Denise Vincenti

The integration of the ‘experimental method’ into the field of psychology in nineteenth-century France was fostered by the work of Théodule Ribot and his attempt to found a scientific, non-metaphysical psychology. In this respect, the birth of French scientific psychology seems to amount to a rejection of the longstanding paradigms in French spiritualism. Ribot was vocally opposed to spiritualism, and was concerned to ground psychology in the natural sciences. However, this article brings to light common ground underlying, and interactions between, his work and that of the French spiritualists. In so doing, the aim is not only to investigate some little known sources of Ribot’s thought, but also to foster reconsideration of spiritualism as a philosophical doctrine. Through the comparison with Ribot, spiritualism appears as a composite doctrine, able to promote crucial epistemological revolutions (such as the birth of scientific psychology) and to relate metaphysical assumptions to empirical and experimental observations.

À lafin du XVIII e siècle, lemédecin et philosophe allemand Ernst Platner, en rapportant une observation faite sur un aveugle-né, affirme qu’un homme privé de la vue depuis la naissance ne peut pas posséder la catégorie de l’espace. Cette courte observation s’affirme bientôt comme référence privilégiée du débat sur la nature acquise ou innée de la connaissance. L’une des principales contributions publiées en France est le texte de Jules Lachelier sur la genèse de la notion d’espace. Texte fort peu connu de la production de l’auteur, « L’Observation de Platner » (1903) renferme des vues originales sur la question. Sur la base d’une connaissance approfondie du débat psychologique de l’époque, Lachelier donne ici une nouvelle forme aux positions spiritualistes formulées sur le problème, en finissant par reconceptualiser le dualisme entre nativisme et empirisme.

This essay focuses on the meaning that the term “experimental” acquires within spiritualism during the second half of the nineteenth century. It builds upon Paul Janet’s notions of “experience” and “experimentation” in psychology, by stressing the role of physiology and pathology in his reflection. Regardless of the role the concept of “experimentalism” took on in Victor Cousin’s psychology, which arguably indicated more an “internal affection” than actual experimentation, in Janet’s spiritualism the term regains its original meaning of empirical verification. Janet highlights the importance of madness to the development of a new psychological paradigm that could reconcile philosophy and medicine, reason and experience, by taking up pathology as a form of natural and indirect experimentation.

In Ravaisson’s philosophy, the concept of spontaneity refers to the first, basic and organic form of improvisation. Nature consists in fact of a rational law of development named habit, that regulates all movements, summarizing the external impulsions and the internal penchants in the form of spontaneous activity. However the insertion of spontaneity in nature determines the appearance of unpredictability and negativity in life’s productions, like organic and psychical pathologies. Ravaisson will try to show how this morbid spontaneity belongs to nature’s rationality.