Today, Kant's political philosophy faces two challenges. Some think it is an obsolete theory, grounded in a highly metaphysical moral philosophy. Others think it is no more than a theory of the liberal, night-watchman state. The most prevalent view holds that right and political obligation are derived from the categorical imperative, and that Kant's political philosophy is merely a subdivision of Kantian morality. Defenders and opponents of Kant likewise argue that such a derivation is impossibl…
Read moreToday, Kant's political philosophy faces two challenges. Some think it is an obsolete theory, grounded in a highly metaphysical moral philosophy. Others think it is no more than a theory of the liberal, night-watchman state. The most prevalent view holds that right and political obligation are derived from the categorical imperative, and that Kant's political philosophy is merely a subdivision of Kantian morality. Defenders and opponents of Kant likewise argue that such a derivation is impossible because: the categorical imperative is a synthetic proposition and the principle of right is an analytic one, and therefore the latter cannot be derived from the former; and the heteronomous incentives tied to the state's laws preclude the law from sharing in the domain of moral autonomy. ;I oppose both views. First, I show that the categorical imperative is analytic, not synthetic, and that both the moral law and the law of right are in fact grounded in freedom itself. Second, I argue that the domain of the moral law encompasses all human activity, independent of incentive and motivation, and that moral worth is a subset of this domain. I go on to demonstrate that the law of right constitutes the minimum moral command of all activity of coexisting human beings and that the lawgiving of the general will is autonomous. This establishes that morality and the law are actually coextensive. Concerning the challenge that the Kantian state is merely the liberal state of the 19th century and has no end other than protection of freedom of action, I argue that human freedom cannot be harmed and therefore cannot be protected. Rather, the true purpose of the Kantian state is to ensure that individuals' freedom are mutually compatible. This requires, among other things, that everyone's right to property be limited. In sum, then, I show that Kant's political philosophy is anchored in a demanding and relevant notion of freedom, and that it leads to a state that actively protects the capacity of its citizens to pursue their life plans under conditions of equal opportunity
