should Blackmail Be Banned?
    Philosophy 63 (246): 501-514. 1988.
    There is no right to blackmail. So says the law and so say most moral observers. A few libertarian voices have been raised in defence of blackmail but such a defence is liable to be treated as a reductio of the defender's own free market philosophy. However, it is surprisingly difficult to say just what is wrong with blackmail.
  •  7
    Bound by convention: obligation and social rules
    Oxford University Press. 2022.
    How should we assess the social structures that govern human conduct and settle whether we are bound by their rules? One approach is to ask whether those social arrangements reflect pre-conventional facts about our nature. If they do, compliance will serve our interests because these rules are not just conventions. Another approach is to ask whether following a convention has desirable consequences. For example, the rule which makes the dollar bill legal tender is a convention and the great usef…Read more
  •  16
    Descartes's Use of Doubt
    In Janet Broughton & John Carriero (eds.), A Companion to Descartes, Blackwell. 2007.
    This chapter contains section titled: The Role of Reflection The Need for Certainty Descartes's Conjectures Descartes's Suppositions Note References and Further Reading.
  •  212
    Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (74): 93-142. 2000.
    In recent years, some philosophers have claimed that we can know a priori that certain external world skeptical hypotheses are false on the basis of a priori knowledge that we are in certain kinds of mental states, and a priori knowledge that those mental states are individuated by contingent environmental factors. Appealing to a distinction between weak and strong a priority, I argue that weakly a priori arguments of this sort would beg the question of whether the skeptical hypothesis under ass…Read more
  •  366
    Does belief have an aim?
    Philosophical Studies 115 (3): 283-305. 2003.
    The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs.
  •  37
    II—David Owens: The Value of Duty
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1): 199-215. 2012.
    The obligations we owe to those with whom we share a valuable relationship (like friendship) cannot be reduced to the obligations we owe to others simply as fellow persons (e.g. the duty to reciprocate benefits received). Wallace suggests that this is because such valuable relationships are loving relationships. I instead propose that it is because, unlike general moral obligations, such valuable relationships (and their constitutive obligations) serve our normative interests. Part of what makes…Read more
  •  98
    Shaping the Normative Landscape
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    Shaping the Normative Landscape is an investigation of the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. David Owens shows that these are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative environment
  •  459
    Epistemic Akrasia
    The Monist 85 (3): 381-397. 2002.
    One way of discerning what sort of control we have over our mental lives is to look at cases where that control is not exercised. This is one reason why philosophers have taken an interest in the phenomenon of akrasia, in an agent's ability to do, freely and deliberately, something that they judge they ought not to do. Akrasia constitutes a failure of control but not an absence of control. The akratic agent is not a compulsive; an akratic agent has the ability to control their action, to make it…Read more
  •  82
    Intellectual Trust in One's Self and Others
    Mind 112 (447): 536-539. 2003.
  •  44
    Freedom and practical judgement
    In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions, Oxford University Press. pp. 122-137. 2009.
    Unlike many other animals, human beings enjoy freedom of action. They are capable of acting freely because they have certain psychological capacities which other animals lack. In this paper, I argue that the crucial capacity here is our ability to make practical judgements; to make judgements about what we ought to do. A number of other writers share this view but they treat practical judgement as a form of belief. Since, as I argue, we don't control our beliefs, that undermines this model of hu…Read more
  •  7
    Intellectual Trust In Ones Self And Others
    Mind 112 (447): 536-539. 2003.
  •  46
    Habitual agency
    Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2): 93-108. 2017.
    It is often maintained that practical freedom is a capacity to act on our view of what we ought to do and in particular on our view of what it would be best to do. Here, I discuss an important exception to that claim, namely habitual agency. Acting out of habit is widely regarded as a form of reflex or even as compulsive behaviour but much habitual agency is both intentional and free. Still it is true that, in so far as we act out of habit, we have no capacity to determine what we do by making a…Read more
  •  57
    Wrong by Convention
    Ethics 127 (3): 553-575. 2017.
    Some acts (mala in se) are wrong prior to any social prohibition (e.g., murder). Other acts (mala prohibita) are wrong only once socially prohibited (e.g., traffic violations). This article considers certain obligations of care that parents owe to their children and children to their parents. Violations of these familial obligations are like paradigm mala prohibita in that they are wrongs created by social convention. But, it is argued, they are unlike paradigm mala prohibita in that their prohi…Read more
  •  232
    Promising without Intending
    Journal of Philosophy 105 (12): 737-755. 2008.
    It is widely held that one who sincerely promises to do something must at least intend to do that thing: a promise communicates the intention to perform. In this paper, I argue that a promise need only communicate the intention to undertake an obligation to perform. I consider examples of sincere promisors who have no intention of performing. I argue that this fits well with what we want to say about other performatives - giving, commanding etc. Furthermore, it supports a theory of promissory ob…Read more
  •  72
    The right and the reasonable (review)
    Mind 114 (454): 371-389. 2005.
  •  87
    The Value of Duty
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1): 199-215. 2012.
    The obligations we owe to those with whom we share a valuable relationship (like friendship) cannot be reduced to the obligations we owe to others simply as fellow persons (e.g. the duty to reciprocate benefits received). Wallace suggests that this is because such valuable relationships are loving relationships. I instead propose that it is because, unlike general moral obligations, such valuable relationships (and their constitutive obligations) serve our normative interests. Part of what makes…Read more
  •  213
    A simple theory of promising
    Philosophical Review 115 (1): 51-77. 2006.
    Why do human beings make and accept promises? What human interest is served by this procedure? Many hold that promising serves what I shall call an information interest, an interest in information about what will happen. And they hold that human beings ought to keep their promises because breaches of promise threaten this interest. On this view human beings take promises seriously because we want correct information about how other human beings are going to act. Some such view is taken for grant…Read more
  •  94
    The problem with promising
    In H. Sheinman (ed.), Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays, . pp. 58-79. 2011.
    Why have philosophers since Hume regarded promising as problematic? I distinguish two problems raised by Hume. The problem of the bare wrong is the problem of how it can make sense to avoid a wrong when the wrong does not affect any intelligible human interest. The problem of normative power is the problem of how something can be a wrong simply because it has been declared to be a wrong. I argue that the problem of the bare wrong is more basic. I then examine the attempts of practice theorists l…Read more