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6Deliberative Democracy Beyond ProcessIn James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett (eds.), Debating Deliberative Democracy, Blackwell. 2003.Why Reciprocity Requires Deliberation Why Reciprocity Requires Substantive Principles Why the Principles should be Morally Provisional Why the Principles should be Politically Provisional When Moral and Political Judgments Conflict Notes.
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204. Why Deliberative Democracy Is DifferentIn Dennis Thompson & Amy Gutmann (eds.), Why Deliberative Democracy?, Princeton University Press. pp. 125-138. 2004.
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371. What Deliberative Democracy MeansIn Dennis Thompson & Amy Gutmann (eds.), Why Deliberative Democracy?, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-63. 2004.
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466. The Moral Foundations of Truth CommissionsIn Dennis Thompson & Amy Gutmann (eds.), Why Deliberative Democracy?, Princeton University Press. pp. 160-188. 2000.
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43Previous Works Jointly Authored by Amy Gutmann & Dennis ThompsonIn Dennis Thompson & Amy Gutmann (eds.), Why Deliberative Democracy?, Princeton University Press. pp. 209-210. 2004.
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30Power and Resistance: Perpetuating and Challenging Capitalist ExploitationContemporary Political Theory 6 (1): 4-23. 2007.Although oppressive social practices like capitalism are often portrayed as static, totalizing social 'structures' with 'logics' and 'imperatives' that must be accommodated politically and economically, such portrayals are problematic both theoretically and politically. They rest on determinist and essentialist conceptions of social practices, and they curtail the scope of politics, government regulation, and human action and creativity. Fortunately, social practices can instead be conceptualize…Read more
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152. Moral Conflict and Political ConsensusIn Dennis Thompson & Amy Gutmann (eds.), Why Deliberative Democracy?, Princeton University Press. pp. 64-94. 2004.
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123. Deliberative Democracy beyond ProcessIn Dennis Thompson & Amy Gutmann (eds.), Why Deliberative Democracy?, Princeton University Press. pp. 95-124. 2004.
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Mill in parliament : when should a philosopher compromise?In Nadia Urbinati & Alex Zakaras (eds.), J.S. Mill's Political Thought: A Bicentennial Reassessment, Cambridge University Press. 2007.
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174Why Deliberative Democracy is DifferentSocial Philosophy and Policy 17 (1): 161. 2000.In modern pluralist societies, political disagreement often reflects moral disagreement, as citizens with conflicting perspectives on fundamental values debate the laws that govern their public life. Any satisfactory theory of democracy must provide a way of dealing with this moral disagreement. A fundamental problem confronting all democratic theorists is to find a morally justifiable way of making binding collective decisions in the face of continuing moral conflict
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74Why Deliberative Democracy?Princeton University Press. 2004.The most widely debated conception of democracy in recent years is deliberative democracy--the idea that citizens or their representatives owe each other mutually acceptable reasons for the laws they enact. Two prominent voices in the ongoing discussion are Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. In Why Deliberative Democracy?, they move the debate forward beyond their influential book, Democracy and Disagreement.What exactly is deliberative democracy? Why is it more defensible than its rivals? By offe…Read more
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5PrefaceIn Dennis Thompson & Amy Gutmann (eds.), Why Deliberative Democracy?, Princeton University Press. 2004.
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7ContentsIn Dennis Thompson & Amy Gutmann (eds.), Why Deliberative Democracy?, Princeton University Press. 2004.
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8Conflicts of InterestIn Ezekiel J. Emanuel (ed.), The Oxford textbook of clinical research ethics, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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2The concept of conflicts of interestIn The Oxford textbook of clinical research ethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 758--766. 2008.
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31Political EthicsIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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44Democratic disagreementIn Stephen Macedo (ed.), Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement, Oxford University Press. pp. 243. 1999.
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149Pourquoi la démocratie délibérative est-elle différente ?Philosophiques 29 (2): 193-214. 2002.Tous les théoriciens de la démocratie ont à confronter le problème fondamental qui consiste à trouver une façon moralement justifiable de prendre des décisions collectives contraignantes face à des désaccords moraux persistants. Une théorie délibérative de la démocratie nous fournit l’approche la mieux défendable de ce problème parce qu’elle laisse ouverte la possibilité que les valeurs morales exprimées par un large éventail de théories puissent être justifiables. Le principe fondamental de not…Read more
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20Constitutional Character: Virtues and Vices in Presidential LeadershipPresidential Studies Quarterly 40 (1): 23-37. 2010.
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26Democratic Secrecy: The Dilemma of AccountabilityPolitical Science Quarterly 114 (2): 181-193. 1999.
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58Democracy in Time: Popular Sovereignty and Temporal RepresentationConstellations 12 (2): 245-261. 2005.
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117Representing future generations: political presentism and democratic trusteeshipCritical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 13 (1): 17-37. 2010.Democracy is prone to what may be called presentism – a bias in the laws in favor of present over future generations. I identify the characteristics of democracies that lead to presentism, and examine the reasons that make it a serious problem. Then I consider why conventional theories are not adequate to deal with it, and develop a more satisfactory alternative approach, which I call democratic trusteeship. Present generations can represent future generations by acting as trustees of the democr…Read more
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28The institutional turn in professional ethicsEthics and Behavior 9 (2). 1999.This Article does not have an abstract
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77Hume's SkepticismDissertation, University of Massachusetts - Amherst. 1998.David Hume has traditionally been regarded as a skeptic, perhaps the most formidable in the history of Western philosophy. Since the publication of Norman Kemp Smith's Philosophy of David Hume in 1941, however, there has been an increasing tendency to downplay the skeptical dimension of Hume's philosophy, in some cases to the point of denying that Hume is a serious skeptic, or even a skeptic at all. Much of the motivation for a nonskeptical reading of Hume comes from recognition of his endorseme…Read more
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
General Philosophy of Science |