David Suárez-Rivero

Providing some basic arguments and a historical context, I introduce the special volume What can we do in Philosophy using Logic? In this introduction, I discuss whether logic is useful for understanding, evaluating or building arguments in philosophy. I argue that, although there has been research supporting the idea that logic can serve as a philosophical instrument, this has not shown completely its utility. This is the reason I offer to discuss the importance of logic in philosophy, trying to show that philosophers employ logic when they work with arguments and also obtain worth benefits by applying it.

En el presente artículo evalúo el concepto de violencia, explorando casos hipotéticos que permitan establecer cuáles son las condiciones o criterios que muestran cuándo una acción puede ser calificada como violenta. Frente a esto, parto de la idea de que una acción es violenta cuando rompe reglas o normas, las cuales son establecidas por sistemas sociales que se fundan en sistema de creencias. Concluyo, así, que hay que examinar los sistemas de creencias, donde se fundan los sistemas sociales, para erradicar todo tipo de acción que pueda romper reglas o normas.

In this paper I focus my attention on the proposal given by Howard Wettstein in 1980 to the cognitive phenomenon stated by Gottlob Frege in his paper “On sense and reference”. I offer three arguments in order to show that his answer does not weaken this phenomenon. Particularly, I defend three ideas: first, it is legitimate that philosophical semantics, in contrast with what Wettstein defends, provides an answer to the cognitive phenomenon; second, Wettstein does not conceive Frege’s argument correctly by considering it generates a semantic theory from a purely mentalist phenomenon; third, the explanation supplied by Wettstein is assumed by Frege when he states the phenomenon.