Dawei Zhang

對《莊子》中著名寓言故事的邏輯分析和章義解釋表明，懷疑者在提出文本核心論題和提出道德建議方面擔任重要角色，一些角色是明顯的懷疑者，另一些角色是隱藏的懷疑者；懷疑者的共同特徵是對更高的認知與價值立場以及心靈轉化持懷疑與無知態度。但是懷疑者的處境不是被决定的，而是有實現心靈轉化的可能性，關鍵的影響因素是承認認知與價值立場存在等級這一事實，幷認識到懷疑者自身的自大、自矜、傲慢或狹隘等理智與道德上的惡德。理解小大之辯或價值等級的道理，如此便能從懷疑者逐漸轉變爲非懷疑者，繼而成爲抱道懷德者。莊子雖然刻畫了或隱或顯的懷疑者形象，但莊子本人幷不是知識論和倫理學（價值論）的懷疑主義者，也不是非道德主義者和道德相對主義者，而是明確主張「小知不及大知」，即存在認知與價值等級，幷且建議以間接的、非强制的話語向懷疑者提出具有規範力量的道德建議。 Logical analysis and chapter interpretation of well-known fables in the Zhuangzi suggest that skeptics assume important roles in formulating the central themes of the text and in offering moral advice, some as apparent skeptics and others as hidden skeptics; the common characteristic of skeptics is their attitude of skepticism and ignorance of higher cognitive and value standpoints and of spiritual transformation. But the skeptic's status is not determined; rather, there is the possibility of spiritual transformation, and the key influencing factor is the acknowledgment of the fact that there is a hierarchy of cognitive and value standpoints, and the awareness of the skeptic’s own intellectual and moral vices such as egotism, self-conceit, arrogance, or narrow-mindedness. Understanding the rationale for the debate between the small and the large or the value hierarchy, one can gradually transform oneself from a skeptic to a non-skeptic, and then to a person who holds the Dao and the virtues. Although he portrays the skeptic either implicitly or explicitly, Zhuangzi is not an epistemological or ethical skeptic, nor is he an amoralist or moral relativist, but he explicitly asserts that "small knowledge is inferior to great knowledge", i.e., that there is a hierarchy of cognition and value, and suggests that the skeptic should be offered moral advice in an indirect, non-coercive discourse.

Wang Xuanlan criticized the view of time defined by Xin (心) through the way of Chongxuan xue (Twofold Mystery) in Xuanzhulu, and advocated a view of time from the perspective of Dao (道). The core proposition of the time of Xin is expressed as “in the pure Xin, all of the past and the present are included”. The whole content of the time of Xin is the “three periods” constituted by the past, present and future. Wang's criticism of the time of Xin is consistent with that of worldly law such as Xin, words and knowledge. However, the criticism cannot be completed in one step. The result of criticism is not clinging to no-Xin, no-words and non-knowledge, but completely denying all worldly law. In this way, the Dao in the basic position could manifest itself. The view of the time of Dao is expressed as ”the Dao has no birth and death, and the time in it is infinite“.

The research method of Buddhist ethics is contemporary ethical theory, which focuses on precepts (Sila) and disciplines (Vinaya) in experience, rather than transcendental moral ideals (Nirvana or wisdom). Precepts are seen as external norms, while disciplines are internal norms. The former belongs to rule ethics and the latter belongs to virtue ethics. Although the exposition of duty and responsibility can be discovered in Buddhist ethics, there is no sufficient reason to interpret Buddhist ethics as deontology. Views on the consequences of actions can also be found in Buddhist classics, but it is hard to say that Buddhist ethics is the theory of consequences or utilitarianism. The method of rule ethics in the discussion of Buddhist ethics has failed, and Buddhist virtue ethics is a feasible alternative. However, previous research on Buddhist virtue ethics was not perfect, and the teleology of Aristotelian was reasonably criticized. Influenced by caring ethics, emotionalism virtue ethics is a more suitable way to understand Buddhist ethics. The moral reason for Buddhism is a whole argumentation system, including moral rules and moral virtues.

Normal interpersonal treatment is often based on the existence of the rational nature of both the agent and the target of the treatment, and their relationship is reciprocal and mutual. However, when the rational person confronts the irrational person, such as the mentally retarded or vegetative person, the reciprocal relationship cannot be maintained because the targeted person loses his or her rational capacity. But this inequality does not deprive the object of action of the right to be treated rationally, because people treat the irrationally disabled not according to the principle of reason but according to the principle of emotion - specifically, the principle of love. The principle of love often disregards the specific conditions of the object of treatment and still treats them reasonably. Thus, the emotional principle has a broader application in interpersonal treatment.

Intertextuality (mutual illustration) is a common rhetorical device in ancient Chinese and has been used many times in Laozi (Dao Dejing). Intertextuality (mutual illustration) is of unique significance for understanding the linguistic structure and philosophical thoughts of Lao-zi. According to the current research on mutual illustration rhetoric on ancient Chinese, the forms of this rhetoric in Laozi can be divided into mutual illustration of single sentence, of multiple sentences and of ellipsis and antisense. There are only two references to mutual illustration in the annotations of Laozi in the past dynasties, and most of the commentators ignore the importance of mutual illustration in understanding Laozi. By interpreting Laozi through mutual illustration rhetoric, we can make innovations in understanding methods, understanding contents and philosophical thoughts.

From the perspective of perceptual ontology, Laozi criticizes the unnatural state in which the body is concealed in the perceptual social power and ethical relations, and advocates the perceptual liberation of the body. According to different subjects of the body, the covered body should be divided into people’s body and monarchs’ body. The body of the people is concealed in the rites and music, and could be liberated by resuming production; the body of the monarchs is covered in the excessive exercise of power, and could be liberated in the restraint of power. The body is not only in the ethical relationship of the different order pattern, but also in the power relationship of the same structure of family and country. The power, body and ethics form the internal structure of trinity. The perceptual existence of the body is the basis of power and ethics, and the perceptual liberation of the body is the purpose of power and ethics.

In order to have an effective and reliable understanding of the basic moral concepts, moral propositions and moral reasoning in Daoist ethical thoughts, it is necessary to use the methods of doing philosophy and doing ethics to engage in research work, and thus draw an intellectual conclusion about Daoist ethics. The methods of Daoist ethics mainly include analysis, explanation and comparison. The method of analysis focuses on logical analysis and language analysis of moral language in the classic texts of Daoist ethics. The method of interpretation focuses on effective translation and understanding of moral language with unclear meaning in Daoist ethics. The method of comparison focuses on critical dialogue between ancient Daoist ethical thoughts and contemporary ethical theories and comparison between Confucian, Buddhist and Daoist ethics. Explaining the method of doing Daoist ethics clearly will promote the dialogue and understanding between Daoist ethics and contemporary ethics.

Wuwei (nonaction) is one of the core concepts of Daoist ethics. Edward Slingerland pointed out that wuwei involves a paradox, and Arthur C. Danto questioned whether wuwei could support a genuine moral theory and the idea of right action. To defend Daoist ethics and its concept of right action, it is necessary to envisage Danto’s criticism and the problems raised by Slingerland. According to Ivanhoe, Wuwei is not a paradox, but a riddle or mystery about self-cultivation. He thinks that if people could find the trick to the riddle, they can realize Wuwei. Ivanhoe’s analysis failed. Nickolas Knightly argues that we must acknowledge the paradox of Wuwei squarely. Based on criticizing Ivanhoe’s and Knightly’s schemes, this paper further analyzes the strategies to deal with the paradox of Wuwei. Wuwei should be placed in a specific situation and context. Wuwei requires the agents to have the corresponding psychological motivation, which will not continuously interfere with the purpose of action. Wuwei, as the behavior evaluation word of Daoist ethics, corresponds to moral anti-realism and nonassertive moral abolitionism.