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David Papineau

King's College London
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    265
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    42
  •  News and Updates
    70
  •  Philosophical Views

 More details
  • King's College London
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
General Philosophy of Science
Science, Logic, and Mathematics
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
General Philosophy of Science
  • All publications (265)
  •  2
    Naturalism
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2020.
    Naturalism, Misc
  •  69
    Scientific Realism
    with Mikael Karlsson, Andre Kukla, Jarrett Leplin, Stathis Psillos, and Howard Sankey
    In Patrick Greenough & Michael Patrick Lynch (eds.), Truth and realism, Oxford University Press. pp. 35-54. 2006.
    Arguments For and Against Scientific Realism
  •  9
    The Nature and Value of Sport
    In Thomas Hurka (ed.), Games, Sports, and Play: Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 122-134. 2019.
    Suits is good on games, but bad on sports. Because he views sports as games, he has trouble accommodating the many sports that aren’t really games at all, like running, swimming, and rowing. More importantly, he mistakes the value of sport, suggesting that it derives from the challenges posed by the arbitrary rules that constitute games, when in truth it lies in the development and exercise of physical abilities. This paper argues that sport includes any activity whose central purpose is the exe…Read more
    Suits is good on games, but bad on sports. Because he views sports as games, he has trouble accommodating the many sports that aren’t really games at all, like running, swimming, and rowing. More importantly, he mistakes the value of sport, suggesting that it derives from the challenges posed by the arbitrary rules that constitute games, when in truth it lies in the development and exercise of physical abilities. This paper argues that sport includes any activity whose central purpose is the exercise of physical skills, whether or not it is also a game, and that the value of sport derives from the intrinsic worth of such exercises.
  •  4
    The Foundations of Narrative
    In Julian Dodd (ed.), Art, Mind, and Narrative: Themes From the Work of Peter Goldie, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 61-79. 2016.
    This chapter aims to show how the distinctive features of narrative are upshots of the more basic human practice of _constructing histories_, in the sense of forming representations that locate past events not only geographically, but also by their temporal locations. The chapter first compares this special human ability with some cognitive abilities also present in non-human animals and infants, and then assesses a number of standard ideas about human memory against this background. After that,…Read more
    This chapter aims to show how the distinctive features of narrative are upshots of the more basic human practice of _constructing histories_, in the sense of forming representations that locate past events not only geographically, but also by their temporal locations. The chapter first compares this special human ability with some cognitive abilities also present in non-human animals and infants, and then assesses a number of standard ideas about human memory against this background. After that, the chapter reveals how many features of narrative emerge straight from the construction of histories. This analysis is intended to complement Peter Goldie’s discussion of narrative and its importance for human life in _The Mess Inside_. We will be better placed to understand the significance of Goldie’s points about narrative once we see how they are corollaries of certain more basic features of human thinking.
  •  5
    The Baldwin Effect and Genetic Assimilatio n
    In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), Innate Mind: Volume 2: Culture and Cognition, Oup Usa. pp. 102-111. 2007.
    Paul Griffiths — the author of Chapter 6 in this book — argues that the process coined “genetic assimilation” has little connection with the issue C. H. Waddington had in mind when he invented the term. This chapter's response is that Griffiths is running two things together, genetic canalization and genetic assimilation. What he says would make sense if related to an earlier paper by, David Papineau, the author of this chapter. Previously David Papineau had been concerned only with Waddington's…Read more
    Paul Griffiths — the author of Chapter 6 in this book — argues that the process coined “genetic assimilation” has little connection with the issue C. H. Waddington had in mind when he invented the term. This chapter's response is that Griffiths is running two things together, genetic canalization and genetic assimilation. What he says would make sense if related to an earlier paper by, David Papineau, the author of this chapter. Previously David Papineau had been concerned only with Waddington's notion of genetic canalization, but Waddington's thoughts about the Baldwin Effect involve the more specific idea of genetic assimilation, and it was these thoughts that David Papineau addressed in that paper. Given this, Griffith's criticisms miss their mark.
  •  4
    A Fair Deal for E verettians
    In Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent & David Wallace (eds.), Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory & Reality, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 206-226. 2010.
    Those who criticize the Everett interpretation on the grounds that it makes no sense of probability apply a double-standard, for no other physical theory of probability does any better in explaining probability or in deriving its link with decision theory. In fact, others do worse, for in any one world theory it is a mystery as to why, given that only a single outcome of a chance process occurs, we should nevertheless act so as to maximize expected utilities, which involves all possible outcomes…Read more
    Those who criticize the Everett interpretation on the grounds that it makes no sense of probability apply a double-standard, for no other physical theory of probability does any better in explaining probability or in deriving its link with decision theory. In fact, others do worse, for in any one world theory it is a mystery as to why, given that only a single outcome of a chance process occurs, we should nevertheless act so as to maximize expected utilities, which involves all possible outcomes of a chance process. This difficulty does not apply to the Everett interpretation, in which all outcomes happen.
  •  6
    Seven Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts
    In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 111-144. 2006.
    This chapter focuses on the topic of phenomenal concepts. It develops and extends the comparison of phenomenal concepts with so-called “perceptual concepts,” to throw the nature of phenomenal concepts into clearer focus. A position against a recent argument by David Chalmers against the whole type-B strategy of defending physicalism by appeal to phenomenal concepts is defended.
  • A Scandal of Probability Theory
    In Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent & David Wallace (eds.), Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory & Reality, Oxford University Press Uk. 2010.
  • Phenomenal and Perceptual Conepts
    with King'S. College
    In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. 2006.
  • Explanatory gaps and dualist intuitions
    In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of consciousness, Oxford University Press. 2008.
  • Naturalist Theories of Meaning
    In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2008.
  • Naturalist Theories of Meaning
    In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2005.
  • Theories of Consciousness
    In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
  • Theories of Consciousness
    In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
  • The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism
    In Ansgar Beckermann, Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  • David Lewis and Schrödinger's Cat
    In Frank Jackson & Graham Priest (eds.), Lewisian Themes, Oxford University Press Uk. 2004.
  • Teleosemantics: The Programme, Prospects, and Problems
    with Graham Macdonald
    In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philo-sophical Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2006.
  • Teleosemantics: The Programme, Prospects, and Problems
    with Graham Macdonald
    In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philo-sophical Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2006.
  •  229
    Illusionism and a Posteriori Physicalism: No Fact of the Matter
    with Christopher Brown
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (7): 7-27. 2024.
    Illusionists and a posteriori physicalists agree entirely on the metaphysical nature of reality — that all concrete entities are composed of fundamental physical entities. Despite this basic agreement on metaphysics, illusionists hold that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, whereas a posteriori physicalists hold that it does. One explanation for this disagreement would be that either the illusionists have too demanding a view about what consciousness requires, or the a posteriori physicali…Read more
    Illusionists and a posteriori physicalists agree entirely on the metaphysical nature of reality — that all concrete entities are composed of fundamental physical entities. Despite this basic agreement on metaphysics, illusionists hold that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, whereas a posteriori physicalists hold that it does. One explanation for this disagreement would be that either the illusionists have too demanding a view about what consciousness requires, or the a posteriori physicalists have too tolerant a view. However, we will argue that this divergence of opinion is merely an upshot of the semantic indeterminacy of the term 'conscious' and its cognates. We shall back up this diagnosis by showing how semantic indeterminacy of the kind in question is a pervasive feature of language. By illustrating this pattern with a range of historical examples, we shall show how the dispute between the illusionists and a posteriori physicalists is one instance of a common kind of terminological imprecision. The disagreement between them is thus not substantial. In effect, the two sides differ only about how to make an indeterminate term precise. The moral is that they should stop looking for arguments designed to settle the dispute in their favour.
    Philosophy of Mind
  •  12
    Ruth Millikan's On Clear and Confused Ideas (review)
    with Nicholas Shea and Davood Papineau
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 453-466. 2007.
  • Theories of Consciousness
    In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
  • Theories of Consciousness
    In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
  • The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism
    In Ansgar Beckermann, Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  • David Lewis and Schrödinger's Cat
    In Frank Jackson & Graham Priest (eds.), Lewisian Themes, Oxford University Press Uk. 2004.
  • Teleosemantics: The Programme, Prospects, and Problems
    with Graham Macdonald
    In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philo-sophical Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2006.
  • Teleosemantics: The Programme, Prospects, and Problems
    with Graham Macdonald
    In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philo-sophical Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2006.
  • Phenomenal and Perceptual Conepts
    with King'S. College
    In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. 2006.
  • Naturalist Theories of Meaning
    In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2005.
  • Naturalist Theories of Meaning
    In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2005.
  • Theories of Consciousness
    In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
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