David Palme

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and the branch of social philosophy known as critical theory share two features: they criticize philosophy extensively, and their critique is ‘negative’. Negative critique does not set positive, external standards against which the criticized object would have to measure itself. Instead, it highlights how the shortcomings discovered by such critique are themselves necessarily linked to our concepts. Such negativism is often claimed as Hegelian, although it would be more accurately ascribed to Karl Marx and Theodor W. Adorno. Contrary to the standard reading, Adorno and Wittgenstein share a great deal in common in their critique of philosophy. Through an interpretation of PI 1953: § 125, this chapter argues that critical theory could make fruitful use of Wittgenstein’s ideas.

Why should we act morally? This question regarding justification has like no other occupied moral philosophy since the Second World War. Eventually, a perspective has prevailed that has abandoned traditional models of justification in favour of ethical pluralism and moral progress. Since there should no longer be any external reasons, only that which can be thought without contradiction can be considered generally binding. But what does contradiction mean here? This study brings Wittgenstein's philosophy of language into constellation with critical theory in order to show that modern moral philosophy must fail because of its claim. The starting point is Wittgenstein's private language argument and in particular §125 of the Philosophical Investigations, in which he describes contradiction as the central philosophical problem of bourgeois society. It becomes clear that neither freedom from contradiction nor moral justification precede social practice. On the contrary, the supposed rationality of modern moral philosophy reflects the contradictions of our society. The task of philosophy is therefore not to resolve these contradictions, but to expose them through critical linguistic analysis. By bringing Wittgenstein into dialogue with Marx, Adorno and Horkheimer, a new approach to moral philosophy emerges - a critique that is both linguistic and social.

What ideas of morality and ethics existed under National Socialism? This annotated volume of sources presents for the first time a biographically contextualized selection of texts by academic moral philosophers who distinguished themselves particularly during the "Third Reich". The examination of their ideologues helps to better understand the connection between normative self-understanding and the crimes of National Socialism. In addition, the book enables a differentiated view of the development of moral philosophy after 1945.

The crimes committed by Germans under National Socialism would not have been possible without the existence of a web of shared ethical convictions. "Thick" terms such as "work", "people" or "community" are the nodal points of this intellectual construct. The contributions in this volume are not only concerned with the historical presentation of National Socialist normativity. Rather, they also make suggestions for the analysis of these concepts. An essential part of this effort is the examination of ethics of National Socialist-oriented philosophers.