David Phillips

The concern of this book is the nature of religious belief and the ways in which philosophical enquiry is related to it. Six chapters present the positive arguments the author wishes to put forward to discusses religion and rationality, scepticism about religion, language-games, belief and the loss of belief. The remaining chapters include criticisms of some contemporary philosophers of religion in the light of the earlier discussions, and the implications for more specific topics, such as religious education, are investigated. The book ends with a general attempt to say something about the character of philosophical enquiry, and to show how important it is to realise this character in the philosophy of religion.

Many philosophers, of very different persuasions, think that the time has come for philosophy to give up its epistemological pretensions. It must cease to see itself as the arbiter of rationality and truth. Its role as such an arbiter is due, in part, to confusions involved in representationalist theories in epistemology. According to these, our epistemic practices are judged by whether they adequately represent something said to be independent of them all called Reality or Truth. These judgments are said to be the business of philosophy. But, now, it is said that philosophy is redundant in this respect The trouble was not that it did its work badly. There was never any work to perform. Philosophy traded under false pretences

SummaryIn this article Phillips sketches the difference between a form of trust which is in fact a kind of credibility or reliability and a form of trust that could be termed ‘absolute trust’. He tries to show that one of the conditions of possibility of the reliability-form is a kind of absolute trust. Someone who would want to evaluate the trustworthiness of God, can do this only in light of criteria which make up a set of values in which an unconditional trust is placed. This criticism of certain - mostly foundationalist - ways of talking about trust in God is not, he argues, a religious, but a philosophical criticism. Although the trust placed in another person (as in love or friendship) and the trust placed in God are both to be called ‘absolute’, only in the first case our trust can be betrayed.

This chapter contains section titled: Organizing the Notes for On Certainty Groundlessness and Language‐games Searching for Primary Links Between Language and Reality Seeing Logic and Practice Pictures, Propositions and Reality Forms of Life Practices and Parallels Is the Title on Certainty a Happy One? Is on Certainty a Polemic against Moore? Is Wittgenstein's Main Interest in Moore's Propositions the Nature of Nonsense? Does Wittgenstein Say that the Propositions he is Interested in Form a Class, and Does he Say the Same of all of Them? Are Wittgenstein's Propositions Context‐free? What is the Connection between Wittgenstein's Propositions and Logic? Is Wittgenstein Appealing to Primitive, Pre‐linguistic Reactions as the Basis of our Language‐games? What is Meant by the Sureness in Our Language‐games? How are Our Conclusions Related to the Notions of a Form of Life or World‐picture? How do Wittgenstein's Conclusions Differ from Some Classical and Contemporary Views of Our Relation to the World? Rhees's Development of Wittgenstein's Concerns.

This book is one philosopher's response to the poetry of R. S. Thomas. It examines the poet's struggle with the possibilities of sense in religion: R. S. Thomas has described his poetry as an obsession with the possibility of having 'conversations or linguistic confrontations with ultimate reality'. Some attempts at giving meaning to religious belief cannot withstand the assaults of criticism. In R. S. Thomas's verse, however, there emerges a hard-won celebration of the worship of a hidden God; a rare achievement in contemporary poetry. In plotting the course of the development of the poetry, the book brings out its many similarities with the thrusts and counter-thrusts of argument in the philosophy of religion in the second half of the twentieth century. The book should be of interest not only to admirers of R. S. Thomas, but to philosophers, theologians, students of literature, and to anyone concerned with questions concerning the sense or senselessness of religious belief.