Delroy Tyrrell

When first investigating metaethics, the most infamous problem of all arises: Hume’s Gap. The observation made by philosopher David Hume has been the subject of much philosophical thought and review; within this never-ending literature, the attempts to interpret and bridge the descriptive and normative have been equally vast and complex. This paper argues for one such interpretation: a categorical error made by focusing on deriving an ought from an is, while missing the important aspect of what justifies an ought initially. If the aforementioned interpretation is accepted, then this paper attempts to show that the best explanation for obligation can be found within a theistic lens using a Leibnizian-type necessity argument, additionally highlighting issues in both the treatment of the gap as a derivational problem and attempts to achieve this derivation. This paper will not attempt to prove theism, nor assert theism as true, but show that it simply provides the most explanatorily adequate account if the previous conditions are met.

The founding assertion that certain truths are "self-evident" reflects a deeper philosophical commitment to moral realism—the view that objective moral facts exist independently of human opinion. Yet contemporary American discourse reveals a paradox: while citizens engage in passionate moral debates as if objective truths were at stake, many simultaneously embrace relativistic frameworks that deny such truths exist. This contradiction suggests a fundamental crisis in moral epistemology that transcends partisan politics. Through analysis of the philosophical foundations underlying moral claims, this paper argues that moral realism provides the necessary framework for coherent ethical discourse. The very possibility of meaningful moral disagreement presupposes objective standards by which competing claims can be evaluated. Drawing on transcendental arguments and the self-refutation of relativistic positions, this study demonstrates that moral realism is not merely one philosophical option among many, but a logical prerequisite for any serious engagement with ethical questions. The practical implications extend beyond academic philosophy: without shared commitment to objective moral standards, democratic discourse devolves into mere expressions of preference rather than reasoned deliberation about justice and human flourishing. This analysis suggests that addressing contemporary polarization requires not political compromise but renewed philosophical rigor in understanding the nature of moral truth itself. Keywords: moral realism, objective morality, meta-ethics, moral subjectivism, self-refutation, transcendental arguments, moral epistemology, democratic discourse, Intersubjective morality, self-evident truths,

This paper presents Dual-Level Moral Anthropology (DLMA), a novel theoretical framework that reconceptualizes moral responsibility through two distinct but integrated levels of moral processing. Drawing on teleological principles, moral psychology, and event-causal libertarianism, DLMA proposes that moral agency operates through: (1) Teleological Moral Psychology - automatic moral intuitions aimed at tracking moral truth, and (2) Conscious Moral Agency - libertarian responses to these teleologically-oriented intuitions. This framework aims to resolve classical problems in moral philosophy while providing new insights into moral development, responsibility attribution, and the relationship between determinism and free will. DLMA’s core claims are grounded in six core axioms illustrating the relationship between agents and these two “Levels”. From these axioms, three key theorems follow: (1) Inherited Properties Without Culpability: Agents can inherit corrupted teleological natures without bearing moral guilt if their conscious agency remains uncorrupted. This addresses debates about inherited moral responsibility, genetic determinism, and conditions for culpability. (2) Rational Agency Without Biological Drives: Purely rational agents lacking appetitive drives can still engage in morally significant action through conscious agency alone. This illuminates debates in AI ethics, the mind-body problem, and the role of emotion in moral motivation. (3) Necessary Goodness Compatible with Libertarian Freedom: Agents possessing necessary goodness can retain libertarian freedom when their conscious agency perfectly endorses their teleological orientation. This contributes to compatibilist-libertarian debates and Frankfurt-style cases. Using this framework, DLMA can potentially resolve classical challenges in theology such as Christ's sinlessness, angelic moral agency and divine freedom. I am arguing that DLMA provides a better solution to these issues than traditional responses due to its grounding in teleological orientation integrating with free will rather than sidestepping the categories all-together. Keywords: moral psychology, teleological ethics, libertarian free will, dual-process theory, moral responsibility, moral epistemology, moral development, event-causal libertarianism, moral intuition, moral agency

This essay defends the existence of objective moral standards as a necessary framework for coherent moral reasoning. Using real-life examples, logical arguments, and an epistemic lens, I argue that moral relativism is both self-refuting and impractical. By demonstrating that claims of “no objective standards” ultimately assert a kind of standard themselves, I expose the contradiction at the heart of relativist thought. Through historical case studies—such as racism and the Holocaust—I show that objective morality not only aligns better with our deepest intuitions but is also necessary for meaningful moral discourse and societal progress.