This paper defends phenomenal conservatism as an epistemology of logic (‘PC-Logic’), according to which basic logical beliefs are prima facie justified when they seem obvious to us. A central challenge—the ‘obscurity objection’—holds that PC-Logic offers a mysterious or unintelligible account of such justification. I examine leading versions of this objection and contend that each fails. In particular, I argue that logical seemings are no more obscure than other justificatory appearances and tha…
Read moreThis paper defends phenomenal conservatism as an epistemology of logic (‘PC-Logic’), according to which basic logical beliefs are prima facie justified when they seem obvious to us. A central challenge—the ‘obscurity objection’—holds that PC-Logic offers a mysterious or unintelligible account of such justification. I examine leading versions of this objection and contend that each fails. In particular, I argue that logical seemings are no more obscure than other justificatory appearances and that evolutionary considerations can demystify the reliability of logical seemings.
