David Turnbull

In general, naturalistic philosophy deals with concepts that relate to the world as expressed in natural language, as it has evolved from a finite stock of root words substantially derived (in European languages) from Latin and Greek. In that sense naturalistic philosophy occupies an intermediate position between natural language and the appropriation of that language for uses in science. Our aim is to show that naturalistic philosophy is neither dead, nor is it to be found residing exclusively in a separate discipline named “philosophy of science”. We maintain that although science and naturalistic philosophy have some methodologically distinct aspects, when properly described, science includes naturalistic philosophy. Naturalistic philosophy is entailed in activities from conceptualisation and theorisation, to interpretation of the products of science. We provide examples of the process of argumentation said to characterise naturalistic philosophy, as an integral part of the work of eminent scientists. This more complete view of what constitutes the doing of science has implications for the teaching of science, suggesting that at least some emphasis is required on the conjectural and creative aspects of science, as well as the purely methodological.

Free will and individual responsibility are cornerstones of the justice system and widely accepted as axiomatic. In the present work we use predicate calculus to illustrate that there is a clash of assumptions between biological theory and these axioms of justice and ethics. This creates a conflict with the justice system, for from the assumption that self-consciousness and free will determines actions, punishment is legitimised whenever social, moral and legal norms are violated.If we accept that voluntarist and determinist assumptions are mutually exclusive and necessarily generate either separate or incoherent working spaces in current models, the discussion about such models requires a third space for deliberation. A third space for dialogue offers an opportunity to generate fresh approaches, with implications not only for remodelling our current concepts of justice, but also for re-modelling our current approaches to science.

One goal of social justice is to overcome discrimination. This goal implies that discrimination needs to be well understood so that once an endpoint has been reached people will know that justice has been achieved. Moreover, equal opportunity legislation in some legal jurisdictions requires a predefined endpoint to enable distinction between “lawful” and “unlawful” discrimination. In this article, we show that the concept of an endpoint is logically flawed. We also illustrate how the concept of discrimination is utilized inconsistently due to a shift between deontological and utilitarian frames of reference. This shift is a major factor leading writers of an EEO training module to fall into the traps of inaccuracy and “doublespeak.” Finally, we argue that futures oriented thinking about social issues should entail a temporally open ended removal of barriers rather than imposition of quotas based on ostensible endpoints that have been invoked in legislation. This would enable avoidance of inconsistency and illogicality, without diminishing relevance to social justice.

In addressing the regulation of human genetic futures, scientific standards concerning human kinds are endorsed by philosophical approaches that tend to exclude many people with genetic conditions from the deliberative process. In broadening the axiological, ontological and epistemological framework to include disability perspectives, the focus is shifted from questions of regulation to practical matters of participation, invoking ideals of community equality and enabled choice. In developing practical community engagements to deliberate upon genetic futures, a process that allows dialectical encounter between eugenic and non-eugenic approaches is envisioned so that strong versions of eugenics are avoided.