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If P then Q Conditionals and the Foundations of ReasoningBehavior and Philosophy 19 (2): 103-107. 1991.
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36. Self-Deception as RationalizationIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception, University of California Press. pp. 157-169. 1988.
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126Distinctness and non-identityAnalysis 65 (4). 2005.The following statement (A) is usually abbreviated with symbols: (A) There are items X and Y, each is F, X is not identical to Y, and everything F is identical to X or is identical to Y. (A) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of exactly two distinct things that are F. Some things are neither identical nor distinct. The difference between distinctness and nonidentity makes a difference in asking questions about counting, constitution, and persistence.
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20From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against BeliefPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1): 149-154. 1986.
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12Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes's MeditationsPhilosophical Review 82 (1): 120. 1973.
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43Resemblance and Identity: An Examination of the Problem of Universals (review)Philosophical Review 77 (3): 386-389. 1968.
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5How Plausible is the Principle of Plenitude?Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2): 149. 1978.The cardinality of incompatible possibilities whose actuality requires at least N seconds exceeds the cardinality of disjoint intervals at least N seconds long. Therefore, not all logical possibilities can be actual in the long run, even if the long run is infinite.
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11Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics ‐ By Cynthia Macdonald (review)Philosophical Books 48 (1): 81-82. 2007.
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17Difficulties for the Reconciling and Estranging Projects: Some SymmetriesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 240-244. 2007.Suppose that Susan did not go to the movies. The reconciling project attempts to show that this plus Determinism does not imply that Susan could not have gone to the movies. The estranging project attempts to show the opposite. A counter‐entailment argument is of the form A is consistent with C, and C entails not‐B, therefore A does not entail B. An instance of the counter‐entailment arguments undermines a central argument for the reconciling project. Another instance undermines a central argume…Read more
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1Infinite regress argumentsIn James H. Fetzer (ed.), Principles of philosophical reasoning, Rowman & Allanheld. pp. 93--117. 1984.
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4Chisholm on Brentano's thesisIn Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Open Court. pp. 25--201. 1997.Roderick Chisholm provides, in different places, two formulations of Brentano's thesis about the relation between the psychological and the intentional: (1) all and only psychological sentences are intentional; (2) no psychological intentional sentence is equivalent to a nonintentional sentence. Chisholm also presents several definitions of intentionality. Some of these allow that a sentence is intentional while its negation is nonintentional, which ruins the prospects of defending the more plau…Read more
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229Causal necessity and logical necessityPhilosophical Studies 33 (2). 1978.Hume's arguments for the contention that causal necessity precludes logical necessity depend on the questionable principle that a cause must precede its effect. Hobbes' definition of entire cause, although it fails to account for causal priority, is not refuted by Hume. The objections of Myles Brand and Marshall Swain (Philosophical Studies, 1976) to my counterexample against Hume (Philosophical Studies, 1975) are ineffective. Their other objections to my criticisms of their argument against def…Read more
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254The direction of causation and the direction of conditionshipJournal of Philosophy 73 (8): 193-207. 1976.I criticize and emend J L Mackie's account of causal priority by replacing ‘fixity’ in its central clause by 'x is a causal condition of y, but y is not a causal condition of x'. This replacement works only if 'is a causal condition of' is not a symmetric relation. Even apart from our desire to account for causal priority, it is desirable to have an account of nonsymmetric conditionship. Truth, for example, is a condition of knowledge, but knowledge is not a condition of truth. My definitions of…Read more
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6Causal Asymmetries (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1): 243-246. 2001.Time and cause present apparent asymmetries. What happens later depends on what happens earlier, and not the other way around. Effects depend on their causes, and not the other way around.
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28Red, green and absolute determinacy: A reply to C. Radford's incompatibilities of coloursPhilosophical Quarterly 16 (October): 356-358. 1966.
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32Impartial PerceptionPhilosophy 58 (225). 1983.Wittgenstein remarks in the "Tractatus" that the eye is not in the visual field. I question the claim of Michael Dummett and P T Geach that reflection on this remark helps one conceive of an observer perceiving objects in space without having any location in that space. The literal meaning of "point of view" is illustrated by the visual field. Reflection on the fact that the point of view is not itself normally an object of sight is no help in conceiving perception from no point of view.
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79Knowledge and relevant alternatives: Comments on DretskePhilosophical Studies 40 (3). 1981.Fred Dretske holds that if one knows something, one need not eliminate every alternative to it but only the relevant alternatives. Besides defending this view in "The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge" ("Phil. Stud.", 40, 363-378, n 81), he makes some tentative suggestions about determining when an alternative is relevant. I discuss these suggestions and conclude that there are problems yet to be solved. I do not conclude that there are insoluble problems or that Dretske's approach is on the wron…Read more
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