David Torrijos-Castrillejo

The Greek term heimarménē, rendered in Latin as fatum and in English as “fate” (and occasionally as “destiny”), designates one of the doctrinal elements at the intersection of Greek religion and philosophy. For philosophical inquiry, it presents the challenge of examining how the supposed causal force of fate interacts with other types of causality. Reflection on fate also gives rise to philosophical questions concerning contingent events, freedom of the will, determinism, divine foreknowledge, and providence, among others. Moreover, this theme is deeply embedded in the human experiences depicted throughout Greek epic and tragic literature and, through them, has significantly shaped the imaginative landscape of Western literature as a whole. Such experiences include unexpected good fortune, human inability to resist misfortune, practices of divination, and the relationship between human beings and the divine. Given the centrality of topics such as free will, determinism, and divine foreknowledge in contemporary philosophy of religion, it is especially illuminating to investigate how Greek philosophers—and even other Greek authors not typically classified as philosophers—addressed these issues. Late antique Greek thought revisits the themes of fate and divine providence within the framework of Christian theology, engaging in sustained dialogue with “pagan” Greek philosophy. These exchanges constitute a significant contribution to the metaphysical understanding of fate.

This article examines Boethius’ commentary on chapter 9 of Aristotle’s 'De interpretatione', a text of central importance for the classical problem of future contingents and their implications for determinism, contingency, and human freedom. Written in connection with the fifteenth centenary of Boethius’ death and accompanying the first Spanish translation of this commentary, the study situates Boethius’ exegetical work within his broader pedagogical and philosophical project as a translator and commentator of Aristotle. Particular attention is given to the dual structure of Boethius’ commentary, its sources, and its relationship to the Greek exegetical tradition, especially Porphyry and Ammonius. The article argues that, while Boethius draws heavily on earlier Greek commentators, he is far from being a mere transmitter: his treatment of divine foreknowledge and future contingents reveals original philosophical contributions. By distinguishing between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity, Boethius develops a nuanced account of the truth of future contingent propositions as “indefinite,” thereby rejecting both causal determinism and the denial of truth values to future statements. The study further shows how this position anticipates key doctrines of the 'Consolation of Philosophy', particularly through an implicit use of the so-called “Iamblichean principle” of knowledge. Ultimately, the article highlights the significance of Boethius’ commentary as a crucial stage in the historical development of medieval discussions on divine providence, contingency, and free will.

In his second book, The Psychology of Aristotle, Franz Brentano added an appendix on the causality of God according to Aristotle. In previous pages of this work, he had argued that the active intellect is part of the human soul, which is a spiritual substance. Since something spiritual cannot be originated in a physical way, each soul is created directly by God. Brentano knew that many interpreters of his time, especially Eduard Zeller, not only did not accept that Aristotle thought of God as creator, but they also understood the first unmoved mover only as a final cause. This article disregards the question of creation, but it does take into consideration the reasons given by Brentano in that appendix for understanding the first unmoved mover not only as a final cause, but also as an efficient one. It also briefly reviews some manuscripts from the same period that deal with this same topic. Although Brentano is heavily influenced by a Christian and particularly Thomistic philosophical framework, this does not prevent him from providing compelling reasons for defending the plausibility of attributing efficient causality to the first unmoved mover.

Although an edition of Petrus Hispanus’ commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius’ 'De divinis nominibus' has long been available, his contribution to the pivotal question of beauty—so extensively explored by medieval commentators on this treatise—has remained virtually unnoticed. This article seeks to address that lacuna by examining the principal passages devoted to beauty, primarily in Chapter 4, where Pseudo-Dionysius’s presents God as subsistent beauty and as the source of both good and beauty, thereby articulating a profound connection between goodness, beauty and being. The study undertakes a comparative analysis of Petrus Hispanus’ commentary and the gloss on the same Dionysian text by Thomas Gallus, upon whom Petrus Hispanus depends to a considerable degree. This comparison reveals that, in the section on beauty, Petrus Hispanus offers a richer and more nuanced treatment than Gallus’ paraphrase. The theme of beauty emerges in close relation to the soul’s ascent toward God within a Christian framework deeply shaped by Neoplatonic thought. While Petrus Hispanus retains traditional descriptions of beauty—such as harmony or order—he also emphasizes its intelligible nature more strongly than either Dionysius or Vercelli did, assigning to the intellect a privileged role in the apprehension of beauty.

This book tackles the necessary task of contrasting the medieval perspective on the aesthetic with our current perspective, so distant from each other! Some thirty prestigious scholars, philosophers, philologists, theologians, art experts, from various countries and languages imbibe the various medieval traditions and thinkers in an attempt to illuminate their conception of the aesthetic with the aim of enriching our present-day outlook. The book is structured in three thematic areas. The first section is a sort of prolegomena to the question of beauty in the Middle Ages. A second section studies and analyses the various currents of thought in medieval aesthetics, not only in terms of their mutual interrelationship, but also in terms of their connection with classical thought. Finally, a third part analyses the reception and evaluation of medieval aesthetics by contemporary culture, as well as its influence on the latter. The work arises from the conviction that dialogue between the present and the past, and particularly the medieval past, is fundamental in the task of resolving the many ruptures that corrode our culture. Harmony, beauty, as is evident in the contributions that weave the fabric of this work, springs magically - or rather, divinely - from the mysterious and unfathomable - and always novel - interweaving of differences, between the present and the past, the medieval and the contemporary, between theology, philosophy, philology, art..., between different cultures and countries. This work is an example of this, illuminating our times from the extraordinary experience lived by these people who preceded us and who have contributed - although often ignored - to the shaping of the best of our civilisation.

This study examines Dionysius the Carthusian’s contribution to medieval aesthetic thought, situating his treatise De venustate mundi et pulchritudine Dei within the broader Dominican intellectual tradition shaped by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Although often judged eclectic or insufficiently original, Dionysius articulates what may be the final and most comprehensive medieval synthesis on beauty. The article reviews the history of scholarship on the De venustate, addressing earlier misinterpretations by Zöckler, Rösler, Huizinga, De Bruyne, and more recent clarifications by Emery, Assunto, and Calma. Against claims that Dionysius neglects artistic beauty or espouses an excessively intellectualist account, the study shows that he affirms both sensible and spiritual beauty, while elaborating a distinctively intellectual framework rooted in participation, exemplar causality, and the transcendental character of the pulchrum. The first part of the article analyzes Dionysius’s earlier De natura aeterni et veri Dei, where he already outlines a theology of divine beauty influenced by Augustine, the Pseudo-Dionysius, and Aquinas. The second and central part focuses on the De venustate, highlighting Dionysius’s systematic integration of the pulchrum into the circle of transcendentals through convertibility with being, truth, unity, and goodness. Drawing deeply on Albert, Ulrich of Strasbourg, the Victorines, and the Summa Halensis, Dionysius distinguishes essential and accidental beauty and develops a hierarchical ascent from corporeal beauty, through the structures of the cosmos and the spiritual creatures, to the superessential beauty of God. Particular attention is devoted to his appropriation of beauty to the Word, grounded in the Verbum’s status as exemplar cause. The article concludes that Dionysius offers not merely a compilation of earlier doctrines but a creative and systematic aesthetic vision that synthesizes the major medieval traditions.

Born in Ribadavia around 1545 (although the date 1559 has also been suggested), he was the son of Diego de Lemos and Beatriz García de Lemos, who died when he was a child and a teenager respectively. He was taken in by his elder brother, Santiago, with whom he began his education. Probably, he entered the Dominican convent in Ribadavia at around the age of thirty. We have no reliable information about his education until we find him teaching theology at the convent of San Vicente Ferrer in Plasencia. He also resided for some time at the convent of San Pablo in Palencia. But his biography begins to shine after a memorable lecture delivered on 21 May 1600 during the General Chapter of the Order of Preachers held in Naples. He set out the Dominicans’ position on divine help ('auxilia'), which at that time was being defended in Rome against the Society of Jesus, in relation to the Concordia by the Jesuit Luis de Molina. He spoke so effectively that he was appointed by the Master General to represent the Order, together with Diego Álvarez, in the Congregation De Auxiliis. From 23 January 1601, he represented the Dominicans by delivering numerous speeches and drafting a multitude of writings for the Pope and for examination by the other members of the Congregation de auxiliis, which are preserved in various Roman archives. Some were copied by Serry in his book or appear in the Acta. Lemos’s theological and dialectical skill enabled him to excel in this task. In 1602, the disputes began in the presence of Clement VIII himself. Following his death, they continued before Paul V between 1605 and 1606, until on 5 September 1607 the Pope declared the matter settled, without issuing any condemnation, as he saw that both the Jesuits’ and the Dominicans’ positions were legitimate. Lemos had been granted the rank of Master in his order on 29 March 1605, at the General Chapter in Valladolid. Once the congregations De Auxiliis had concluded, he remained in Rome. Around 1602, he had been appointed consultant to the Congregation of the Index. On 15 November 1607, the Pope appointed him qualifier for the Holy Office in Rome, a role he held until the end of his life. For this reason, he is listed among the theologians who signed the consultation held on 24 February 1616, which declared the heliocentric thesis “absurd in philosophy and formally heretical” or “at least erroneous for the faith”, an assessment that proved significant in the famous Galileo case. In 1618 he also held the post of consultant to the Congregation of Rites. Around 1620 he wrote a series of short treatises on the Immaculate Conception, a theological thesis championed by the Spanish monarchy but opposed by Thomas Aquinas, the Doctor whom the Dominicans followed. Philip III offered him the episcopal dignity on two occasions, which he declined, remaining for the rest of his days at the convent of Santa Maria Sopra Minerva, where he was buried. Upon his death, his reputation for holiness drew a crowd of Roman people to his funeral, and they venerated his body as a relic. His major work is the Panoplia gratiae, published posthumously in four volumes. It was dictated during his old age, when he had lost his sight. It was published on the initiative of the Dominican Cardinal Raimondo Capizucchi, former Master of the Sacred Palace. Although the title page bears the date 1676, its final approval was in December 1681. It is considered one of the most important books on this subject from the perspective of Dominican Thomism. The Acta of the De Auxiliis congregations published in his name may be based not only on his personal material, but also on the archive of Francisco Peña, Dean of the Tribunal of the Rota. It appears that they were edited by the Jansenist Benedictine Thierry de Viaixnes. Although in 1654 the Inquisition issued a decree declaring them to be unofficial, they are compiled using original documents, which are preserved in the archives and are of unquestionable value, particularly for understanding Lemos’s own discourses.

This article examines the question of divine freedom in a little-known text by Suárez printed among his 'Opuscula theologica' (1599): 'De libertate divinae voluntatis'. The article then compares this brief work with two other publications by Suárez in which he also addresses the freedom of God: first, an earlier work, the 'Disputationes metaphysicae', and then his commentary on the first part of the 'Summa theologiae', published somewhat later. Examining the question of divine freedom provides us with an opportunity to consider Suárez's conception of free will from a more formal point of view.

The notion of divine providence according to Socrates is explored within the theological framework of his thought, as defended by McPherran. In accordance with this perspective, some texts by Xenophon are studied. In them Socrates appears to formulate, for the first time in the history of philosophy, the argument of design. In human beings, a peculiar manifestation of divine providence can be seen, which privileges the most specific trait of human beings: intelligence. Divinity also reveals itself to be intelligent in its providence, supporting the life and development of living beings that stand out for their intelligence and are called to act in accordance with it. These assessments of Xenophon's Socrates can be confirmed by some pages of Plato's dialogues and by their relationship with some presocratic doctrines.

Aquinas' vision of man is worthy of being proposed in the 21st century as an alternative to the anthropological reductionisms triumphant in today's public discourse. For him, the human being is not a mere animal, neither is a pure spirit who can use his body as if it were an independent entity. This metaphysical and unitary view of the human being is also not foreign to an anthropology that starts from a ‘first-person’ experience. Self-awareness leads the human being to realise that he is corporeal, but it also enables him to reach back to his spiritual condition. Moreover, this implies that our soul is immortal and our action is free, as well as having consequences for our corporeality, which is that of a spiritual animal. Man's spiritual nature makes him intrinsically oriented towards God: the human being is a ‘tree turned upside down,’ because his life is not only based on its material facets, but he must ultimately live with the aspiration to be rooted in God as the goal of his biographical journey.

St Thomas brings together in the crucifixion the double mission of Jesus Christ as Saviour and Master. His spirituality is marked by an intense devotion to the Crucified One, manifested in his synthetic and catechetical works, but above all in his biblical commentaries. The Crucified is Master because the crucifixion reveals the divine power and the fully human life of Christ noticeable in his virtues. In this way, the Crucified One is presented as doctrine and as doctor: he is the best book in which to contemplate the mystery of God and he is the Master who teaches from the chair of the cross.

This article discusses three documents by Báñez, which until recently had been ignored by studies on this theologian. They fall into two different categories. First, we will focus on two ‘opinions’ ('pareceres') by Báñez delivered to political authorities. As such, they are similar to his responses to the inquiries made by the Inquisition that we already knew about, but they differ in their addressee and also in their dissemination, as both have been printed and distributed by the respective political authorities. Secondly, we will study some theses printed by Báñez to be defended publicly at an academic event, the only ones that remain from his long career—to our knowledge—although we know that he printed many others.

This paper analyses the section of Nemesius of Emesa’s treatise On the Nature of Man dedicated to fate. The main objective is to analyse Nemesius’s response to the supporters of a notion of fate within the framework of astral determinism, Stoicism, and Middle Platonism. Following a mainly descriptive method, the paper focuses on Nemesius’s own thought and not just on his treatment of his sources, as much of the existing literature has done until now. Without pretending to give a definitive answer on the originality of his own philosophy, we examine how Nemesius assigns some of the functions of fate in one of his Middle Platonic sources to divine providence. In doing so, he develops a personal theology in which he gives an innovative prominence to divine free will and transcendence in the traditional philosophical problem of providence.

After summarising the evolution of Franz Brentano’s personal thought on time, this paper discusses his work in historical order to see his presentation of Aristotle’s philosophy of time, with particular regard to his unpublished manuscripts. Although he tends to view Aristotle’s idea of time as a mere relation of the changing thing to the celestial rotation, mainly the first sphere, at the end of his life, Brentano assimilates Aristotle’s conception of time more closely to his own personal account of time, which is linked to psychic phenomena and the flow of consciousness.

The purpose of this book is to fill a gap in the Spanish literature that has already begun to be filled in other languages: to provide the reader with simple and rigorous access to two famous commentators on Aristotle from late Antiquity. This also makes an important contribution to the corpus of Neoplatonic authors in the Spanish language. Classical commentaries have become particularly important in recent decades. On this occasion, it is possible to present an important facet of the author of the 'Consolation of Philosophy', as well as to complete our knowledge of Ammonius. This book provides the Spanish translation of the ninth chapter of Aristotle's treatise 'On Interpretation' ('De interpretatione' or 'Peri hermeneias'), its study and edition, also offering the original texts, Greek and Latin respectively, which are difficult to locate in printed version.

Pedro de Ledesma became one of the most important professors in the theological faculty of the University of Salamanca at the beginning of the 17th century. He and Juan Vicente de Astorga were Dominican theologians in substantial agreement with Domingo Báñez about the main points of the disputes on grace. However, they manifest remarkable differences between them. Astorga believes that God could not maintain the infallibility of His predestination of creatures only through His foreknowledge of the acts of the creature, as Luis de Molina defends. He thinks that God disposes by His providence each concrete act of creatures and, by His concurrence, effectively achieves their fulfillment. However, God does not influence created free will by means of a physical premotion, but by a moral one, i.e. by suggestions and inspirations. Ledesma criticizes Astorga’s thesis, although he uses Astorga’s arguments to defend the compatibility of physical premotion with the freedom of the creature. In this article, the thought of both theologians is presented in the light of their unpublished manuscript works. The opposition between these two friars manifests the variety of approaches adopted by Dominicans of the time, who cannot be considered as a uniform group.

The Dominican Pedro de Ledesma was a member of the School of Salamanca, professor of Theology in the late 16th and early 17th century. Here we investigate for the first time his contribution to the «de auxiliis» controversy, in which mainly the Dominicans and the Jesuits contended about human free will and God’s influence on it. Among the various theological problems involved, this thesis examines the nature of the divine concurrence in free human action and, in particular, divine concurrence in actual efficacious grace. Ledesma focuses his contribution to this debate on the real (and not only moral) difference between sufficient and efficacious grace. Another original feature of his conception of divine concurrence and efficacious grace are the target of his attacks, since he does not only dispute the theology of the Jesuit Luis de Molina, but also that of several Dominicans, such as Juan Vicente de Astorga; likewise, he opposes Pedro de Herrera and Diego Álvarez with a less sophisticated conception of «physical premotion» than theirs. This thesis updates Ledesma’s intellectual biography and contains the most complete list of his manuscript work to date. Ledesma’s ideas are studied on the basis of three documents: first, his unpublished lectures of 1590 on divine concurrence; second, the report on Molina’s Concordia sent to the Inquisition in 1594 (a manuscript hitherto neglected, and transcribed in the Appendix); third, the book on the dispute completed in 1601 and published in 1611.

Diego de Deza was an important ecclesiastic in early 16th century Spain. Before being ordained bishop, he was the first Dominican to occupy the most important chair of theology in Salamanca, which would later be held by Francisco de Vitoria. As bishop he contributed in different ways to the spread of Thomism, especially with the refoundation of the Colegio de San Gregorio in Valladolid and the Colegio de Santo Tomás in Seville. Especially in his college of Seville he gave indications that indicated to follow Aquinas as a teacher not only for theology, but also for philosophy and the Bible. This article investigates this contribution by contrasting various unpublished manuscripts.

This article studies the notion of providence as exposed by John Philoponus in two theological works, 'De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum', where he studies providence in contrast with Neoplatonism, and 'De opificio mundi', in which he returns to the same topic in polemic with astral determinism. Drawing on elements of Neoplatonic philosophy, he argues against the thesis of the eternity of the world and harshly criticizes astral determinism in accordance with the antideterminist line previously defended by other Christian authors such as Origen.

Although some ancient sources relate Parmenides to the religious doctrine of fate, this concept is not usually prominent in the scholarly presentation of the Eleatic thinker. Here, we offer a tentative interpretation of the notion of necessity in Parmenides’ poem, as a peculiar philosophical understanding of the presence of fate in reality. Necessity, divinised by Parmenides, implies that all things are bound together by the chains of fate. Therefore, his philosophical proposal consists in understanding this unity of reality originated by the connexion of fatal necessity. However, this presence of fate in all things is not bad news, but also means that everything is connected by Love.

Divine providence, according to Aquinas, is the order of divine wisdom by which it leads creatures to their end. The existence of necessary, contingent and free things is part of this disposition. The infallible character of divine knowledge and will is not at odds with the fallible nature of things ordained by God: providence has infallibly disposed things to happen in a fallible way. Even the acts of human freedom are under the direction of divine mind, for the creator cooperates with free will. The care of divine providence is studied by Aquinas in a special way in his Commentary on the Book of Job, which constitutes the second part of this paper. In this work, he envisages how human evil and suffering are remedied by divine providence. There are rational arguments that shed some light on the problem of human suffering. However, it is the gaze of faith that provides the ultimate confidence in the salvation of sinful and suffering man.

This article reviews the notion of 'noûs' and the verb 'noein' in pre-Socratic philosophy: it brings together research carried out since Kurt von Fritz's famous articles of 1945-1946, taking into account 20th and 21th centuries studies, in particular the ones of James H. Lesher, Shirley D. Sullivan, Rossana Stefanelli and Favio Stella. This paper also focuses on the conception of 'noûs' in the thought of Xenophanes, who links it with divinity and thus anticipates the important contribution of Anaxagoras. Finally, it examines the conception of 'noûs' and 'noein' in Parmenides, in whose Poem it is closely linked to his conception of Being.

Philosophy is inserted as a pedagogical novelty, a sort of renewal of the preparation of young people for adult life. However, what begins as an educational reform ends up representing a genuine intellectual approach: the formulation of scientific knowledge emerges from it. Philosophy goes beyond the originally narrow boundaries of paideia, understood as education of the young, to become a way of life also for adults. However, this does not prevent Greek and Roman philosophy can be understood as a community of life, if not always between “teachers and disciples”, at least between “lovers of knowledge”, philosophers, who are also among themselves lovers, i.e. “friends”. For these reasons, these pages begin with a brief consideration of the Greek paideia, from traditional religion to philosophy. Second, the paper exposes the important imitative character of Greek education inherited by philosophy. Third, the article pays attention to a privileged context for the development of imitation, the philosophical friendship, the discipleship among philosophers itself. In friendship we will find a context that overcomes some of the limitations posed by education founded on imitation.

Friendship is a notion that runs through the thought of different ancient philosophers and has the peculiar characteristic of being held in high esteem almost unanimously by all. Although there are earlier precedents, for Socrates friendship takes on great importance and his disciple Plato provides deep reflections on the subject, linking friendship with transcendence. However, the pages of Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics' on this subject are undoubtedly the most influential for posterity. For him, friendship has many variants, although he privileges over all of them friendship between equals and founded on ethical character. Only complete moral integrity guarantees that the love between friends consists of a genuine appreciation for the person of the other and not for something different from it. After Aristotle, Cicero's treatise 'Lellius' or 'On Friendship' stands out. Despite taking up several appreciations of Aristotle, Cicero is original and corrects some of his ideas, giving priority to the strength of mutual love over the preconditions of friends. Moreover, he gives a prominent place to trust ('fides') in their relationship. Finally, Seneca frames friendship within his ethical conception, subordinating love for the friend to the moral development of the philosopher.

This book explores a key concept for human life: friendship. German and Spanish scholars approach friendship from different points of view, integrating philosophical and theological reflections as well as perspectives from other human sciences. In addition to researching biblical texts such as Ecclesiasticus and the Gospel of John, they present the ideas of Christian thinkers such as Alfred of Rieval, St. Thomas Aquinas, John H. Newman, Gilbert K. Chesterton, Edith Stein, Maritain and Benedict XVI. These contributions are read in continuity with ancient philosophy, with particular reference to Aristotle's pages on friendship, which open up this human relationship to a wider context, even linking it to politics.