Delphine Antoine-Mahut

The aim of this contribution is to study the classificatory principles used by the first French histories of philosophy and the consequences of they have for our current understanding of that history. The principles of eclecticism have been institutionalized in philosophy programs and in a teaching tradition which is still alive. More specifically, this chapter examines the spiritualist features of Cartesianism in these histories, and how they affect the understanding of Locke and Malebranche. These two authors are interesting to study because they are both excluded from the field of « avowed » disciples of Descartes, while being also considered spiritual heirs of him. Studying these two limit cases allows us to go beyond the traditional opposition between a too idealist spiritualism and an empiricism stemming from the natural sciences, and detect a more subtle intra-empirical struggle between Malebranche and Locke where the two adversaries are in a sense brothers relative to the Cartesian filiation.

Descartes is identified as a defender of the pure idea, especially in contrast to Hobbes. The objective of my contribution is to discuss this historiographical cliché by combining an internalist approach to the Cartesian corpus (the _Treatise on Man_, the _Optics_, and the _Objections_ and _Replies_) and a reception study of Cartesianism by La Forge. Three results emerge: as (1) the debate between Descartes and Hobbes employs two distinct conceptions of the material idea; and (2) Cartesianism is obliged to take the arguments of materialists seriously in order to preserve the specificity of the material, Cartesian definition of the idea; and (3) Cartesianism should therefore be reintroduced in the history of modern-day materialism and anthropology as an essential component and no longer simply a ghostly antagonist.

Les recentes etudes sur l'epais dossier de la querelle d'Utrecht ont mis au jour le caractere tumultueux des relations entre Descartes et celui qu'il a pourtant considere comme son disciple, jusqu'a la brouille definitive. La premiere contribution de ce volume aborde cette relation a partir de l'oeuvre de Regius et a la lumiere de l'interrogation suivante: sur quel type de theorie de la connaissance, Regius se fonde-t-il pour rediger une physique a laquelle ne manquerait plus ce qui manque aux Principes de la philosophie de Descartes? La seconde contribution montre en quoi et pourquoi les textes divers (de Clerselier, Schuyl, La Forge ) qui accompagnent l'edition posthume du traite de l'Homme visent a endiguer toute tentation de lire cet ouvrage comme un manifeste materialiste. Elle interroge donc le texte de Descartes a partir de l'histoire de sa reception, pour en tirer enseignement sur Descartes meme.

René Descartes (1596-1650) is often presented as the founder of the "dualistic" thesis radically separating the soul from the body, in early modern philosophy. As such, he is likely to have initiated two kinds of revolutions: a revolution in the study of nature and living being(understood as inanimate), on the one hand; and a revolution in the study of the human mind(understood as the foundation of all knowledge), on the other. This entry focuses on his scientific work and overall reception, as a way of understanding the interaction of these two fields.

This volume is the first systematic study of the style of reasoning specific to the field of philosophy in nineteenth-century France. The chapters analyze the often dispersed responses to the fundamental question of the division of the sciences based on the reciprocal relationships of inclusion or exclusion, of adversity or sorority, between metaphysics and the positive sciences. In line with the arrhythmic progress of the different forms of knowledge, these responses renew the Condillacian criticisms of the Cartesian order of the relationships between metaphysics and physics. Between a pronounced divorce and a successful marriage, this volume traces the philosophical history of the various attempts at divorce or union, which, as the century progressed, resulted in original hybridizations that aspired to define a new and ever-problematic “French philosophy.”

The historiography of Cartesianism often opposes Regius, a dissident empiricist medical doctor who denied the capacity of natural reason to demonstrate the immateriality and the immortality of the soul, to Descartes, a metaphysician who on the contrary grounded his philosophy in the real distinction between thinking and corporeal substance. In this contribution, I show how our understanding of this relation is modified when approaching the relation between the two men taking departure in the question of physiological experiments. Going back to some foundational texts, namely the disputations on physiology defended at the University of Utrecht from around 1640, I follow the evolution in how they dealt with three essential questions: the beating of the heart, digestion, and muscular movement, all the way until the last edition of the Philosophia naturalis in 1661. I reconstruct the prolonged dialogue between Regius and Descartes on these questions in order to show that the recourse to physiological experimentation in Regius’s work does not serve to question Descartes’s philosophy. Quite to the contrary, Regius wishes to consolidate this philosophy and purge it of its slag by responding to accusations of abstraction and dogmatism directed against a Cartesian metaphysics and physics that remove both venture to speak of the invisible. By following the aftermath of Regius’s innovations in the texts by Clerselier and De la Forge that accompany the posthumous edition of L’Homme in 1664, this contribution proposes, in short, to reconsider an interpretation of Cartesianismthat is too “dualist,” by taking into account what a more empiricist reading can contribute to it.

This volume is the first systematic study of the style of reasoning specific to the field of philosophy in nineteenth-century France. The chapters analyze the often dispersed responses to the fundamental question of the division of the sciences based on the reciprocal relationships of inclusion or exclusion, of adversity or sorority, between metaphysics and the positive sciences. In line with the arrhythmic progress of the different forms of knowledge, these responses renew the Condillacian criticisms of the Cartesian order of the relationships between metaphysics and physics. Between a pronounced divorce and a successful marriage, this volume traces the philosophical history of the various attempts at divorce or union, which, as the century progressed, resulted in original hybridizations that aspired to define a new and ever-problematic “French philosophy.”

In this contribution, I continue the conversations I began with Stephen Gaukroger on the role of Cartesianism role in the advent of modern anthropology. Drawing on one of his most recent works, the translation and critical edition of Charles Bonnet’s Analytical Essay on the Faculties of the Soul (1760), I show that Bonnet gradually finds in Malebranche a synchronic and diachronic form of cerebral holism, extending in an unprecedented way to the explanation of the physiological propagation of original sin. I then describe how he extends and radicalizes it. By mobilizing the biological theory of preformation, Bonnet founds a “physics of resurrection” that opens the way to the moral perfection of all organized beings in the universe. By dismissing theology to make restitution a philosophical dogma involving the natural relationship between souls and bodies, he also dismisses the arbitrariness of this perfection and inaugurates a new ecology.

This volume explores the philosophy of Étienne Bonnot de Condillac. It presents, for the first time, English-language essays on Condillac's philosophy, making the complexity and sophistication of his arguments and their influence on early modern philosophy accessible to a wider readership. Condillac's reflections on the origin and nature of human abilities, such as the ability to reason, reflect and use language, took philosophy in distinctly new directions. This volume showcases the diversity of themes and methods inspired by Condillac's work. The chapters are divided into four thematic sections. Part 1 highlights themes and discussions that were central to Condillac's own philosophical thinking, thus laying the ground for the subsequent discussions that trace Condillac's influence in the 19th century and beyond. Part 2 focuses on the different ways in which Condillac's philosophy has been taken up, criticised and further developed in France. Part 3 discusses thinkers working in other European countries and parts of the world who took up Condillac's work. Finally, Part 4 looks at the practical applications of Condillac's philosophy in a variety of different fields, such as economics, psychology, psychopathology and deaf studies. Condillac and His Reception will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on early modern philosophy, history of science and intellectual history.

This volume is the first systematic study of the style of reasoning specific to the field of philosophy in nineteenth-century France. The chapters analyze the often dispersed responses to the fundamental question of the division of the sciences based on the reciprocal relationships of inclusion or exclusion, of adversity or sorority, between metaphysics and the positive sciences. In line with the arrhythmic progress of the different forms of knowledge, these responses renew the Condillacian criticisms of the Cartesian order of the relationships between metaphysics and physics. Between a pronounced divorce and a successful marriage, this volume traces the philosophical history of the various attempts at divorce or union, which, as the century progressed, resulted in original hybridizations that aspired to define a new and ever-problematic "French philosophy."

Les études dites de réception se trouvent aujourd’hui dans une situation paradoxale. Au premier regard le tableau paraît souriant. Anciens ou modernes, les textes sont aujourd’hui communément abordés sous l’angle de leurs lectures immédiates (réception médiatique notamment) et, surtout, de leurs aménagements posthumes (avatars éditoriaux, propositions herméneutiques, usages sociaux). La multiplication de pareils travaux manifeste un engouement qui ne semble pas près de se démentir. Spectaculaire si l’on considère le nombre de thèses et de colloques qui entretiennent cette vague, pareil essor ne suffit pourtant pas à lever tous les doutes. Loin de faire l’unanimité, les études dites de réception suscitent toujours une certaine méfiance. Ne seraient-elles pas le Cheval de Troie d’un relativisme conduisant à niveler toutes les formes de critiques et d’interprétations? Outre la crainte d’une dangereuse indifférenciation, un soupçon plus radical remet en cause leur bien-fondé : s’intéresser à l’histoire des gestes critiques et des modes de lecture, n’est-ce pas un indice d’épuisement pour des champs disciplinaires n’ayant d’autre objet que leur propre histoire? Ce dossier fait le pari inverse. Il doit son impulsion à la conviction qu’un regard patient et informé sur les actes de lecture de nos prédécesseurs éclaire, en retour, nos propres pratiques. Accuser réception : ce titre voudrait suggérer, par-delà les procès en illégitimité, la nécessité de prendre en compte la vie longue des textes pour mieux comprendre ce que nous faisons quand, après tant d’autres et parfois dans leur ombre, nous lisons les textes du passé. Rassemblant les contributions de spécialistes venus d’horizons divers comme l’histoire de la philosophie occidentale, celles de la poésie chinoise, des littératures médiévales et modernes ou encore de l’herméneutique biblique, ce dossier, qui mêle études monographiques et réflexions transversales, analyse la constitution de certains paradigmes critiques, mais également celle de territoires disciplinaires fondés sur des traditions interprétatives parfois oubliées. Il espère montrer que la question des réceptions n’est pas réductible à la somme figée des commentaires formulés sur un texte, un auteur ou une période. Posée de manière dynamique, elle donne à voir la production des héritages qui nous ont été transmis et permet ainsi d’arpenter autrement les paysages qui sont devenus les nôtres. Textes réunis par Stéphane Zékian et Thierry Roger et mis en ligne avec le soutien de l'Université de Lausanne.

The place given by Cousin to Condillac in the project of founding a new “French Philosophy” in the first half of 19th century France seems eminently paradoxical. On the one hand, Condillac is designated as one of the main representatives of this specifically 18th century sensualism that has to be fought by all means. But on the other hand, Cousin recognises that in Condillac “the metaphysician dominates”. What is more, he does not hesitate to present Condillac as “the only, the true French metaphysician of the 18th century”. This Condillac is thus likely to constitute a positive reference. Shedding of light on a very little known intertextuality between Cousin, Saphary and Degérando, this chapter attests to the crucial importance of the identification of the true philosophical lineage between the new French and spiritualist school and Condillac in the first decades of the 19th century. The paradoxical dimension of Condillac’s philosophy thus appears to be found in the empirical nature and the eminently practical vocation of this metaphysics, which must enable the founding of a new psychology, other morals and other politics. Which is a great leverage to shatter the philosophical dualisms and antagonisms structuring the official historiography of modernity we mainly inherit from 19th century France. Empiricism, French Philosophy, Historiography, Metaphysics, Reception Studies, Sensualism, Spiritualism.

This volume explores the relationship between physics and metaphysics in Descartes’ philosophy. According to the standard account, Descartes modified the objects of metaphysics and physics and inverted the order in which these two disciplines were traditionally studied. This book challenges the standard account in which Descartes prioritizes metaphysics over physics. It does so by taking into consideration the historical reception of Descartes and the ways in which Descartes himself reacted to these receptions in his own lifetime. The book stresses the diversity of these receptions by taking into account not only Cartesianisms but also anti-Cartesianisms, and by showing how they retroactively highlighted different aspects of Descartes’ works and theoretical choices. The historical aspect of the volume is unique in that it not only analyzes different constructions of Descartes that emerged in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, but also reflects on how his work was first read by philosophers across Europe. Taken together, the essays in this volume offer a fresh and up-to-date contribution to this important debate in early modern philosophy.

Plus que Malebranche lui-même, ce volume interroge les potentialités complexes de ses textes et les différents prismes qui les ont réfractées, dans des contextes et à des desseins souvent bien différents de ceux de l'Oratorien. Plus que de savoir si telle ou telle réception est ou non "fidèle" aux "intentions" de Malebranche, ce volume entend participer à une réflexion plus large sur une méthodologie de l'histoire des idées soucieuse de n'occulter aucune des lectures réelles d'une œuvre à la fois apologétique et grosse de matériaux subversifs.

Qu'est-ce qu'être cartésien? Qu'est-ce qui fait la spécificité du cartésianisme dans l'histoire des idées? Ce volume propose une réponse â cette question : le cartésianisme peut tout aussi bien se penser à l'aide des outils d'une histoire de la philosophie classique recourant à la philologie, aux " sources " et à l'intertextualité, y compris en des termes critiques ; que dans les lexiques de la réfraction, de la transformation voire de la construction, rationnelle ou imaginaire. Dans ce dernier cas, on peut parfaitement revendiquer la neutralisation des exigences de continuité attestables entre l'invention et la source originelle et tenter de penser des Descartes ad hoc, étant entendu qu'une telle entreprise aura toujours, en retour, quelque chose à nous apprendre sur le corpus d'origine. De Descartes à la période contemporaine, les contributions présentées offrent une synthèse inédite du prisme de ces lectures possibles, toute appelées, tendanciellement mais différemment, par l'oeuvre de Descartes.

The Oxford Handbook of Descartes and Cartesianism comprises fifty specially written chapters on Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and Cartesianism, the dominant paradigm for philosophy and science in the seventeenth century, written by an international group of leading scholars of early modern philosophy. The first part focuses on the various aspects of Descartes's biography (including his background, intellectual contexts, writings, and correspondence) and philosophy, with chapters on his epistemology, method, aetaphysics, physics, mathematics, moral philosophy, political thought, medical thought, and aesthetics. The chapters of the second part are devoted to the defense, development and modification of Descartes's ideas by later generations of Cartesian philosophers0in France, the Netherlands, Italy, and elsewhere. The third and final part considers the opposition to Cartesian philosophy by other philosophers, as well as by civil, ecclesiastic, and academic authorities. This handbook provides an extensive overview of Cartesianism - its doctrines, its legacies and its fortunes - in the period based on the latest research.

English summary: This book examines the philosophy of Elisabeth of Bohemia in conjunction with Descartess. She maintained a philosophical dialogue with another philosopher employing pertinent arguments. In addition, she perhaps developed her own theses, truly philosophical theses which can be better understood in consideration with her numerous correspondents. The study seeks to better understand Elisabeths role in Cartesian thought, and to determine her own philosophical thought. French description: Le titre meme de ce volume, sous forme d'interrogation, est a comprendre comme un postulat. Il s'explique comme suit : il s'agit de s'interroger sur la pensee philosophique d'Elisabeth tout autant que sur celle de Descartes. La reflexion d'Elisabeth semble en effet posseder une dimension philosophique a deux titres au moins : d'abord parce que la princesse entretient un dialogue philosophique de haute tenue avec un autre philosophe, en deployant des arguments pertinents; ensuite parce qu'elle developpe peut-etre elle-meme des theses qui lui sont personnelles, qui seraient des theses au sens fort et pleinement philosophique du terme, et dont l'etude pourrait etre affinee par la prise en consideration de ses tres nombreux autres correspondants. Reste un scrupule : celui de trahir le souhait meme d'Elisabeth de cantonner ses echanges intellectuels au plan prive, en la propulsant en pleine lumiere et en lui faisant endosser une posture philosophique qu'elle a soigneusement evitee de son vivant. Qu'on songe qu'elle voulait que cet echange soit code! Mais comme le premier traitre fut Descartes lui-meme, transmettant les lettres d'Elisabeth a Christine de Suede, considerons-nous comme habilites, en bons cartesiens, a divulguer la pensee de la princesse palatine. C'est a ce prix en effet, que nous pourrons redefinir le role de cette derniere dans le cartesianisme, determiner s'il existe une pensee propre d'Elisabeth et enfin, si elle existe, savoir en quoi elle consiste.

Pour la première fois en 1649, Descartes consacre une attention méticuleuse à la description de " toute la nature de l'homme ". Les passions ne lui fournissent pas une simple occasion parmi d'autres d'en traiter. Elles l'obligent surtout (et son lecteur avec lui) à se placer du point de vue du composé psychosomatique lui-même, soit à décrire, dans toutes ses manifestations et implications (éthiques notamment), cette " troisième notion primitive " que ni la philosophie première seule, ni la physique seule, ne permettaient de cerner.

À l'instar du « dualisme », de l'« harmonie préétablie » et du « parallélisme », l'« occasionnalisme » est souvent présenté comme une doctrine unifiée reportant toute puissance ou toute causalité en Dieu en en destituant du même coup les créatures. Cependant, des différences notables apparaissent entre les auteurs traditionnellement rangés sous cette bannière. Comment distinguer alors ceux qui se contentent d'utiliser des arguments répertoriés comme « occasionnalistes » et ceux qui manifestent une adhésion positive à cette doctrine ? Le cas d'Arnauld est à cet égard exemplaire. Car il mobilise des arguments occasionnalistes ponctuels afin de prémunir la théorie cartésienne des rapports de l'âme et du corps de ses mauvaises interprétations possibles. Peut-on alors le considérer comme partiellement occasionnaliste ou doit-on conclure à un occasionnalisme stratégique et intéressé ? Like « dualism », « preestablished harmony » and « parallelism », « occasionnalism » is often put up as a unified doctrine assigning all power or causality to God and relieving all creatures of it. Yet notable differences separate the authors who are usually regarded as occasionnalists. Then how can we distinguish the ones who only use arguments regarded as occasionnalist ones, and those who join this doctrine ? In this respect, the case of Arnauld is a pattern. Because he uses punctual occasionnalist arguments in order to caution Descartes against the malicious interpretations of the theory of mind and body's distinction