Dean Komel

The comparative study of the philosophical terminologies can be considered as an important contribution to the intercultural discussion in the contemporary philosophy. The main goal of such terminological investigations is to recognize different philosophic traditions and to found the basis for their dialog. The author examines the Slavic word for the truth »resnica«, which remains present only in the Slovenian language. The Slovenian language as well as the Slovenian philosophical terminology was only partly influenced by the Cyril-Methodian tradition and has retained a lot of terminological possibilities, which take their origins from pre-Cyril-Methodian time. The word »resnica« is examined first by etymology as well as by its historical presence in some other Slavic languages. The grammatical and semantic characteristics of the word are important to understand its philosophical context. In the last part of the article, the author analyses the terminological use of »resnica« by some Slovenian philosophers.

The purpose of the article is to present the outlines of the reception and the influence of Heidegger’s philosophy on the territory of former Yugoslavia. This reception and influence were in their essence co-conditioned by specific political, social and cultural circumstances in the region, which were throughout accompanied by “the syndrome of dehumanization”. The confrontation with Heidegger’s philosophy is therefore co-defined by the profoundly experienced crisis of European humanity. During both world wars the attempt of an overcoming of this crisis of humanity by the means of phenomenological and existentialist philosophy was the main focus of attention. The period after the Second World War is denoted by the linking of Marxism with Heidegger’s attempt to surpass philosophy as metaphysics through the perspective of the history of being; in this context we specifically discuss the Praxis philosophical school and the original philosophical thought of Vanja Sutlić. During the disintegration of Yugoslavia and in the period thereafter, besides the intensive appropriation of Heidegger’s thought through translations and interpretations, which also led to the thorough study of Slavic philosophical terminologies, post-Heideggerian ways of thinking came to the fore, together with the possibility for a new humanization within the wider European and global social framework.

Undoubtedly, a great accomplishment of Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy lies in the fact that he was the first thinker who, by meditating on intersubjectivity, formulated the philosophical possibility through the thinking of culture in terms of intercultural encounters, and that, in this sense, he may have been one step further even from Heidegger, even though he was justifiably reproached by his student that he didn’t venture to overstep the ground of philosophical subjectivist tradition. However, Heidegger was well aware that Husserl’s concept of subjectivity is considerably different from that of the modern age. The argument speaking in favour of this is the possibility of discussing interculturality, which for modern philosophy proves unattainable in so far as it subjects the sphere of culture to the unifying form of subjectivity, without being able to consider it in terms of the constitution of the being-in-the-world– this, for example, being true for all Neo-Kantian theory of culture. By unfolding the universal horizon of the world, Husserl was, within certain limits, capable of giving thought to the relationship between the home world and foreign world as well as the possibility of mutual encounters of various cultural worlds. It is on this basis that we are trying to develop the hermeneutics of interculturality which concentrates primarily on the intermediate space of intercultural encounters and understanding

Phenomenology became established as a wide philosophical movement in the 20th century, without ever becoming unified as a direction in contemporary philosophy. The article attempts to rethink the central motivation of phenomenological thinking, which is expressed as an appeal »To matters themselves«. The main focus in this is devoted to an ear for the utterance of matters themselves, which directs us to the phenomenon of speech that allows us to talk of phenomena. Herder’s reflection on the origin of language provides possible guidance in this connection, insofar as it adopts the articulation of phenomena.

The situation today seems to come to a point where the historicity of philosophy as a way of thinking which responds to being can be easily done away with. The "hermeneutic address" reveals primarily the almost unbearable state of being unaddressed which speechifies without interruption. But where from do we take the supposition of a certain hermeneutic address in philosophy, and what makes it possible for us to expect it from the history of philosophy. The question is strangely connected to a reproach which is often addressed to philosophical hermeneutics, namely that its present condition cannot be related to its origin in Greek first philosophy. The hermeneutic problem would therefore comprise only philosophy in its historical lateness, while being absent in its earliness. This first of all means that the critique of the interpretative reason as the characteristic of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics and the skill of interpretation bearing the name Hermeneutics, have nothing in common; and secondly, all endeavors of relating Hermeneutics and hermeneia as a possibility given to us by the very god Hermes. Although it seems that there is nothing else to be added to the story, let us refocus our attention to the beginning and origin of Hermeneutics, which is usually related to the Greek word "hermeneia" and Greek god of rhetoric, Hermes

According to Nietzsche, a culture which establishes itself in terms of values and in itself represents the value of Europe as such, is obliged to raise the question of its own value. The experience of the critical modernity thus opens up through philosophical perception and understanding of culture so that the communication within the culture becomes critical. Together with Marx and Freud, Nietzsche stands in a row of critics of the Western culture in the second half of the 19th century, receiving a favorable reception in the 20th century. Actually, it is a lot more than just a reception; it is a manysided conceptual transformation of the self-comprehension of philosophy as a whole, which was given a strong impulse by thinkers such as Husserl, Wittgenstein and Heidegger. It is not so much the critique of morality in itself but rather the critique of the moral nature of logic that represents the break and conflict which Nietzsche introduced into modern philosophy. In this context, the word “introduce” proves adequate since it points to the interpretative moment of the break

Članek poskuša odgovoriti na vprašanje, kaj je interkulturnost, pri čemer se najprej skuša ograditi od vseh tistih pomenov, ki se nalagajo na pojmovanje interkulturnosti brez poskusa temeljitejše osmislitve. Tak odgovor nujno vključuje določeno kritiko časa in prostora, v katerem nastopa interkulturnost kot premena samega dojemanja kulture. Interkulturnost je razgrnjena predvsem v elementu »priznavanja«, s katerim je povezano pojmovanje sveta prebivanja. To omogoča, da interkulturnost definiramo kot kulturo razgovora v poudarjenem smislu.The article is an attempt at answering the question what is interculturality. First of all it brackets out all the meanings that pile up over the conception of interculturality without prior thorough reflection. Such an answer necessarily implies a specific criticism of time and space, in which interculturality appears as the transformation of the very conception of culture. Interculturality is disclosed primarily in the element of “acknowledgement”, which is closely related to the conception of the world of existence. This enables us to define interculturality as the culture of dialogue in the true sense of the word

When Ernst Jünger wrote e Worker, the »Gestalt theory« was already well acclaimed and accepted in psychology, religiology, philosophy, historiography, etc. e most general denition of the »Gestalt« can be traced back to Aristo- tle: the “Gestalt” as a whole is more than the sum of its parts. But this denition does not mean much, if we understand the relation between the whole and its parts merely in a formal manner, and not organically. e livingly connected relation is in question, which means, that in order to set the transition between the whole and the parts in motion an eort or energy must be invested, otherwise we remain without an impression

When discussing philosophical hermeneutics, the word »philosophical« is not just an ordinary attribute. Above all, it denotes the very activity of philosophy itself, which in itself discloses the hermeneutic question of the possibility of truth. The development of the 20th century philosophical hermeneutics thus depends on the philosophy’s historical facing the question of the possibility of its immanent truth. This »historical« dimension is not something extrinsic to philosophy, but rather an intrinsic quality of the possibility of philosophical thinking itself, which implies the basic presupposition of philosophical hermeneutics we’re here trying to indicate and develop. We therefore accept in advance the historical criterion of philosophical thinking.

Kada se raspravlja o filozofskoj hermeneutici, riječ »filozofska« nije tek običan atribut. Prije svega, ona označava zbiljsku djelatnost filozofije same, koja u sebi razotkriva hermeneutičko pitanje o mogućnosti istine. Razvoj filozofske hermeneutike u 20. st. ovisi dakle o povijesnom suočavanju filozofije s pitanjem o mogućnosti njene imanentne istine. Ova »povijesna« dimenzija nije nešto izvanjsko filozofiji, već njena unutarnja sposobnost mogućnosti samog filozofskog mišljenja koje implicira temeljnu pretpostavku filozofske hermeneutike na koju ovdje pokušavamo ukazati i razraditi. Stoga unaprijed prihvaćamo povijesni kriterij filozofskog mišljenja.When discussing philosophical hermeneutics, the word »philosophical« is not just an ordinary attribute. Above all, it denotes the very activity of philosophy itself, which in itself discloses the hermeneutic question of the possibility of truth. The development of the 20th century philosophical hermeneutics thus depends on the philosophy’s historical facing the question of the possibility of its immanent truth. This »historical« dimension is not something extrinsic to philosophy, but rather an intrinsic quality of the possibility of philosophical thinking itself, which implies the basic presupposition of philosophical hermeneutics we’re here trying to indicate and develop. We therefore accept in advance the historical criterion of philosophical thinking

he article tackles the distinction between multiculturalism and interculturality, which evinces a phenomenological relevance, insofar it concerns the investigation of the worldhood of the world. The first problem arising in this respect is the issue of gaining phenomenological evidence of such distinction. It is necessary to take into account the historical relationship of philosophy and culture. This is evinced in the measure of the epochal opening up of truth, which proves decisive for grounding historical humanness. The discussion of interculturality therefore cannot avoid historical nihilism as the determining cultural disposition of contemporary Europe, which in the meantime grew to planetary proportions. Phenomenological original evidence that the world speaks in various languages hereby stumbles upon its historical limit as marked by controversial announcements of the “end of history”. The fact that phenomenology of today lacks the evidence of differentiating between multiculturalism and interculturality is not some sort of theoretical deficit but rather the epochal withdrawal which brings to the fore a conversation and opens up an understanding of interculturality as the culture in conversation

It seems that everything in hermeneutics begins with the question and that the very phenomenon of hermeneutics is regarded by contemporary philosophy more as a question than as a concept. It is for this very reason that it seems necessary to start a hermeneutic discussion on the possibility of philosophy as principally critical thinking, which does not only attempt to rehabilitate its previous greatness. Philosophical hermeneutics cannot accept the role of merely providing an alternative answer to the question of the possibility of philosophy, nor should it seek and find the answer in what philosophy used to be. Philosophical hermeneutics cannot impose itself neither as a new nor as a different response to philosophy. Rather, it must first and foremost respond to its question, and through this only, following Schleiermacher, hermeneutics is an ability of understanding the language of the other. And of course, we have to ask ourselves straight away, where, on which spot, from which side should philosophical hermeneutics approach this issue?

The purpose of this article is to consider interculturalism as a sort of pseudonym: it does not only deal with culture, but also with its subtracted truth. For this reason, an intercultural theory that simply criticizes Eurocentrism and western hegemony countering them with the prospects of diversity totally misses the target: change should occur originating from inside the same thought that has originated Eurocentrism. Here interculturalism differs from multiculturalism which defends diversity without seeking a common ground, identifiable, according to the Author, with the intermediate state of being in the world

The underlying premise of this essay is that the essential contribution of the hermeneutic turn in contemporary philosophy is the acknowledgment of a historical criterion of thinking, whereby the philosophical tradition is claimed by the question of its own truth. Philosophy, historically established by founding experience in truth, thus finds itself facing the open experience of truth, i.e. the truth as the coming about of the openness. Philosophical hermeneutics, as differing from hermeneutic philosophy, cannot limit itself solely to interpretative criticism. Rather, it must follow the opening of truth primarily happening in transit from thinking to language. And the moment of this transit is the question of ourselves.

Taken philosophically, Europeanness is the origin of intercultural encountering and understanding rather than some sort of substantial basis of common cultures. This of course doesn’t imply the negation of historical foundations of common European existence, which were the key determinations -- be they good or bad -- of its geography. However, these determinations remain obscure unless the horizon and the ground are constituted from the midst as the intercultural midst of the world. Intercultural evidence of culture reveals itself from within the midst of the world as the ground and horizon of mutual encountering

The question of the contemporaneity of Europe appears in the context of dialogue on the common European future, which, on the one hand is an achievement of the encounter of diverse cultural languages and, on the other, dictated through reflection on what is reestablishing the Europe of today as a world’s. Views on “opening the future” and “enabling development” cannot be mutually harmonized, since there is a lack of experience of contemporaneity in the jointing of horizons. From this experience also comes the common interest in European dialogue. The diversity of European languages does not prove to be an obstacle to reestablishing this dialogue, but its vital condition. It is, namely, the historically mediated possibility that brings the essential difference into the uniform process of the expansion of power without difference