David Schwartz

This paper examines Allen Carlson's influential view that knowledge from natural science offers the best (and perhaps only) framework for aesthetically appreciating nature for what it is in itself. Carlson argues that knowledge from the natural sciences can play a role analogous to the role of art-historical knowledge in our experience of art by supplying categories for properly 'calibrating' one's sensory experience and rendering more informed aesthetic judgments. Yet, while art history indeed functions this way, Carlson's formulation leaves out a second (and often more important) role played by art-historical knowledge over the last century - namely, providing the context needed for interpretations of meaning. This paper explores whether natural science can also inform our aesthetic experience of nature in this second sense. I argue that a robust sense of meaning from our aesthetic experience of nature is indeed made possible by coupling our aesthetic experience of animals with knowledge from the natural science of animal ethology. By extending the scope of Carlson's analogy to include interpretations of meaning, my argument shows that the cognitive, scientific model can accommodate a wider range of aesthetic engagement with nature than previously recognised.

ABSTRACTWhen attempting to articulate the nature and scope of corporate social responsibility , a variety of opinions emerge. The primary CSR issue appears to be: Should firms go “beyond profits”? In order to address this normative question, this article will explore the theoretical underpinnings of CSR and its practical application. Part one of the paper begins by discussing common CSR definitions. Part two outlines the CSR debate in terms of the “narrow view” of CSR versus the “broad view” . Part three applies both the narrow and broad approaches to CSR in analyzing two classic business and society cases: the Ford Pinto; and Merck's river blindness pill. The article concludes with a proposed synthesis of the CSR approaches discussed

Background: The use of race as a category in medical research is the focus of an intense debate, complicated by the inconsistency of presumed independent variables, race and ethnicity, on which analysis depends. Interpretation is made difficult by inconsistent methods for determining the race or ethnicity of a participant. The failure to specify how race or ethnicity was determined is common in the published literature.Hypothesis: Criteria by which they assign a research participant to racial or ethnic categories are not reported by published articles.Methods: Methods were reviewed for assigning race and ethnicity of research participants in 268 published reports reporting associations among race , health outcome and genotype.Results: Of the 268 published reports reviewed, it was found that 192 did not explain their methods for assigning race or ethnicity as an independent variable. This was despite the fact that 180 of those reports reached conclusions about associations among genetics, health outcome and race or ethnicity.Conclusions: More attention needs to be given to the definition of race and ethnicity in genetic studies, especially in those diseases where health disparities are known to exist