Derong Chen

Abstract Modern epistemological discussions often portray Zhuangzi as a thinker offering primarily skeptical or relativistic insights. Such interpretations, however, rely heavily on surface readings of his metaphors and overlook the deeper meta‑questions these metaphors presuppose. This paper argues that Zhuangzi engages three central meta‑questions in epistemology and that his foundational metaphors—especially those concerning knowledge, perspective, and transformation—encode implicit meta‑epistemological commitments. By reframing these metaphors through the lens of meta‑epistemology, the paper clarifies how Zhuangzi challenges conventional assumptions about what it means to know. The analyses of Zhuangzi’s metaphors in this paper articulate a coherent meta‑epistemological stance: knowledge is fundamentally perspectival, inquiry is transformative rather than method‑bound, and epistemic success is relational rather than representational. This reading not only complicates standard interpretations but also reveals a more philosophically robust account of Zhuangzi’s epistemology. By foregrounding meta‑questions, the paper offers a new interpretive framework that bridges classical Chinese philosophy and contemporary epistemology. It demonstrates that Zhuangzi is not merely a skeptic or relativist but a thinker who advances a distinctive and sophisticated meta‑epistemological vision.

In Metaphorical Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy: Illustrated with Feng Youlan's New Metaphysics, Derong Chen examines Chinese philosophy through a critical analysis of Feng Youlan's nnew metaphysics. He views metaphysics in Chinese philosophy as a metaphorical metaphysics separate from Western metaphysics. In examining the historical influences and contemporary reaction to Feng's work, he identify's Feng's system as the continuation of the Chinese philosophical tradition. This approach is most applicable to scholars of comparative philosophy and Chinese philosophy.

The notions of Di (Emperor), Shangdi (God in heaven), and Tian (Heaven) were endowed with a variety of meanings and were used to refer to different objects of worship in ancient Chinese religion. In different eras, Di referred to the earthly emperor as well as to the heavenly emperor; Tian referred to the physical sky as well as to a supreme personal god in different contexts. Hegel oversimplified these three notions when he characterized ancient Chinese religion as a kind of natural religion. This article aims to clarify Hegel’s misunderstanding of ancient Chinese religion by clarifying the meanings and references of these three notions as they appeared in the Yin-Shang and the Zhou Dynasties.