Detlef von Daniels

This chapter develops a post-foundational account of the normativity of international law through a historical and philosophical reinterpretation of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. It argues that normativity cannot be adequately understood as a timeless concept but must be situated within the historical development of modern law and legal theory. Kelsen’s distinction between law, morality, and social facts provides the basis for an ideology-critical perspective that resists attempts to ground legal normativity in moral values or practical reason. At the same time, his account of the unity of national and international law is modified to accommodate the plurality of legal systems and the complexity of international legal practice. The resulting perspective is examined in relation to three contested issues: general principles of law, soft law, and practical reasoning. Rather than providing an ultimate foundation for international law, the chapter advocates critical reflection on the presuppositions of legal normativity and the role of legal scholarship in shaping international legal discourse.

This essay outlines a genealogical approach to cosmopolitan thought that challenges conventional narratives of philosophical progress and the normative assumptions underlying contemporary theories of global justice. Rather than treating cosmopolitanism as a timeless ideal gradually realised through international institutions, it examines the historical contingency of philosophical ideas and their relationship to political and legal developments. Drawing on examples from ancient Greek political thought and the history of international law, the essay develops this approach through historically contextualised readings of Immanuel Kant and Hans Kelsen. Kant’s political philosophy, particularly when read alongside his philosophy of religion, reveals a tension between external legality and inner morality that complicates conventional interpretations of his cosmopolitanism. Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, in turn, offers a post-foundational perspective on international legal order, exposing the limits of normative claims presented as scientific truths. The essay argues that genealogical criticism need not remain merely deconstructive. By recovering the historical circumstances and philosophical tensions within Kant’s and Kelsen’s thought, it opens up alternative ways of understanding cosmopolitanism, international law, and political responsibility.

This paper re-examines Kant’s late controversy with Johann Georg Schlosser, arguing that their exchange concerns more than a minor episode in the reception of critical philosophy. Schlosser’s translation of Plato’s letters and his criticism of Kant articulate a conservative response to the Enlightenment, contrasting philosophical criticism with an allegedly higher form of intuitive knowledge accessible only to a select few. Kant’s replies distinguish the public and communicable exercise of reason from the esoteric claims of philosophical enthusiasts (*Schwärmer*). Yet his engagement with Schlosser also confronts him with a more fundamental challenge: how can critical philosophy retain its transformative force under conditions of political reaction and restrictions on public discourse? The paper argues that Kant’s humorous rejection of the ‘noble tone’ is accompanied by an attempt to articulate an alternative, enthusiastic defence of philosophy as a common project of enlightenment. At the same time, the controversy reveals unresolved tensions between philosophical autonomy, institutional conditions and political action. Schlosser’s objections thus illuminate both the ambitions and the limitations of Kant’s late conception of philosophy.

This essay offers a critical and occasionally humorous examination of Otfried Höffe’s proposal for a federal, democratic world state as a guarantor of perpetual peace. Using the extended metaphor of a poker game, it questions whether the institutional arrangements that appear to secure peace and justice within nation-states can simply be reproduced at the global level. The argument challenges both the empirical assumptions and the normative foundations of Höffe’s proposal. It criticises the reliance on social contract theory, the identification of law with a centralised monopoly of coercion and the neglect of historical contingencies and alternative forms of transnational governance. Drawing on Kant’s philosophy of history, the essay argues that political philosophy must attend to the conditions under which institutional transformations might actually occur rather than merely deducing ideal political arrangements. Finally, the essay explores the dangers inherent in the idea of a world state, particularly its tendency towards centralisation, the absence of meaningful possibilities of exit and the risk that universal claims to legitimacy may become instruments of despotism. Combining philosophical argument with irony and political satire, it concludes that the world state is neither a necessary nor a desirable ideal of cosmopolitan politics.

This article examines whether Kant’s philosophy of right is inherently state-centred and challenges the implicit statism underlying much contemporary Kant scholarship. While discussions of Kantian cosmopolitanism often take the modern sovereign state for granted, interpretations of his doctrine of right tend to neglect its cosmopolitan implications. Drawing on a contextualist approach to the history of political thought, the article argues that projecting the modern nation-state onto Kant’s philosophy obscures both the historical plurality of legal and political orders and the distinctive structure of his legal theory. Kant’s conception of right begins with individual freedom rather than the state, while his account of public right encompasses constitutional, international and cosmopolitan law as interdependent dimensions of a rightful condition. Nevertheless, an idealist form of statism remains embedded in Kant’s conception of the state as an a priori requirement of reason and in his philosophy of universal history. The article explores an alternative, historically sensitive interpretation that accommodates legal pluralism, confederal arrangements and the gradual transformation of political institutions. It concludes that the contemporary relevance of Kant’s philosophy lies not primarily in providing a normative blueprint for global political order, but in cultivating historically informed political judgement attentive to the contingencies and paradoxes of political development.

This article challenges the assumption that legal positivism is necessarily a state-centred theory. Drawing on H. L. A. Hart’s analytical framework, it argues that the concept of law need not be confined to municipal legal systems and can accommodate a plurality of legal orders. First, it examines the possibility of legal systems consisting of primary rules without centralised secondary rules and reinterprets the latter as institutional mechanisms rather than necessary conditions of legality. It then explores the dialectic of legal institutions and distinguishes legal systems exercising conditional from those exercising unconditional force. Building on Hart’s critique of Hans Kelsen’s doctrine of the unity of law, the article introduces "linkage rules" as a third category of rules governing relations between distinct legal systems. Such rules may establish relationships of purported validation, completion, reception or delegation without presupposing a unified legal order. The resulting account reconceives the rule of recognition as a potentially coordinated practice and outlines a legal positivism capable of addressing legal pluralism beyond the nation state.

This paper examines the relationship between law and politics by revisiting the debate between Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen on constitutional adjudication. Rather than treating their disagreement merely as an episode in the constitutional history of the Weimar Republic, it reconstructs their arguments in the context of European multilevel governance. The paper argues that neither Schmitt’s conception of political unity nor Kelsen’s hierarchical model of legal order adequately captures the interaction of competing legal systems. It develops a perspective of realist legal pluralism that takes account of the social foundations of judicial independence and the political consequences of juridification. In particular, the growing authority of courts not only transforms the institutional balance of power but also changes the terms in which political conflicts are articulated and resolved. A further limitation of legal approaches concerns political responsibility. While courts may decide questions of considerable political significance, they cannot assume responsibility for their consequences in the same way as political representatives. Finally, the paper recovers from Schmitt’s thought a conception of political authority (*auctoritas*) as leadership through persuasion, which cannot be assigned in advance to any particular institution. It concludes that the limits of juridification must be understood not simply as deficiencies of legal institutions but as an expression of the irreducible possibilities of political action.

This chapter develops a post-foundational account of the normativity of international law through a historical and philosophical reinterpretation of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. It argues that normativity cannot be adequately understood as a timeless concept but must be situated within the historical development of modern law and legal theory. Kelsen’s distinction between law, morality, and social facts provides the basis for an ideology-critical perspective that resists attempts to ground legal normativity in moral values or practical reason. At the same time, his account of the unity of national and international law is modified to accommodate the plurality of legal systems and the complexity of international legal practice. The resulting perspective is examined in relation to three contested issues: general principles of law, soft law, and practical reasoning. Rather than providing an ultimate foundation for international law, the chapter advocates critical reflection on the presuppositions of legal normativity and the role of legal scholarship in shaping international legal discourse.

This chapter examines the historical development and contemporary significance of critical-social democratic theory, distinguishing between two traditions that emerged from the intellectual legacy of Marxism: social democratic reformism and the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory. The first tradition, represented by Eduard Bernstein, Hermann Heller, Anthony Giddens, and Thomas Meyer, combines a commitment to social justice with parliamentary democracy, institutional reform, and empirical analysis. The second, extending from Max Horkheimer to Claus Offe, Wolfgang Streeck, Axel Honneth, and Nancy Fraser, seeks to expose the structural contradictions and social pathologies of capitalist societies. Through a historical and systematic comparison, the chapter argues that the social democratic tradition has developed a more convincing understanding of democracy as a framework for political contestation among competing, equally legitimate values and interests. By contrast, Critical Theory frequently subordinates democratic institutions and political pluralism to comprehensive diagnoses of capitalism or normative commitments to emancipation. The chapter concludes that a renewal of critical-social democratic theory requires a return to Bernstein's emphasis on empirical inquiry and individual responsibility, together with Heller's understanding of democratic pluralism and the institutional foundations of political conflict.

This paper explores the relationship between Leibniz’s metaphysics and contemporary cosmopolitan political philosophy through two seemingly contradictory theses: first, that we are all Leibnizians, and second, that Leibniz himself was not a Leibnizian. The first thesis argues that contemporary theories of global justice share with Leibniz a scientific and rationalistic conception of the world, despite their rejection of his metaphysical and theological commitments. The second thesis challenges conventional interpretations of Leibniz by reconsidering his metaphysics, philosophy of history, and rational theology in light of contemporary debates on consciousness, legal pluralism, and systems theory. Rather than presenting Leibniz as a precursor of modern cosmopolitanism, the paper develops a genealogical perspective that reveals both the limitations of contemporary political philosophy and the philosophical possibilities concealed within Leibniz’s thought. It concludes by reconsidering his conception of justice as *caritas sapientis* and the unresolved problem of evil.

Die Frage nach der Verwirklichung internationaler Gerechtigkeit und ihr Spannungsverhältnis zur demokratischen Legitimation werden in der politischen Philosophie und Theorie seit Jahren auf abstrakter Ebene diskutiert. In dem Jahrbuch werden diese Debatten weitergeführt, aber zugleich auf das jüngere politische Zeitgeschehen bezogen. In den letzten Jahren rückte Europa zunehmend als geopolitische Einheit ins Bewusstsein und wurde zugleich durch das Aufkommen populistischer Bewegungen als geistige Wesenheit fragil. Das ursprünglich europäisch geprägte Völkerrecht, das neben der Friedenssicherung für eine kurze Zeit nach dem Ende des Ost- West-Konflikts das Versprechen barg, durch Konstitutionalisierung auf europäischer Ebene und darüber hinaus zu einer »Ordnung der Zwecke« zu werden, droht so, seine Verankerung in einem geteilten Rechtsgefühl zu verlieren. Der implizite Bezug auf die sozialen Voraussetzungen des gemeinsamen Lebens sowie die Sorge um das politische Leben sind daher zwei Grundtöne, die sich durch alle Aufsätze ziehen. Mit Beiträgen von Ayelet Banai und Regina Kreide, Christine Bratu und Detlef von Daniels, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Georg Nolte, Elif Özmen, Dietmar von der Pfordten und Lutz Wingert.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the divide between systematic and historical approaches in political philosophy can be overcome. To this end, I use the contemporary debate on cosmopolitanism and show that Plato already gave a philosophical answer to its central beliefs. Since this is meant to be a historical claim, I argue (1) that the question of how Plato reacts to the cosmopolitan challenge is not new but was already posed by Plato’s contemporaries, and (2) that Plato reacted to changing constitutional situations and to the cosmopolitan challenges of the early Sophists through systematic and historical political philosophy. In a more detailed interpretation of the *Politeia*, I show (3) how Plato constructs his dialogue to silence his opponents and make room for something else, namely philosophy. Reading Plato in this way does not offer solutions but instead urges us to reconsider philosophical beliefs.

This article critically examines competing visions of Europe's political constitution in the context of the European Union's constitutional and political crises. It contrasts historical, social-philosophical, and normative approaches to European integration, focusing particularly on the proposals of Jürgen Habermas, Ulrich Beck, and Robert Menasse. While Habermas advocates a constitutionalization of Europe, Beck envisages a cosmopolitan transformation of European politics, and Menasse challenges the nation-state through a post-national European vision. The article questions the historical narratives and normative assumptions underlying these approaches and examines their implications for democracy, political legitimacy, and the future of European integration.

This essay examines the limits of legal and philosophical approaches to privacy by exploring the historical and experiential dimensions of the distinction between public and private life. Drawing on Sophocles’ *Ajax* and *Antigone*, as well as Tennessee Williams’ *A Streetcar Named Desire*, it shows how literature reveals experiences of shame, guilt, vulnerability, and personal identity that cannot be adequately captured by the language of individual rights. A genealogical and phenomenological perspective challenges the presumed universality of liberal conceptions of privacy and illuminates the continuing relevance of older moral and cultural frameworks. The essay argues that literature offers a distinctive form of philosophical reflection, exposing the limitations of legal reasoning and revealing the fragility of privacy in the digital age.

This essay revisits the political realism of Glen Newey through an imaginary conversation across philosophical traditions. Starting from Newey’s critique of contemporary liberal political philosophy, particularly his engagement with John Rawls and Bernard Williams, it examines his concept of “power loops”: situations in which attempts to legitimate political authority reproduce the very power relations they seek to justify. The essay then brings Newey’s political realism into dialogue with Plato’s *Republic* and Niklas Luhmann’s concept of re-entry. It argues that the paradoxes Newey identifies in political legitimation are not confined to contemporary political theory but can also be understood through the dialectical tradition of philosophy. A reconsideration of Plato reveals how the limits of reason, political order, and comprehensive theories of justice are reflected within the philosophical argument itself. Finally, drawing on John Ford’s *The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance*, the essay explores how artistic representation can disclose the violence and contradictions concealed within liberal political narratives. The resulting dialogue suggests a way of extending Newey’s philosophical legacy beyond the boundaries of analytical political theory.

The article shows the extent to which recent populist movements challenge both liberal prac- tice and liberal theory, and require a deeper reflection based on a history of ideas. To this end, I will first outline the current state of debate and name Carl Schmitt’s politically intervening think- ing as a theoretical challenge. With reference to Hans Kelsen’s fundamental criticism of Schmitt, I will illustrate that the underlying political ontology becomes questionable in this debate. This ontology gains contour through the historical circumstances of the 1930s and the influence of Martin Heidegger’s neo-antique thinking. Against this background, a historically oriented anal- ysis of Plato offers a way out of Heidegger’s metaphysical appropriation of the ancients, at the same time providing a way of overcoming the narrowness of current liberal discourse.

Liberalism, with cosmopolitanism as its intellectual spearhead, seems to be in retreat, while illiberal and populist narratives have come to dominate the digital space. In this book, Detlef von Daniels suggests that this crisis can be addressed through historically situated self-reflection. It begins by noting that cosmopolitan ideas have antecedents going back to the pre-Platonic Sophists. In this light, Plato emerges as the first anti-cosmopolitan philosopher. Unsurprisingly, Plato again plays an important role in today’s authoritarian discourses. Kant’s political philosophy is then read as a fundamental reorientation of philosophy, though one whose dialectics Kant himself had already discerned. Against Heidegger’s appropriation of both antiquity and Kant, Kelsen’s theory of law emerges as a sober antidote that gives rise to two models of post-foundational thought. Framed by the voices of Sappho and Hölderlin, the book finally reveals a poetic mode of communication across space and time.

Die Globalisierung in ökonomischer und politischer sowie in kultureller und sozialer Hinsicht rückt das Thema internationale Gerechtigkeit immer stärker in den Fokus. Letztlich geht es um die Frage moralischen Handelns auf globaler Ebene, um eine globale Praxis, die prinzipiell für alle gerecht ist. Ausgangspunkt der Debatte ist dabei die Frage nach der Verallgemeinerbarkeit grundlegender Prinzipien sozialer Gerechtigkeit, die zumindest innerhalb demokratischer Nationalstaaten gelten: Inwieweit kann der Anwendungsbereich innerstaatlicher Prinzipien sozialer Gerechtigkeit global ausgedehnt werden? Bestehen auf globaler Ebene andere, gegebenenfalls schwächere Beziehungen moralischer Verantwortung, die entsprechend andere Prinzipien globaler sozialer Gerechtigkeit fordern?

This paper critically examines the philosophical foundations of global constitutionalism through five theses on Kant and Kelsen. It argues that Kelsen’s Neo-Kantian legal positivism cannot simply be supplemented by Kantian moral philosophy. A historically contextualized reading of Kant challenges the assumption that his political philosophy provides a normative foundation for contemporary international law, while Kelsen’s theory reveals the limits of constitutional interpretations of the international legal order. Finally, Kant’s philosophy of religion offers the beginnings of a critique of institutions and ideology, calling into question the presumed moral authority of legal and political institutions.

This chapter argues that the problem of evil is a way to reflect upon three underlying problems that pertain to legal pluralism as a critical, self-reflective theory. First, legal plu­ ralism is prone to be absorbed by its “saved subjects.” Second, there is no theoretical space outside or above political contestation. Third, the legal pluralist herself potentially exerts influence on the observed through her observations. By analyzing the debate be­ tween Eugen Ehrlich and Hans Kelsen, the chapter demonstrates how these three issues accompany the development of the debate on legal pluralism and how the problem of evil emerges as its underlying enigma.

This paper develops a genealogical perspective on pluralist jurisprudence by critically examining three approaches to law: analytical jurisprudence, legal pluralism, and the philosophy of international law. It argues that each tradition, in seeking to establish itself as a self-sufficient theoretical framework, reveals limitations that become apparent from the perspectives of competing traditions. Rather than proposing a comprehensive theory of legal pluralism, the genealogical approach uncovers the historical and philosophical presuppositions underlying these traditions. It thereby promotes a self-reflective understanding of legal theory, emphasizing the plurality of legal practices, the contingency of theoretical frameworks, and the dangers inherent in claims to universal validity.

Since the end of the Cold War, human rights have become a dominant framework in international politics and political philosophy. This article questions whether philosophy should confine itself to justifying this development or whether it can adopt a more sceptical stance towards the human rights discourse. Taking Christoph Menke and Arnd Pollmann’s philosophy of human rights as its point of departure, the article critically examines five central claims concerning the historical foundations of human rights, recognition, universalism, human dignity and democracy. It argues that the experience of the Holocaust cannot sustain the proposed philosophy of historical progress, while the appeal to mutual recognition remains too indeterminate to provide a convincing foundation for universal rights. Moreover, the emphasis on human dignity and the progressive universalisation of rights risks obscuring the distinctive functions of law and the irreducibly political character of conflicts over rights, membership and political order. Rather than rejecting human rights, the article develops a sceptical perspective that treats their contemporary prominence as a historically contingent political phenomenon. It concludes that political philosophy should preserve its critical distance from prevailing normative commitments and remain attentive to historical experience, competing values and the limits of moral universalism.

Monarchy is liberalism’s little secret. Given the number of articles and books appearing every year dealing with liberal democracy as the hallmark of contemporary Western societies, it is astonishing that monarchy is rarely ever mentioned despite the fact that monarchy, and not a republic, is the constitutional form of quite a number of Western liberal states. I argue that considering the political reality of the established monarchies in Europe leads into a dilemma: either contemporary liberalism is not the kind of theory it claims to be or it has to reconsider its central tenets. In conclusion, I show that the dilemma cannot be solved or avoided but needs to be embraced by conceiving liberalism not as a applied moral theory but as a political theory that leaves room for various symbolic self-understandings and acknowledges the crooked timber of historical realities.

This book develops a concept of law from a transnational perspective by bringing Jürgen Habermas’s critical theory into dialogue with H. L. A. Hart’s analytical jurisprudence. It examines the strengths and limitations of both approaches in accounting for the emergence and interaction of legal orders beyond the nation-state. Building on a reconsideration of primary rules, legal institutions, and the plurality of legal systems, the book argues that law cannot be adequately understood within a state-centred conceptual framework. Instead, the relationships between different legal systems must be incorporated into the concept of law itself. This perspective offers an alternative to theories seeking a unified normative foundation of law and provides a framework for general jurisprudence capable of addressing the complexity of contemporary transnational legal relations.