Davide Bordini

In this paper, I investigate the relation between recipes and taste. In particular, I do three things. First, I sketch and articulate different versions of essentialism, a view that I take to reflect our pre-theoretical intuitions on the matter. Roughly, on this view, taste is essentially related to recipes—either by contributing to their identity or by being otherwise strongly related to it. Second, I argue that no version of essentialism is really convincing; hence, I conclude, recipes and taste are not essentially related. Third, after drawing some general lessons from the discussion, I lay the ground for an alternative approach to account for that relation. My final suggestion will be that the main source of the relation between recipes and taste is not to be found in recipes themselves and their essences, but in dishes—i.e., the concrete instances of a recipe.

In this paper, I investigate the relation between recipes and taste. In particular, I do three things. First, I sketch and articulate different versions of essentialism, a view that I take to reflect our pre-theoretical intuitions on the matter. Roughly, on this view, taste is essentially related to recipes—either by contributing to their identity or by being otherwise strongly related to it. Second, I argue that no version of essentialism is really convincing; hence, I conclude, recipes and taste are not essentially related. Third, after drawing some general lessons from the discussion, I lay the ground for an alternative approach to account for that relation. My final suggestion will be that the main source of the relation between recipes and taste is not to be found in recipes themselves and their essences, but in dishes—i.e., the concrete instances of a recipe.

According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience (e.g., Dretske, 1995, 1996; Tye, 1995, 2000). This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.). Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear intentional. Standardly, intentionalists have re-described moods’ undirectedness in terms of directedness towards everything or the whole world (e.g., Crane, 1998; Seager, 1999). This move offers the intentionalist a way out, but is quite unsatisfying. More recently, Angela Mendelovici (2013a, b) has suggested something that looks more interesting and promising: instead of re-describing moods’ phenomenology, she accepts its undirectedness at face value and tries to explain it in intentionalist terms. In this paper, I focus on and criticize Mendelovici’s proposal. As I will show, despite its prima facie virtues, the view is poorly motivated. For, contrary to what Mendelovici argues, introspection does not support her proposal—arguably, it provides some evidence against it. So, the problem that intentionalism has with moods is not solved, but is still there.

According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience (e.g., Dretske, 1995, 1996; Tye, 1995, 2000). This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.). Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear intentional. Standardly, intentionalists have re-described moods’ undirectedness in terms of directedness towards everything or the whole world (e.g., Crane, 1998; Seager, 1999). This move offers the intentionalist a way out, but is quite unsatisfying. More recently, Angela Mendelovici (2013a, b) has suggested something that looks more interesting and promising: instead of re-describing moods’ phenomenology, she accepts its undirectedness at face value and tries to explain it in intentionalist terms. In this paper, I focus on and criticize Mendelovici’s proposal. As I will show, despite its prima facie virtues, the view is poorly motivated. For, contrary to what Mendelovici argues, introspection does not support her proposal—arguably, it provides some evidence against it. So, the problem that intentionalism has with moods is not solved, but is still there.

According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience (e.g., Dretske, 1995, 1996; Tye, 1995, 2000). This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.). Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear intentional. Standardly, intentionalists have re-described moods’ undirectedness in terms of directedness towards everything or the whole world (e.g., Crane, 1998; Seager, 1999). This move offers the intentionalist a way out, but is quite unsatisfying. More recently, Angela Mendelovici (2013a, b) has suggested something that looks more interesting and promising: instead of re-describing moods’ phenomenology, she accepts its undirectedness at face value and tries to explain it in intentionalist terms. In this paper, I focus on and criticize Mendelovici’s proposal. As I will show, despite its prima facie virtues, the view is poorly motivated. For, contrary to what Mendelovici argues, introspection does not support her proposal—arguably, it provides some evidence against it. So, the problem that intentionalism has with moods is not solved, but is still there.

What makes any intentional state about something? Call this the Question of Aboutness (QA). In his article, Crane discusses and criticizes Putnam’s argument for the assumption that a plausible theory of intentionality should answer QA. Crane focuses on the crucial premise: the claim that what goes for physical representations goes for mental representations. Accepting such a claim, Crane argues, depends on one’s commitment to physicalism or anti-psychologism, two substantial and controversial assumptions one is not forced to accept. Hence, he concludes, the requirement of answering QA should not be imposed as a constraint on theories of intentionality. In my commentary, I do three things. First, contra Crane, I argue that Putnam’s crucial premise can be accepted regardless of one’s commitment to physicalism or anti-psychologism. Second, I sketch an alternative way of justifying that premise on purely methodological grounds. This leads to an improved version of Putnam’s argument. Third, borrowing Kriegel’s distinction between subjective and objective mental representation, I sketch a way of resisting the improved version of Putnam’s argument. However, I argue, that is not enough to prevent some version of QA from arising. So, an answer to QA (or some version of it) still constrains theories of intentionality.

This chapter focuses on the controversies surrounding the transparency of experience (or simply transparency), an (alleged) introspective datum that has played a central role in debates on the nature of perceptual experience and phenomenal consciousness. The main emphasis is on issues arising in relation to transparency and introspection, though its significance for the metaphysics of experience is also stressed. First, the chapter outlines Harman’s and Tye’s characterization of transparency and the conclusions they draw about the metaphysics of experience. Next, it discusses the relation between this characterization and introspection by addressing two central questions: first, what picture of introspection is suggested by Harman’s and Tye’s transparency thesis? Second, does introspection genuinely support this thesis? The discussion reveals that Harman’s and Tye’s characterization of transparency relies on substantial and controversial theoretical assumptions that go beyond what can be established on purely (or largely) introspective grounds. In this way, the chapter highlights the main points of disagreement about transparency and, when relevant, their implications for the metaphysics of experience. It concludes by sketching a way of structuring the debate and raising further questions about the genuine pre-theoretical core of transparency and why theoretical supplementation plays such a pivotal role.

One of the most fundamental divides in contemporary philosophy of consciousness is whether phenomenal consciousness requires some form of self-consciousness. More specifically, disagreement revolves around the “Awareness Principle”: For any subject S and conscious mental state M of S, S is aware of M. We call the relevant awareness of one’s own mental states “inner awareness.” While the Awareness Principle (or some idea in the vicinity) was largely accepted by early phenomenologists and early analytic philosophers, it is much more disputed by contemporary philosophers of mind. In this chapter, we offer a bird’s-eye view of philosophical debates surrounding the Awareness Principle. Our goal is to review the main theoretical options available on the market. We open by distinguishing various versions of the Awareness Principle (§1) before addressing the place of inner awareness in the history of philosophy (§2) and in contemporary debates on consciousness (§3).

Since the 1990s the so-called transparency of experience has played a crucial role in core debates in philosophy of mind. However, recent developments in the literature have made transparency itself quite opaque. The very idea of transparent experience has become quite fuzzy, due to the articulation of many different notions of transparency and transparency theses. Absent a unified logical space where these notions and theses can be mapped and confronted, we are left with an overall impression of conceptual chaos. This is a problem, given the constant and ubiquitous references to transparency in the literature and its prominent position in the contemporary philosophy of mind. My goal in this paper is to restore clarity through proper analysis of the mutual relations between the different transparency theses. This allows me to uncover a unitary multidimensional logical space where existing (as well as possible) views can be properly singled out and located.