David Robert

This book addresses the question of how one ought to choose when one is uncertain about what outcomes will result from one’s choices, but when one can nevertheless assign probabilities to the different possible outcomes. These choices are commonly referred to as choices under risk. In this book, I develop and motivate a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, namely expected comparative utility (ECU) theory. Roughly, for any agent, S, faced with any choice under risk, ECU theory says that S ought to measure and rank her options (in terms of how choiceworthy they are) according to their ECU and S ought to choose whichever option carries the greatest ECU (or one of them in the event that several options are tied). The ECU of an option is a probability‐weighted sum of each of its possible comparative utilities. For any option, a, and for any possible state of the world, G, the comparative utility of a in G is the difference in utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative(s) to a carry the greatest utility in G. In this book, I show that in some commonplace decisions under risk, ECU theory gives different recommendations from those of expected utility theory—the standard normative theory of rational choice under risk.

In this paper, I assume that people morally ought to be effective altruists, which is to say, they ought to pursue the goals of effective altruism, where “effective altruism is about using evidence and reason to figure out how to benefit others as much as possible, and taking action on that basis.” Assuming that, I argue that it is morally permissible for effective altruists to donate to organizations that fund or conduct aging-focused research to hasten the defeat of human aging, where defeating human aging involves comprehensively curing and preventing human age-related disease and disability, such that humans will not die from age-related disease and disability, and where hastening the defeat of human aging involves defeating human aging earlier than if additional funds were not invested in aging-focused research.

This paper aims to address the question of how one ought to choose when one is uncertain about what outcomes will result from one’s choices, but when one can nevertheless assign probabilities to the different possible outcomes. These choices are commonly referred to as choices under risk. In this paper, I develop and motivate a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, namely expected comparative utility (ECU) theory. Roughly, for any agent, S, faced with any choice under risk, ECU theory says that S ought to measure and rank her options (in terms of how choiceworthy they are) according to their ECU and S ought to choose whichever option carries the greatest ECU (or one of them in the event that several options are tied). The ECU of an option is a probability‐weighted sum of each of its possible comparative utilities. For any option, a, and for any possible state of the world, G, the comparative utility of a in G is the difference in utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative(s) to a carry the greatest utility in G. In this paper, I show that in some commonplace decisions under risk, ECU theory gives different recommendations from those of expected utility theory—the standard normative theory of rational choice under risk.

In this paper, I argue for a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, namely expected comparative utility (ECU) theory. I first show that for any choice option, a, and for any state of the world, G, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a in G is the comparative utility (CU) of a in G—that is, the difference in utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility in G. On the basis of this principle, I then argue that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, S should rank his or her decision options (in terms of how choiceworthy they are) according to their comparative expected comparative utility (CECU) and should choose whichever option carries the greatest CECU. For any option, a, a's CECU is the difference between its ECU and that of whichever alternative to a carries the greatest ECU, where a's ECU is a probability-weighted sum of a's CUs across the various possible states of the world. I lastly demonstrate that in some ordinary decisions under risk, ECU theory delivers different verdicts from those of standard decision theory.

In this paper, I will assume that metaphysical naturalism is true, except for the fact that some form of property dualism is true—the view that mental properties are essentially different from, and not reducible to, physical properties. If that is the case, then contrary to a widespread belief, death does not bring about eternal oblivion, a permanent cessation of the stream of consciousness at the moment of death. Several authors (Clark, 1994, n.d.; Darling, 1996; Stewart, 1999; Sharlow, 2009) have independently argued that the stream of consciousness continues after death—devoid of the body’s former memories and personality traits—and it does so as the stream of consciousness of new, freshly conscious bodies (other humans, animals, etc., that are conceived and develop consciousness). And so, any permanent cessation of the stream of consciousness at the moment of death is impossible as long as new, freshly conscious bodies come to exist. Consciousness is defined here as awareness, and is not limited to self-awareness (i.e., the recognition of one’s awareness). In this paper, I will argue for a new, more general thesis, namely the extended existential passage hypothesis. This new thesis has significant implications regarding the requirements of rational choice, as I will point out in this paper.

In this paper, I argue for a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, namely expected comparative utility (ECU) theory. I first show that for any choice option, a, and for any state of the world, G, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a in G is the comparative utility (CU) of a in G—that is, the difference in utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility in G. On the basis of this principle, I then argue that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, S should rank his or her decision options (in terms of how choiceworthy they are) according to their comparative expected comparative utility (CECU) and should choose whichever option carries the greatest CECU. For any option, a, a’s CECU is the difference between its ECU and that of whichever alternative to a carries the greatest ECU, where a’s ECU is a probability‐weighted sum of a’s CUs across the various possible states of the world. I lastly demonstrate that in some ordinary decisions under risk, ECU theory delivers different verdicts from those of standard decision theory.