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19The Direct Argument for IncompatibilismIn David Widerker & Ira M. Schnall (eds.), David Palmer (ed.) Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 88-106., . pp. 88-106. 2014.Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) purports to establish the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility, without appealing to the notion of avoidability, a notion on whose analysis compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree. Van Inwagen intended DA to refute compatibilism, or at least to shift the burden of proof onto the compatibilist. In this paper, we offer a critical assessment of DA. We examine a variety of objections to DA due to John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Ishtiyaq…Read more
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10Freedom from Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of ResponsibilityJournal of Philosophy 90 (2): 98. 1993.
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Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative PossibilitiesIn Gary Watson (ed.), Free will, Oxford University Press. 1982.
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37Pereboom’s Defense of Deliberation-Compatibilism: A Problem RemainsThe Journal of Ethics 23 (3): 333-345. 2019.Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism is the most elaborate and most sophisticated current attempt to defend this position. In this paper, I have provided a careful, and open-minded assessment of that defense. The conclusion that emerged is that it is subject to an important objection that leaves him with no explanation of the relevant difference between a scenario in which it would irrational for an agent to deliberate what to do, and a scenario the deliberation-compatibilist would c…Read more
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13Zimmerman on moral responsibility, obligation and alternate possibilitiesAnalysis 54 (4): 285-287. 1994.
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21Blameworthiness, Non‐robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative ExpectationsMidwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1): 292-306. 2005.
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15Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous MonismGrazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1): 95-100. 1992.Recently, Colin McGinn has argued that Kripke's Cartesian argument against the mind-body identity thesis is not effective against anomalous monism. This paper attempts to show that the Cartesian has at his disposal an argument that is stronger than that formulated by Kripke, and one that cannot be rebutted by the anomalous monist in the way suggested by McGinn. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to the sort of identity theory one would have to subscribe to in order to resist the stronger C…Read more
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580Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative PossibilitiesFaith and Philosophy 17 (2): 249-254. 2000.In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type sce…Read more
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36Contra Snapshot OckhamismInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (2). 1996.Recently, John Fischer has proposed a novel account of the hard/soft distinction which is an entailment account. At its basis is the idea that a fact about a time T as a soft fact about T if it entails a fact about a time later than T; and a fact about a time T as a hard fact about T if it does not do so. Elsewhere, I have expressed serious doubts whether an entailment account of the hard/soft fact distinction can succeed. Thus, it is surprising that Fischer's new account, too, turns out to be …Read more
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15Avoidability and LibertarianismFaith and Philosophy 13 (3): 415-421. 1996.Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer’s contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker’s criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker’s criticism. Here we argue that: (i) Fischer’s fir…Read more
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1123Fischer against the dilemma defence: the defence prevailsAnalysis 73 (2): 283-295. 2013.In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PA…Read more
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79Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's argument against the principle of alternative possibilitiesIn David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate. pp. 53--73. 2003.
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1584On the Luck Objection to LibertarianismIn Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 94-115. 2015.Abstract Libertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for the choices (or decisions) we make only if those choices are free, and our choices are free only if they are neither caused nor nomically necessitated by antecedent events. Recently, there have been a number of attempts by philosophers to refute libertarianism by arguing that because a libertarianly free decision (choice) is both causally and nomically undetermined, which decision an agent makes in a deliberative situat…Read more
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47Two fallacious objections to Adams' soft/hard fact distinctionPhilosophical Studies 57 (1). 1989.
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74Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt ScenariosJournal of Philosophy 103 (4): 163-187. 2006.
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124A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianismPhilosophical Explorations 12 (2). 2009.Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpati…Read more
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474Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilitiesPhilosophical Review 104 (2): 247-61. 1995.
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1Responsibility and Frankfurt-type examplesIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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80Blameworthiness, non-robust alternatives, and the principle of alternative expectationsMidwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1). 2005.
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71A problem for the eternity solutionInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (2): 87-95. 1991.
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