Dean Zimmerman

Swinburne’s analysis of omnipotence in _The Coherence of Theism_ fails due to counterexamples like Plantinga’s McEar. Recently, Swinburne has suggested a fix in terms of the relative sizes of the sets of states of affairs that could be brought about by different candidates for omnipotence. The idea is a good one, though it requires some fleshing out and, in the end, it is not without its problems. An alternative response to McEar is explored, which makes use of the ability to prevent all other possible beings from exercising their powers. Finally, a rather different sort of counterexample is raised, involving future contingencies that depend upon the free actions of others; and a further revision is proposed to deal with it.

In “Truth and Molinism”, Trenton Merricks criticizes the argument against Molinism at the core of William Hasker's book, God, Time, and Knowledge. Merricks claims that, if Hasker's argument against Molinism is a good one, it also refutes theories of subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals that endorse ‘centering’ (like those of Stalnaker and Lewis). Merricks also offers a direct objection to Hasker's argument. But Hasker's anti‐Molinist argument can be embraced by advocates of centering; and Merricks's refutation of Hasker fails.

William Lane Craig has criticized nearly every important claim made in the course of ‘Yet Another Anti‐Molinist Argument’. Zimmerman replies to Craig's main criticisms of the three stages of that argument. The objections to the first two stages misfire due to Craig's gratuitous redefinition of what Zimmerman means by calling Molinist conditionals ‘brute’. Craig's objections to the final stage are more interesting; but, ultimately, they do not seriously undermine Zimmerman's case against Molinism.

There are two ways to combine the doctrine of complete divine foreknowledge with the philosophical thesis of libertarianism (i.e., that freedom and determinism are incompatible): Molinism (which requires the truth of what Plantinga has called “counterfactuals of freedom”) and simple foreknowledge (which does not). David Hunt has ably defended simple foreknowledge against its many critics; and he has claimed that God would have more providential control over the course of history if simple foreknowledge were true than if open theism were true (i.e., than if God did not know the outcomes of free choices until they happened). I develop a framework for describing different views about the “stages” in complete divine foreknowledge, and examine the providential advantages Hunt describes.

There is much philosophical controversy about what it is for a thing to occupy a place. Many metaphysicians accept a dualism of space and space-occupiers, and posit a fundamental location relation that holds between the two; but they disagree about the nature of that relation. Simultaneously, several analytic theologians have been developing occupation accounts of omnipresence — theories according to which God’s presence in space is not highly derivative or indirect, but is rather a species of whatever fundamental relation holds between other things and space. The aim of the chapter is to defend the viability of occupation accounts; and to sharpen the tools of analytic theologians — so that the range of alternatives available to them becomes clearer — by careful examination of the two main rival metaphysical theories of location.

Acts of worship typically involve expressions of fealty: One takes off one’s shoes, bows low, or falls on one’s face. Experiences that naturally prompt such expressions – the sense that one is in the presence of God in an unusual and profound way – raise interesting metaphysical questions about divine presence and absence. Talk of special divine presence poses serious puzzles. In the Jewish scriptures – and in the writings and words of those who treat these scriptures with reverence, whatever their religion – there is much talk of God’s presence and of God’s absence. And yet, God is also affirmed to be everywhere. How can God be everywhere, but also absent from some places, and especially present in others? Metaphysics is a likely place to look for a range of possible answers to this simple but puzzling question.

_In a series of thought-provoking and original essays, eighteen leading philosophers engage in head-to-head debates of nine of the most cutting edge topics in contemporary metaphysics._ Explores the fundamental questions in contemporary metaphysics in a series of eighteen original essays - 16 of which are newly commissioned for this volume Features an introductory essay by the editors on the nature of metaphysics to prepare the reader for ongoing discussions Offers readers the unique opportunity to observe leading philosophers engage in head-to-head debate on cutting-edge metaphysical topics Provides valuable insights into the flourishing field of contemporary metaphysics.

This extensively revised and expanded edition of van Inwagen and Zimmerman’s popular collection of readings in metaphysics now features twenty-two additional selections, new sections on existence and reality, and an updated editorial commentary. Collects classic and contemporary readings in metaphysics Answers some of the most puzzling questions about our world and our place in it Covers an unparalleled range of topics Now includes a new section on existence and reality, expanded discussions on many classic issues, and an updated editorial commentary.

I have argued that contemporary humeans face a trilemma: either (i) give up temporal parts. (ii) deny the humean supervenience of causal relations, or (iii) deny the possibility of there being a difference between rotating and nonrotating homogeneous spheres. Mark Scala (“Homogeneous Simples”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64, 2002) describes an interesting class of seemingly possible objects, spinning and stationary simples; and argues their possibility undermines my argument. I argue that it does not. And 1 conclude with a more general assessment of the status of objections to humeanism from the possibility of homogeneous objects in motion.

Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here.

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the eighth volume in the series. It contains essays by Cian Dorr and John Hawthorne, Maya Eddon, Shamik Dasgupta, Bill Dunaway, Cody Gilmore, Ted Sider, Aaron Cotnoir, Katherine Hawley, Frabrice Correia and Sven Rosencrantz, David Braddon-Mitchell, and Ross Cameron.

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighboring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the 13th volume in the series. It is divided into three parts. Part I concerns parts and pluralities. It begins with Peter van Inwagen’s proposed paraphrase techniques to help nihilists handle certain challenging sentences. In chapter two, Simon Thunder defends manyism: the view that each composite object is simply its many parts. The third chapter presents Joshua Spencer’s puzzle that affects prominent answers to the Special Composition Question. Part II looks at causation, counterfactuals, and essence. It opens with chapter four, where Bradford Skow categorizes varieties of causal relevance and compares them to varieties of relevance found in other domains. In chapter five, John Hawthorne and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri propose a novel translation scheme from the language of quantified model logic into the language of counterpart theory. In chapter six, Sungil Han argues against the definitional model of essence. Topics in Part III include persistence, time, and change. Chapter seven, by Kristie Miller and Caroline West, contends that the normative argument against perdurantism fails. In chapter eight, Martin Pickup proposes a new solution to the problem of change: situationalism. Then, in the final chapter of the volume, Alexander Kaiserman articulates a novel tense logic and uses it to argue that past alteration is possible.