Dermot Moran

New Books on Philosophy of Religion Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks By Nicholas Wolterstorff, Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. 326. ISBN 0–521–47557–0. $18.95 (pbk). The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith: The Incamational Narrative as History By C. Stephen Evans, Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. 386. ISBN 0–19–826397‐X $17.95 (pbk). Consciousness and the Mind of God By Charles Taliaferro, Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. 349. ISBN 0–521–46173–1. $65.00 (hbk). Wittgenstein and Quine By Robert L. Arrington and Hans‐Johann Glock (eds) Routledge, 1996. Pp. xvii + 286. ISBN 0–415–09676–6. £40.00. Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics By Maeve Cooke, MIT Press, 1997 (hbk 1994). Pp. 232. ISBN 0–262–53145–3. £12.00 (pbk). Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues By Kenneth Dorter, University of California Press, 1994. Pp. x + 156. ISBN 0–520–08331–8. $45.00 Plotin über Sein, Zahl und Einheit By Christoph Horn, B. G. Teubner, 1995. Pp. 368. ISBN 3–519–07611‐X. The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I By Norman Kretzmann, Clarendon Press, 199. Pp. 000. 0–19–823660–3. Price £35.00. Reason, Truth and Self: The Postmodern Reconditioned By Michael Luntley, Routledge, 1995. Pp. xv + 248, ISBN 0–415–11853–0. £11.99 Approaches to Intentionality By William Lyons, Clarendon Press, 1995. Pp. 261. ISBN 0–19–823526–7. £30.00 Benacerraf and his Critics Edited by Adam Morton and Stephen P. Stich, Blackwell, 1996. Pp. xi + 271. ISBN 0–631–19268–9. £45.00. Atheism and Theism By Jack J. C. Smart and John J. Haldane, Blackwell Publishers, 1996. Pp. 234. ISBN 0–631–19291–3 (hbk). £40.00. ISBN 0–631–19292–1 (pbk). £12.99. Human Lives: Critical Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics Edited by David S. Oderberg and Jacqueline A. Laing Macmillan Press, 1997. Pp. viii + 244. ISBN 0–333–62980–0. £40 Freedom within Reason By Susan Wolf, Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. 162. ISBN 0–19–508565–5. £13.99 (pbk). An Introduction to Political Philosophy By Jonathan Wolff, Opus, Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. 230 + index. ISBN 19–289251–7 £8.99.

In this paper, I examine Husserl’s conception of the self as both an identical I-pole (Ichpol) for-all experience and as a developing, unfolding unity whose self-explication is its history. As Husserl proclaims in the Cartesian Meditations § 37, “time is the universal form of all egological genesis.” He further states: “The ego constitutes itself for itself in, so to speak, the unity of a history,” (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations § 37, p. 75; Hua I 109). In this paper, I will explore how Husserl understands the temporalization of the ego, including the ego’s essential historicity in the life-world. The Danish philosopher Dan Zahavi has spoken about the “minimal self” as a requirement that all experience have the character of “for-me-ness,” i.e., an immediate, non-objectifying, self-acquaintance of the self with itself. I broaden out this account to analyze the nature of the sensory basis for our experience of the self and the need to understand the self in its habitual and developmental character as a form of “ownship”.

Husserl’s phenomenology offers a very complex treratment of the full conscious person as constituted out of its capacities and habitualities. Human existence develops itself habitually through its intentional meaningful practices both individually and communally. Habit can be found at all levels in the constitution of meaningfulness (Sinnhaftigkeit), from the lowest level of passivity, through perceptual experience, to the formation of the ego itself, and outwards to the development of intersubjective society with its history and tradition, to include finally the whole sense of the harmonious course of worldly life. Husserl uses a range of terms to express his concept of habit including: Habitus, Habitualität, Gewohnheit, das Habituelle, Habe, Besitz, Sitte, and even Tradition. Husserl’s account deeply influenced Ortega Y Gasset, Alfred Schutz, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Pierre Bourdieu, among others. This paper will give an overall analysis of Husserl’s conception of the habitual self.

In this paper I outline the main features of the phenomenological approach, focusing on the central themes of intentionality, embodiment, empathy, intersubjectivity, sociality and the life-world. I argue that phenomenology is primarily a philosophy of intentional explication that identifies the a priori, structural correlations between subjectivity and all forms of constituted objectivities apprehended in their horizonal contexts. Intentional description reveals the structurally necessary, meaning-informing interactions between embodied subjectivity (already caught in the nexus of intersubjectivity) in the context of embeddedness in the temporal, historical, and cultural life-world. I shall defend phenomenology as a holistic approach that rightfully defends the role of subjectivity in the constitution of objectivity and recognizes the inherent limitations of all forms of naturalism, objectivism and scientism.

This manuscript is submitted to _CPR_ for the special issue on sedimentation edited by Saulius Geniusas. In this paper, I examine how the mature Husserl explicates the meaning and role of sedimentation in its various dimensions, ranging from individual self-development within the ego (the layering of time-consciousness), through habit and tradition to the formation of the concrete person, and ultimately outwards to the broader intersubjective processes of acculturation and historicization in the working of traditions. “Precipitation” [_Niederschlag_] and “sedimentation” [_Sedimentierung_] are terms employed in Husserl’s later work to express how original experiences bed down to provide a layer of presumed context. Thus, in _Experience and Judgement_, Husserl explains sedimentation as: “[T]he continuous transformation of what has been originally acquired and has become a habitual possession and thus something non-original” (_Experience and Judgment_ § 67). Sedimentation is increasingly important in Husserl’s understanding of the relation between what is implicitly assumed and what can be ventured in culture and tradition.

Phenomenological accounts of sociality in Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Scheler, Schütz, Stein and many others offer powerful lines of arguments to recast current, predominantly analytic, discussions on collective intentionality and social cognition. Against this background, the aim of this volume is to reevaluate, critically and in contemporary terms, the rich phenomenological resources regarding social reality: the interpersonal, collective and communal aspects of the life-world (_Lebenswelt_). Specifically, the book pursues three interrelated objectives: it aims 1.) to systematically explore the key phenomenological aspects of social reality; 2.) to offer novel, state-of-the-art assessments of both central and lesser-known proponents of the phenomenology of sociality (Gurwitsch, Löwith, von Hildebrand, or Walther), and 3.) to contextualize this elaborate body of work in light of contemporary social cognition research, the growing literature in analytic social ontology, and current trends in moral psychology, moral phenomenology, and social and political philosophy. The collection brings together original articles by a host of prominent scholars and upcoming young talents to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of the topic. It will be essential reading for those studying phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, empathy, and community, including analytic, social, moral and political philosophers, and will also be of interest for social scientists and social psychologists.

This chapter explores Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of self-knowledge, including his conceptions of subjectivity, sense constitution, and the divide between natural and transcendental self-experience. Husserl regards self-knowledge as the key to all knowledge, and he sees his project as a radicalization of Descartes’ exploration of the first person. All objectivity is the achievement of constituting subjectivity, and so coming to know this subjectivity is of the greatest importance to overcome naturalistic objectivism. Self-knowledge, moreover, for Husserl, involves a commitment to be an autonomous responsible subject living a life of clarified rational motives. This chapter outlines Husserl’s rich conception of the self and its self-knowledge, including its temporal and habitual character, the nature of the splitting of the ego in natural and transcendental reflection, and the relation of I to not-I.

Dermot Moran provides a lucid, engaging, and critical introduction to Edmund Husserl's philosophy, with specific emphasis on his development of phenomenology. This book is a comprehensive guide to Husserl's thought from its origins in nineteenth-century concerns with the nature of scientific knowledge and with psychologism, through his breakthrough discovery of phenomenology and his elucidation of the phenomenological method, to the late analyses of culture and the life-world. Husserl's complex ideas are presented in a clear and expert manner. Individual chapters explore Husserl's key texts including _Philosophy of Arithmetic_, _Logical Investigations_, _Ideas_ I, _Cartesian Meditations_ and _Crisis of the European Sciences_. In addition, Moran offers penetrating criticisms and evaluations of Husserl's achievement, including the contribution of his phenomenology to current philosophical debates concerning consciousness and the mind. _Edmund Husserl_ is an invaluable guide to understanding the thought of one of the seminal thinkers of the twentieth century. It will be helpful to students of contemporary philosophy, and to those interested in scientific, literary and cultural studies on the European continent.

Duns Scotus, Metaphysician. William A. Frank and Allan B. Wolter. Purdue University Press 1995, pp. 224 £27.50 Hb. ISBN 1–55753–071–8 £13.19 Pb. ISBN 1–55753–072–6 Plato in Renaissance England. Sears Jayne. Dordrecht, Boston & London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, pp. 197 Dfl. 190.00, $122.00, £80.00 hb. ISBN 0–7923–3060–9 Mechanismus und Subjektivität in der Philosophie von Thomas Hobbes (Quaestiones, 9). Michael Esfeld. Frommann‐Holzboog, Stuttgart‐Bad Cannstatt 1995, pp. 434. ISBN 3–7728–1699–1 Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth‐Century Metaphysics. R. S. Woolhouse. London: Routledge, 1993. £11.99. ISBN 0–415–09021–0, ISBN 0–415–09022–9 pb. Descartes et Regius. Autour de l'Explication de l'Esprit Humain. Edited by Theo Verbeek. Studies of the History of Ideas in the Low Countries. Rodopi, Amsterdam‐Atlanta, 1993, pp. 114 $23.50 pb. ISBN 90–5183–375‐X The God of Spinoza. A Philosophical Study. Richard Mason. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. xiv + 272. £35.00. ISBN 0–521–58162–1 Robert Boyle and the Limits of Reason. Jan Wojcik. Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 243. £40.00. ISBN 0521–56029–2 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. John Locke. Edited and abridged by Kenneth P. Winkler. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1996, pp. 416. £27.95 hb; £6.95 pb. ISBN 0–87220–217–8 hb. 0–87220–216‐X pb. John Locke and the Eighteenth Century Divines. Alan Sell. Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1997, pp. 444. £40.00 hb. ISBN 0–7083–1409–0 The Margins of Orthodoxy. Heterodox Writing and Cultural Response, 1660–1750. Edited by Roger D. Lund. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. xiv + 298. £35.00. ISBN 0–521–47117‐X The Enigmatic Parting Shot: What was Hume's ‘Compleat Answer to Dr. Reid and to That Bigotted Silly Fellow, Beattie'? James Somerville. Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1995. pp. 424. £47.50. ISBN 1–85972–083–8 Discursus Praeliminaris de Philosophia in Genere. Christian Wolff. Ed. and trans. into German by Günther Gawlick and Lothar Kreimendahl. Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung, Abt. I, Bd. 1. Stuttgart: Frommann‐hotzboog, 1996, pp. lxviii + 299. ISBN 3–7728–1523–5 Practical Philosophy. Immanuel Kant. Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a General Introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xxxiii + 668. £50.00. ISBN 0–521–37103–1 Religion and Rational Theology. Immanuel Kant. Translated and edited by Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, £45.00, pp. xxiv + 518. ISBN 0–521–25416–1 Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. Immanuel Kant. Translated by Paul Carus, with a collection of essays edited by Beryl Logan. London, Routledge, 1996. £45.00, hb. ISBN 0–415–11575–2 £14.99 pb. pp. 264. ISBN 0–415–11576–0 Kant: Philosophic de l'Histoire. Edited by Norbert Waszek. Revue Germanique Internationale 6/1996. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 220. ISBN 2–13–047698–8; ISSN 1253–7837 Johann Georg Hamann's Relational Metacriticism. Gwen Griffith Dickson. (Thelogische Bibliothek Töpelmann, Band 67). Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1995, pp. xix + 534. ISBN 3–11–014437–9 Frege. Anthony Kenny. London, Penguin Books, 1995, pp. xii + 223. £7.99 pb. ISBN 0–14–012550–7 Russell. A. C. Grayling. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. ix + 115. £5.99. ISBN 0–19–287683‐X.

We do lots of things together in a shared manner. From the phenomenological point of view, does joint or shared agency need a conscious _sense_ of shared agency? Yet there are many processes where we seem to just go along with the group without conscious intent. Building on the classic phenomenological accounts of Edmund Husserl, Alfred Schutz, Martin Heidegger (and the synthetic account of Berger & Luckmann), I want to emphasize the thick horizon of the life-world as a fundamental condition for intentional shared agency. Joint agency has divergent forms with their own peculiar intentionality, attentivity, anticipations and expectations, and embeddedness in a pre-predicative tacit knowledge in the overall live-world. Phenomenology recognizes that even ego-centered activities that appear to be fully ‘agential’ can be carried out in an anonymous un-owned manner, in the manner which Heidegger calls ‘_das Man_’, or ‘the one’. This suggests that tacit belonging to the collective ‘we’ undergirds individual agency. Husserl, Heidegger, and Schutz all have accounts of this ‘anonymous’, pre-predicative kind of group participation. Phenomenology has rich accounts of anonymous, voluntary, shared, social participation that demand a new concept of agency, one neglected in the current literature in philosophy of action.

This chapter discusses Franz Brentano's influence on the Moravian-born philosopher Edmund Husserl, founder of phenomenology and mentor of Martin Heidegger, among other notable twentieth-century philosophers. Husserl arrived in Vienna having completed his military service there and went on to spend two years there, attending Brentano's lectures in particular. Brentano had distinguished generally between what he termed "genuine" or "authentic" presentations, where the object is directly given; and nongenuine, "inauthentic", or "symbolic" presentations, where the object is referred to in some kind of indirect, empty, or symbolic manner. Ten years after the Philosophy of Arithmetic, Husserl published his Logical Investigations, the first volume of which, entitled Prolegomena to a Pure Logic, was devoted to an extensive refutation of psychologism—the view that logical concepts and operations can be explained fully in terms of psychological concepts and operations. Husserl felt that Brentano remained immersed in a naturalistic, empirical psychology and could not make the breakthrough to phenomenological realm of pure essences.

Recent years have seen growing interest in the work of Edith Stein (1891–1942), particularly in her theory of empathy. This is due not only to the fact that Stein’s work intersects significantly with contemporary research on empathy, but also because Stein’s phenomenological writings shed new light on problems concerning the nature of self, affectivity, and sociality. In this Introduction, we aim at summarizing some important issues surrounding empathy before introducing Stein’s work and the relevance of her philosophical contribution as developed in the original essays collected in this volume.

The diverse essays in this volume speak to the relevance of phenomenological and psychological questioning regarding perceptions of the human. This designation, human, can be used beyond the mere identification of a species to underwrite exclusion, denigration, dehumanization and demonization, and to set up a pervasive opposition in Othering all deemed inhuman, nonhuman, or posthuman. As alerted to by Merleau-Ponty, one crucial key for a deeper understanding of these issues is consideration of the nature and scope of perception. Perception defines the world of the perceiver, and perceptual capacities are constituted in engagement with the world – there is co-determination. Moreover, the distinct phenomenology of perception in the spectatorial mode in contrast to the reciprocal mode, deepens the intersubjective and ethical dimensions of such investigations. Questions motivating the essays include: Can objectification and an inhuman gaze serve positive ends? If so, under what constraints and conditions? How is an inhuman gaze achieved and at what cost? How might the emerging insights of the role of perception into our interdependencies and essential sociality from various domains challenge not only theoretical frameworks, but also the practices and institutions of science, medicine, psychiatry and justice? What can we learn from atypical social cognition, psychopathology and animal cognition? Could distortions within the gazer’s emotional responsiveness and habituated aspects of social interaction play a role in the emergence of an inhuman gaze? Perception and the Inhuman Gaze will interest scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, psychology, psychiatry, sociology and social cognition. Table of Contents Introduction Part I. The Gaze in Classical Phenomenology: Perspectives on Objectification 1. Defending the Objective Gaze as a Self-transcending Capacity of Human Subjects Dermot Moran 2. Two Orders of Bodily Objectification: The Look and the Touch Sara Heinämaa 3. On Eliminativism’s Transient Gaze Timothy Mooney 4. Not wholly human. Reading Maurice Merleau-Ponty with Jacques Lacan. Dorothée Legrand 5. Disclosure and the Gendered Gaze in Simone de Beauvoir's Ethics Christinia Landry Part II. Vision, Perception and Gazes 6. Inside the gaze Shaun Gallagher 7. Perception and its Objects. Maurita Harney 8. Technological Gaze: Understanding How Technologies Transform Perception Richard Lewis 9. The Inhuman Gaze and Perceptual Gestalts: The Making and Unmaking of Others and Worlds Anya Daly Part III. Psychiatry, Psychopathology and Inhuman Gazes 10. Values and Values-based Practice in Psychopathology: Combining Analytic and Phenomenological Approaches G Stanghellini and K.W.M. (Bill) Fulford 11. The Inhuman and Human Gaze in Psychiatry, Psychopathology and Schizophrenia. Matthew Broome 12. Overcoming the Gaze: Psychopathology, Affect, and Narrative. Anna Bortolan 13. From excess to exhaustion : The rise of burnout in a post-modern achievement society. Philippe Wuyts 14. Blackout Rages: The Inhibition of Episodic Memory in Extreme Berserker Episodes John Protevi Part IV. Beyond the Human: Divine, Posthuman and Animal Gazes 15. Wondering at the Inhuman Gaze Sean. D. Kelly 16. What Counts as Human/ Inhuman Right Now? Rosi Braidotti 17. Beyond Human and Animal: Metamorphosis in Merleau-Ponty Dylan Trigg Part V. Sociality and Boundaries of the Human 18. Voice and gaze considered together in ‘languaging’. Fred Cummins 19. Ethics Beyond the Human: Disability and The Inhuman Jonathan Mitchell 20. Social Invisibility and Emotional Blindness James Jardine 21. What are you looking at? Dissonance as a window on the autonomy of participatory sense-making frames. Mark James.