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10Le raisonnement par analogie considéré comme un schéma d'inférenceDialogue 61 (2): 225-248. 2022.Despite its importance in various fields, analogical reasoning has not yet received a unified formal representation. Our contribution proposes a general scheme of inference that is compatible with different types of logic (deductive, probabilistic, non-monotonic). Firstly, analogical assessment precisely defines the similarity of two objects according to their properties, in a relative rather than absolute way. Secondly, analogical inference transfers a new property from one object to a similar …Read more
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16Analogical Reasoning as an Inference SchemeDialogue 61 (2): 203-223. 2022.RésuméEn dépit de son importance dans divers domaines, le raisonnement analogique n'a pas encore reçu de représentation formelle unifiée. Notre contribution propose un schéma d'inférence général, compatible avec différentes logiques (déductive, probabiliste, non monotone). Premièrement, un énoncé analogique définit précisément la similarité entre deux objets en fonction de leurs propriétés, de façon relative et non absolue. Deuxièmement, une inférence analogique transfère une propriété nouvelle …Read more
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10Can Bayes' Rule be Justified by Cognitive Rationality Principles?Theory and Decision 53 (2): 95-135. 2002.The justification of Bayes' rule by cognitive rationality principles is undertaken by extending the propositional axiom systems usually proposed in two contexts of belief change: revising and updating. Probabilistic belief change axioms are introduced, either by direct transcription of the set-theoretic ones, or in a stronger way but nevertheless in the spirit of the underlying propositional principles. Weak revising axioms are shown to be satisfied by a General Conditioning rule, extending Baye…Read more
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95Can Bayes' Rule be Justified by Cognitive Rationality Principles?Theory and Decision 53 (2): 95-135. 2002.The justification of Bayes' rule by cognitive rationality principles is undertaken by extending the propositional axiom systems usually proposed in two contexts of belief change: revising and updating. Probabilistic belief change axioms are introduced, either by direct transcription of the set-theoretic ones, or in a stronger way but nevertheless in the spirit of the underlying propositional principles. Weak revising axioms are shown to be satisfied by a General Conditioning rule, extending Baye…Read more
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18Logique inductive et soutien probabilisteDialogue 32 (2): 293-. 1993.Karl Popper et David Miller ont soutenu l'idée selon laquelle le soutien probabiliste positif = p − p > 0) que e apporte á h, lorsque de h on déduit e, ne justifie en rien l'espoir de pouvoir construire une logique inductive fondée sur le calcul des probabilityés.
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180Abductive logics in a belief revision frameworkJournal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1): 87-117. 2004.Abduction was first introduced in the epistemological context of scientific discovery. It was more recently analyzed in artificial intelligence, especially with respect to diagnosis analysis or ordinary reasoning. These two fields share a common view of abduction as a general process of hypotheses formation. More precisely, abduction is conceived as a kind of reverse explanation where a hypothesis H can be abduced from events E if H is a good explanation of E. The paper surveys four known scheme…Read more
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