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21Freedom from Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of ResponsibilityJournal of Philosophy 90 (2): 98. 1993.
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Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative PossibilitiesIn Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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606The Direct Argument for IncompatibilismIn David Palmer (ed.), David Palmer (ed.) Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 88-106., Oxford University Press. pp. 88-106. 2014.Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) purports to establish the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility, without appealing to the notion of avoidability, a notion on whose analysis compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree. Van Inwagen intended DA to refute compatibilism, or at least to shift the burden of proof onto the compatibilist. In this paper, we offer a critical assessment of DA. We examine a variety of objections to DA due to John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Ishtiyaq…Read more
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36Pereboom’s Defense of Deliberation-Compatibilism: A Problem RemainsThe Journal of Ethics 23 (3): 333-345. 2019.Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism is the most elaborate and most sophisticated current attempt to defend this position. In this paper, I have provided a careful, and open-minded assessment of that defense. The conclusion that emerged is that it is subject to an important objection that leaves him with no explanation of the relevant difference between a scenario in which it would irrational for an agent to deliberate what to do, and a scenario the deliberation-compatibilist would c…Read more
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13Zimmerman on moral responsibility, obligation and alternate possibilitiesAnalysis 54 (4): 285-287. 1994.
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21Blameworthiness, Non‐robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative ExpectationsMidwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1): 292-306. 2005.
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15Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous MonismGrazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1): 95-100. 1992.Recently, Colin McGinn has argued that Kripke's Cartesian argument against the mind-body identity thesis is not effective against anomalous monism. This paper attempts to show that the Cartesian has at his disposal an argument that is stronger than that formulated by Kripke, and one that cannot be rebutted by the anomalous monist in the way suggested by McGinn. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to the sort of identity theory one would have to subscribe to in order to resist the stronger C…Read more
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21In Defense of Davidson's Identity Thesis Regarding Action IndividuationDialectica 43 (3): 281-288. 1989.
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21Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous MonismGrazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1): 95-100. 1992.Recently, Colin McGinn has argued that Kripke's Cartesian argument against the mind-body identity thesis is not effective against anomalous monism. This paper attempts to show that the Cartesian has at his disposal an argument that is stronger than that formulated by Kripke, and one that cannot be rebutted by the anomalous monist in the way suggested by McGinn. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to the sort of identity theory one would have to subscribe to in order to resist the stronger C…Read more
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929The Direct Argument and the burden of proofAnalysis 72 (1): 25-36. 2012.Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) for incompatibilism purports to establish incompatibilism with respect to moral responsibility and determinism without appealing to assumptions that compatibilists usually consider controversial. Recently, Michael McKenna has presented a novel critique of DA. McKenna's critique raises important issues about philosophical dialectics. In this article, we address those issues and contend that his argument does not succeed
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592Why God's beliefs are not hard-type soft factsReligious Studies 38 (1): 77-88. 2002.John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: (1) God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘hard-type soft facts’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; (2) in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to the fixity of the past. In this paper, I take issue…Read more
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145In Defense of Non-Causal LibertarianismAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1): 1-14. 2018.Non-Causal Libertarianism (NCL) is a libertarian position which aims to provide a non-causal account of action and freedom to do otherwise. NCL has been recently criticized from a number of quarters, notably from proponents of free will skepticism and agent-causation. The main complaint that has been voiced against NCL is that it does not provide a plausible account of an agent’s control over her action, and therefore, the account of free action it offers is inadequate. Some critics (mainly agen…Read more
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230Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities: A further lookPhilosopical Perspectives 14 (s14): 181-202. 2000.
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736Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative PossibilitiesFaith and Philosophy 17 (2): 249-254. 2000.In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type sce…Read more
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35Contra Snapshot OckhamismInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (2). 1996.Recently, John Fischer has proposed a novel account of the hard/soft distinction which is an entailment account. At its basis is the idea that a fact about a time T as a soft fact about T if it entails a fact about a time later than T; and a fact about a time T as a hard fact about T if it does not do so. Elsewhere, I have expressed serious doubts whether an entailment account of the hard/soft fact distinction can succeed. Thus, it is surprising that Fischer's new account, too, turns out to be …Read more
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14Avoidability and LibertarianismFaith and Philosophy 13 (3): 415-421. 1996.Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer’s contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker’s criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker’s criticism. Here we argue that: (i) Fischer’s fir…Read more
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1091Fischer against the dilemma defence: the defence prevailsAnalysis 73 (2): 283-295. 2013.In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PA…Read more
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78Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's argument against the principle of alternative possibilitiesIn David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate. pp. 53--73. 2003.
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1551On the Luck Objection to LibertarianismIn Carlos Moya, Andrei Buckareff & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 94-115. 2015.Abstract Libertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for the choices (or decisions) we make only if those choices are free, and our choices are free only if they are neither caused nor nomically necessitated by antecedent events. Recently, there have been a number of attempts by philosophers to refute libertarianism by arguing that because a libertarianly free decision (choice) is both causally and nomically undetermined, which decision an agent makes in a deliberative situat…Read more
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47Two fallacious objections to Adams' soft/hard fact distinctionPhilosophical Studies 57 (1). 1989.
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217Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt ScenariosJournal of Philosophy 103 (4): 163-187. 2006.
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120A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianismPhilosophical Explorations 12 (2). 2009.Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpati…Read more
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