Deborah Goldgaber

How and why, historian of science Lily Kay asks, did the ‘biological problem of DNA-based protein synthesis’ come to be represented ‘as an information code and a writing technology?’ What sort of metaphor was ‘code’ for these bio-geneticists? One whose run-away expansion, Derrida noted in Of Grammatology (1967), urgently required philosophical justification. Yet, 60 years later, there is still fundamental disagreement about its meaning and epistemic status. If the metaphor lacks ontological purchase, what accounts for its effectiveness? If, on the other hand, scriptural metaphors get at the common root of culture and biology, what do we now mean by ‘code’? In this article, I trace several influential accounts of the metaphor’s effectiveness—making explicit the opposing notions of ‘code’ that animate them—and argue that each is too limited. Greater attention to the metaphoricity of ‘code’ yields a more philosophically productive and critical account of the metaphor of code.

In On Touching, Derrida commends philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy for ‘taking into account [the] plasticity and technicity “at the heart” of the “body proper.”’ Specifying the meaning of this plasticity and technicity, Derrida writes, the"[s]upplementarity of technical prosthetics originarily spaces out, defers, or expropriates all originary properness: there is no “the” sense of touch, there is no “originary” or essentially originary touching before it." What is ‘proper’ or ‘original’ to the body, it seems, is not any set of properties or capacities – including sensorial or perceptual powers – but rather the ‘plastic and substitutive structure of prosthetics’, the very possibility of the body’s ‘technical’ supplementation.

In this paper, I argue that poet M. Nourbese Philip's Zong! allows us to radically rethink the possibility of historical restitution and recovery. The formal ideas in Zong!, I argue, imply a metaphysical and ontological revolution in the way memory and mnesic traces are to be conceived. The evidentiary status of the voices and narratives that Zong! retrieves cannot be certified by historical-epistemological conceptions of evidence but rather find their warrant in alternative, ontological (or hauntological) registers.

This article explores the ways new materialism centers the problem of morphogenesis—and de-centers language and culture—in philosophical accounts of corporeality. Attention to organic structures gives insight into the entanglement of nature and culture obscured by tendencies to think matter as lacking agential features. I suggest, in conclusion, that new materialism may operate with a notion of “entanglement” or “intra-activity” that is too productive. New materialisms may require a more pliable set of distinctions to capture the relations between morphogenetic forces.

Concluding his reading of Saussure in Of Grammatology, Derrida seems to take a breathtaking leap. Asserting the absolute generality of the "written trace," he writes: "Articulating the living upon the nonliving, origin of all repetition, origin of ideality, the trace is not more ideal than real, not more intelligible than sensible, not more a transparent signification than an opaque energy and no concept of metaphysics can describe it."1 Appearing in the context of his reading of Saussure, the trace seemed to be about the nature of the linguistic sign, or semiology broadly construed. However, by the chapter's conclusion, the trace and writing are not relative to any context. They function everywhere, articulating...

In “History of Sexuality” Foucault argued that repression is the wrong model of power, understanding it in exclusively negative terms, as external to the body it constrains and inhibits. Power may also be positive, productive, and constitutive of the body and its possibilities. Thus, an adequate account of the relation between cultural forces and the body, Foucault argues, must challenge the “repressive hypothesis”. Contemporary feminist accounts of the body are structured by this same oppositional view of power Foucault assumed: to call on Rosi Braidotti’s distinction, discursive forces are either negative or repressive or positive and empowering. In this paper I argue that this opposition forecloses several possibilities for thinking the morphogenetic role of culture. In particular, it assumes wrongly that repressive relations cannot be productive.