Denis Kazankov

Mismatch arguments are arguments for abandoning an expression on the grounds that what it applies to is sharply at odds with what its users want to talk about when using it. This paper questions how often mismatch arguments justify abandoning an expression. For one thing, abandonment risks being an overly radical response unless it is clearly more feasible than semantically adapting the expression to fit its users’ referential expectations. Furthermore, we can sometimes benefit from using even an expression that resists semantic adaptation due to being associated with categorically unfulfillable referential expectations. I argue that these factors translate into relatively demanding conditions for when abandonment is an appropriate response to an expression having a mismatched extension.

In conceptual ethics, we often face a tension between competing epistemic and moral considerations. Yet the two types of considerations are so different in kind that it’s unclear how to adjudicate between them non-arbitrarily. This paper has three aims. First, I argue that we shouldn’t expect epistemic-moral conflicts in conceptual ethics to be resolvable through comparative reasoning, since the comparability of epistemic and moral considerations presupposes an overarching standard for cross-domain comparison – a standard whose existence and epistemic accessibility are doubtful. Second, I examine two comparative strategies for approaching epistemic-moral conflicts, arguing that both fail. Third, I defend the integrative approach to epistemic-moral conflicts, which holds that these conflicts often arise from contingent factors that agents can modify to promote convergence between epistemic and moral verdicts about conceptual design. I show that once we recognise what kind of tools linguistic expressions are, the prospects for integrating epistemic and moral standards in conceptual ethics become more promising than they initially seem.

In his 2023 book The Concept of Democracy: An Essay on Conceptual Amelioration and Abandonment, Herman Cappelen argues that we should stop using ‘democracy’ and ‘democratic’ (D-words). In this paper, I critically engage with Cappelen’s argument, focusing primarily on his contention that D-words likely fail us semantically, either by being meaningless or by having massively mismatched extensions. Against Cappelen, I argue for three claims. First, even if D-words aren’t fully semantically settled, they are likely at least partially settled. Second, even if D-words are only partially semantically settled, they can be useful enough to retain in our conceptual repertoire. Third, even if the extension of D-words is massively mismatched, this would be a serious consideration for their abandonment only under specific conditions that don’t seem to obtain in the case of the mismatches that Cappelen considers. I also address the objection that my defence of D-words is overly optimistic, as it underestimates the extent of their normative exploitation.

It is increasingly argued that conceptual engineering should be sensitive to the functions that representational devices serve for their users. Less clear, however, is how to interpret conceptual function. This paper addresses this question through what I call the ‘analogy-based strategy’, focusing on linguistic conceptual engineering that targets referential expressions. The analogy-based strategy builds on the observation that referential expressions are treated in conceptual engineering as a subset of human tools. Accordingly, it aims to develop an interpretation of conceptual function that takes seriously the analogy between conceptual functions and other tool functions, and draws on this analogy to reveal new theoretical roles that conceptual function can play in conceptual engineering. After introducing four desiderata for such an interpretation and explaining their significance, I critically assess two candidate interpretations of conceptual function that follow dominant philosophical approaches to function: the proper-function interpretation and the system-function interpretation. I show that both fail to meet key desiderata. As an alternative, I develop a novel motivation-based interpretation, which understands conceptual function in terms of those actual or potential effects of an expression that are central to why a user group is, often implicitly, motivated to retain it in their conceptual repertoire. I argue that this interpretation provides an attractive notion of conceptual function that meets all four desiderata and proves useful for certain kinds of conceptual assessment.

There is a widespread phenomenon that we call linguistic imposters. Linguistic imposters are systematic misuses of expressions that misusers mistake with their conventional usages because of misunderstanding their meaning. Our paper aims to provide an initial framework for theorizing about linguistic imposters that will lay the foundation for future philosophical research about them. We focus on the misuses of the expressions 'grooming' and 'critical race theory' as our central examples of linguistic imposters. We show that linguistic imposters present a distinctive phenomenon by comparing them to some adjacent phenomena, namely conceptual engineering, linguistic hijacking, and dogwhistles. We also address four objections about the extensional adequacy of our definition of linguistic imposters. Finally, we argue that, as linguistic imposters spread, they make some inferences featuring misused expressions more cognitively accessible and seemingly socially licensed to misusers and discuss four types of harms that linguistic imposters are conducive to through these effects.