•  3
    6. Self-Deception as Rationalization
    In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception, University of California Press. pp. 157-169. 1988.
  •  18
    Causal Asymmetries (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1): 243-246. 2001.
  •  12
    Perception, Common Sense, and Science
    Philosophy of Science 45 (1): 163-165. 1978.
  •  126
    Distinctness and non-identity
    Analysis 65 (4). 2005.
    The following statement (A) is usually abbreviated with symbols: (A) There are items X and Y, each is F, X is not identical to Y, and everything F is identical to X or is identical to Y. (A) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of exactly two distinct things that are F. Some things are neither identical nor distinct. The difference between distinctness and nonidentity makes a difference in asking questions about counting, constitution, and persistence.
  •  9
    Illusions and Sense-Data
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1): 371-385. 1981.
  •  31
    From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1): 149-154. 1986.
  •  13
    Experience and the Objects of Perception
    Noûs 21 (3): 435-438. 1987.
  •  43
    Resemblance and Identity: An Examination of the Problem of Universals (review)
    Philosophical Review 77 (3): 386-389. 1968.
  •  5
    How Plausible is the Principle of Plenitude?
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2): 149. 1978.
    The cardinality of incompatible possibilities whose actuality requires at least N seconds exceeds the cardinality of disjoint intervals at least N seconds long. Therefore, not all logical possibilities can be actual in the long run, even if the long run is infinite.
  •  20
    Begging the question
    Analysis 32 (6): 197-199. 1972.
  •  25
    Difficulties for the Reconciling and Estranging Projects: Some Symmetries
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 240-244. 2007.
    Suppose that Susan did not go to the movies. The reconciling project attempts to show that this plus Determinism does not imply that Susan could not have gone to the movies. The estranging project attempts to show the opposite. A counter‐entailment argument is of the form A is consistent with C, and C entails not‐B, therefore A does not entail B. An instance of the counter‐entailment arguments undermines a central argument for the reconciling project. Another instance undermines a central argume…Read more
  •  13
    No Title available: New Books (review)
    Philosophy 61 (238): 547-550. 1986.
  •  1
    Infinite regress arguments
    In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Principles of philosophical reasoning, Rowman & Allanheld. pp. 93--117. 1984.
  • Review of Linda Bruns (review)
    Mind 102 (1): 357--60. 1993.
  •  24
    Causes and Coincidences (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 18 (1): 86-88. 1995.
  •  7
    Book reviews (review)
    Mind 102 (406): 357-360. 1993.
  •  4
    Chisholm on Brentano's thesis
    In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Open Court. pp. 25--201. 1997.
    Roderick Chisholm provides, in different places, two formulations of Brentano's thesis about the relation between the psychological and the intentional: (1) all and only psychological sentences are intentional; (2) no psychological intentional sentence is equivalent to a nonintentional sentence. Chisholm also presents several definitions of intentionality. Some of these allow that a sentence is intentional while its negation is nonintentional, which ruins the prospects of defending the more plau…Read more
  •  19
    Intermediate conclusions
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1). 1975.
    A statement q is a conclusion intermediate between p and h if and only if (1) p justifies h, (2) p justifies q, and (3) (p and not-q) justifies h to a significantly lesser degree than p justifies h. I contend that Gettier-type counterexamples to definitions of factual knowledge violate the following principle: if one knows that h on the basis of p, then all the conclusions intermediate between p and h are true. This principle does not refer to anyone's beliefs that intermediate conclusions are t…Read more
  •  44
    What could have happened
    Noûs 10 (3): 313-326. 1976.
    Morton White proposes two patterns of expansion for sentences of the form "Possible (x is Q)" in "On What Could Have Happened" (Philosophical Review, 1968). His attempts in "Ands and Cans" (Mind, 1974) and in "Positive Freedom, Negative Freedom, and Possibility" (Journal of Philosophy, 1973) to simplify these two patterns and his argument for abandoning the first pattern are mistaken. Although I question a number of White's claims, my purpose is to improve his treatment of possibility rather tha…Read more
  •  66
    Disjunctive Predicates
    American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2): 167-1722. 1993.
    Philosophers have had difficulty in explaining the difference between disjunctive and non-disjunctive predicates. Purely syntactical criteria are ineffective, and mention of resemblance begs the question. I draw the distinction by reference to relations between borderline cases. The crucial point about the disjoint predicate 'red or green', for example, is that no borderline case of 'red' is a borderline case of 'green'. Other varieties of disjunctive predicates are: inclusively disjunctive (suc…Read more
  •  63
    The possibility of transparent white
    Analysis 46 (4): 212. 1986.
  •  229
    Causal necessity and logical necessity
    Philosophical Studies 33 (2). 1978.
    Hume's arguments for the contention that causal necessity precludes logical necessity depend on the questionable principle that a cause must precede its effect. Hobbes' definition of entire cause, although it fails to account for causal priority, is not refuted by Hume. The objections of Myles Brand and Marshall Swain (Philosophical Studies, 1976) to my counterexample against Hume (Philosophical Studies, 1975) are ineffective. Their other objections to my criticisms of their argument against def…Read more
  •  254
    The direction of causation and the direction of conditionship
    Journal of Philosophy 73 (8): 193-207. 1976.
    I criticize and emend J L Mackie's account of causal priority by replacing ‘fixity’ in its central clause by 'x is a causal condition of y, but y is not a causal condition of x'. This replacement works only if 'is a causal condition of' is not a symmetric relation. Even apart from our desire to account for causal priority, it is desirable to have an account of nonsymmetric conditionship. Truth, for example, is a condition of knowledge, but knowledge is not a condition of truth. My definitions of…Read more
  •  6
    Causal Asymmetries (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1): 243-246. 2001.
    Time and cause present apparent asymmetries. What happens later depends on what happens earlier, and not the other way around. Effects depend on their causes, and not the other way around.
  •  26