Del Reed

In Part One of this dissertation I examine the relationship between reason and objectivity in Frege's thought, concentrating on the question of whether or not Frege should be interpreted as a platonist. By platonism I mean the view that objects such as numbers or propositions are objective, non-spatial and timeless, existing in a realm distinct from the external world of physical objects and the internal realm of the mind; and that statements about or involving such objects are true independently of whether or not human beings take them to be true. I defend the traditional interpretation of Frege as a platonist against the claims of revisionist interpretations of Frege, offered by Hans Sluga, Thomas Ricketts and Erich Reck, that seek to deny or mitigate Frege's commitment to platonism. I also argue that similarities between Frege and Descartes further support my interpretation of Frege as a platonist. ;Part Two of the dissertation revolves around Frege's famous distinction between sense and reference. Frege introduces this distinction to explain how an identity statement can be both true and informative. I begin with an examination of Frege's first attempt to solve the puzzle of informative identity statements in his early work the Begriffsschrift, comparing it with his ultimate solution in "On Sense and Reference." I then examine the nature of the distinction between sense and reference and explore some of its consequences. Next I examine the relationship between the sense/reference distinction and three interrelated Fregean principles: the context principle the compositionality principle and the priority principle (judgments are prior to the concepts that compose them. Finally, I examine Saul Kripke's influential criticism of Frege's claim that for a proper name to adequately perform its function it must contain both a sense and a reference. I then critically examine responses by Tyler Burge and Michael Dummett to Kripke's interpretation and criticism of Frege