•  132
    This paper argues that the ancestor-simulation hypothesis carries an unexamined commitment about physics. An ancestor simulation, in Bostrom's sense, aims at the actual past, and is therefore constrained by whatever record of that past survives: it is a boundary-value problem, not an initial-value problem. Because chaotic dynamics drive any freely running simulation away from the record within days, a faithful reconstruction requires continuous correction — and invisible correction, since the re…Read more
  •  145
    This paper argues that the simulation hypothesis does not require base reality to be mathematical in character. Discussions of simulation often assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that the reality underlying a simulation must itself be computational, mathematical, or law-governed in a familiar physical sense. I argue that this assumption is not entailed by the hypothesis. A simulated world must be mathematically implementable, but it does not follow that the base reality being approximated …Read more