Davide Perrotta

This paper proposes applying Husserl’s phenomenological concepts of noesis and noema to contemporary understandings of unconscious mechanisms, with a particular focus on cognitive-behavioral therapies (CBT). The approach will examine mainstream cognitivist concepts, such as cognitive restructuring and appraisal theory, while integrating a phenomenological perspective. Additionally, it will explore some key aspects of the third wave of CBT. In the first section, I contextualize the notion of unconscious mechanisms within contemporary CBT research, which lays the groundwork for explaining why I focus on Husserl rather than psychiatric phenomenology. This choice underscores the relevance of Husserl’s thought for understanding unconscious processes in a cognitive-behavioral context. By clarifying what I mean by unconscious mechanisms when discussing cognitive restructuring, I introduce an application of Husserlian concepts of noesis and noema to explain how they can contribute to further developing this technique. In the first part, I will focus on the epistemic values of cognitive functions, which I define as the “epistemic analysis of experience”. Next, I will introduce the concept of “phenomenological deconstitution”, a broader technique that encompasses what has been previously presented, while delving more deeply into the content of cognitions, emotions, and feelings. In the final section, I incorporate insights from third-wave CBT on emotional processing, demonstrating how these insights complement the earlier discussion and showing the applicability of Husserl’s concept of noema. Throughout the paper, I propose practical applications of these phenomenological insights, particularly in the context of unconscious mechanisms as studied in CBT.

In this paper, I discuss the concept of phenomenological data by analyzing it in comparison with neurophenomenology and similar approaches that employ qualitative tools in empirical studies. I argue that although such data are often labeled as “phenomenological,” they do not meet the epistemological criteria of phenomenology properly understood. I distinguish the epistemological concept of consciousness (pure consciousness) from the psychological concept of the Self (empirical consciousness), and then suggest that neurophenomenology and related approaches are primarily focused on the Self. As a result, they fail to engage with consciousness as originally conceived by Husserl. After briefly introducing the core principles of phenomenology to demonstrate its focus on the universal structures of consciousness, I apply them to interpret two neurophenomenological experiments, so as to reveal the underlying epistemological difference. I identify contingent or empirical elements that are implicitly introduced into these experimental designs, which cannot be defined as universal or invariant. Based on these considerations, I propose that the pure level of analysis, characteristic of phenomenology, is more closely aligned with mainstream cognitive neuroscience than with neurophenomenology and qualitative methods. Finally, I will draw upon the previous discussions to propose an epistemological shift in experimental studies. New insights into the universal processing of consciousness are proposed as a more robust approach to investigating the universal brain processing. Keywords: Essences, Cognitive Neuroscience, Phenomenology, Neurophenomenology,

This paper proposes a pluralistic model of explanation that expands the epistemological foundations of cognitive science by integrating phenomenological analysis into the framework of neurocognitive mechanisms. We endorse the neurocognitive approach, which accounts for cognitive capacities as higher-level aspects exhibited by a multilevel computing mechanism- namely the brain. Building on this foundation, we argue that phenomenological functional analysis – understood as constitutive analyses of cognitive dynamics- adds a complementary level that can clarify the internal structure of cognitive capacities. Phenomenology, in this sense, provides epistemic constraints that help scaffold empirical research by revealing how capacities are enacted across different experiential layers. We introduce phenomenological cognitivism as a framework for functionally decomposing experience into constitutive operations and representational structures, offering descriptions that remain compatible with computational and biological modeling. Rather than appealing to qualitative or first-person content, this approach formulates structured analyses of experience that support formal integration. In the final section, we illustrate this proposal with a pluralistic model of inhibition, distinguishing motor from mental inhibition. We show how phenomenological functional analysis reveals representational and functional distinctions overlooked at behavioral or computational levels. This pluralistic framework thus broadens the scope of cognitive modeling by embedding neurocognitive mechanisms within conceptual richness of phenomenological analyses.

: This paper investigates epistemological differences in the cognitive neuroscientific and phenomenological approaches to outstanding questions in psychiatry. We argue that clinical neuroscience provides scientific explanation in line with a mechanistic approach and describe several examples from computational approaches that illustrate what research on neural processing can tell us about psychiatric diseases. By contrast, phenomenology offers complex descriptions of experiential phenomena. Through a discussion of executive function and the related construct of impulsivity, we show that both cognitive neuroscience and phenomenology provide valuable types of explanation. Our focus on psychopathology also allows us to address some important epistemic differences between these two disciplines. Keywords: Phenomenology; Consciousness; Clinical Neuroscience; Computational Neuroscience; Cognitive Mechanisms Coscienza e meccanismi cerebrali: ricerche epistemologiche tra fenomenologia e neuroscienza clinica Riassunto: Il presente lavoro propone di esaminare le differenze epistemologiche tra la fenomenologia e le neuroscienze cognitive riguardo dibattiti psichiatrici. Le neuroscienze cliniche saranno discusse in linea con un approccio meccanicista della spiegazione scientifica, mentre descrizioni fenomenologiche saranno proposte nel momento in cui complessi fenomeni esperenziali dovranno essere indagati. Un’interpretazione meccanicista delle neuroscienze cognitive sarà esemplificata ricorrendo ad alcuni esempi dagli approcci computazionali che si occupano di questi temi, i quali ci aiuteranno a definire cosa le ricerche sui processi neurali ci stanno dicendo rispetto alle sintomatologie psichiatriche. Questi argomenti saranno sviluppati attraverso una discussione che verterà sulle funzioni esecutive e il costrutto di impulsività a esse legato. Sarà discusso come sia le neuroscienze cognitive sia la fenomenologia possano fornire specifiche forme di spiegazione. Allo stesso tempo, si proporrà un’argomentazione che consentirà di discernere differenze epistemiche che caratterizzano i suddetti approcci, le quali potranno con più facilità emergere nel dibattito psichiatrico. Parole chiave : Fenomenologia; Coscienza; Neuroscienza clinica; Neuroscienza computazionale; Meccanismi cognitivi

Riassunto: Applicando il metodo fenomenologico e ricostruendo alcune tematiche della ricerca neuroscientifica, verranno nel testo discriminate le strutture trascendentali dell’esperienza, attraverso le quali il mondo circostante acquisisce significato, e le computazioni inconsce indagate nel dominio psico-fisiologico. L’emozionalità umana coinvolge meccanismi neurali-istintivi che precedono l’attività cosciente, ed essi possono essere esclusivamente investigati ricorrendo a metodi causali-quantitativi. La motivazione, che può essere descritta attraverso il metodo fenomenologico, esprime una forma di causalità più complessa, che ci consente di riflettere sulla nostra emozionalità all’interno del flusso temporale della coscienza. La distinzione tra emozione e sentimento offre un importante indizio per comprendere la dimensione causale della prima rispetto alle caratteristiche motivazionali della seconda: in questo modo, potremo meglio approfondire il ruolo del sentimento in fenomenologia, coinvolgendo esso processi temporali-costitutivi. Parole chiave: Fenomenologia; Neuroscienza; Causalità; Emozione; Motivazione. Emotional Experience between Causality and Motivation: Phenomenology and Neuroscience on the Human Capacity for Reflection: Applying the phenomenological method and drawing on neuroscientific research, I discriminate between the transcendental structures of experience, through which the surrounding world acquires meaning, and unconscious computations made in the psycho-physiological domain. Human emotionality involves neuronal-instinctive mechanisms that precede subjective conscious activity, and these can only be investigated using causal-quantitative methods. Motivation, which can be described using the phenomenological method, speaks to a more complex causality, that allows us to reflect on our emotionality within the temporal flux of consciousness. The distinction between emotion and feeling offers an important clue to understanding the causal dimension of the former and the motivational characteristics of the latter: in this way, we can better understand the role that feeling, which involves constitutive-temporal processes, plays in phenomenology. Keywords: Phenomenology; Neuroscience; Causality; Emotion; Motivation