Dhivan Thomas Jones

The publication in 2015 (ed. Li) of Chap. 6 of the rediscovered Sanskrit text of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (MA) allows us to witness more directly Candrakīrti’s careful and deliberate critique of the ‘chariot argument’ for the merely conventional existence of the self in Indian Abhidharmic thought. I argue that in MA 6.140–141, Candrakīrti alludes to the use of the chariot argument in the Milindapañha as negating only the view of a permanent self (compared to an elephant), rather than negating ego-identification (compared to a snake in its hole). In contrast to this misuse of the chariot argument, in MA 6.150–165 Candrakīrti uses the chariot argument as an allegory to enable the meditator to refute the basis of ego-identification in seven ways. Candrakīrti’s use of the chariot argument does not establish any theory about the self or not-self, but acts as a guide to meditation as part of philosophy as a spiritual practice with the goal of liberation.

This article investigates the original meaning of dependent arising in the Buddha’s teaching, by focussing on the imasmi" sati formula. Modern scholars such as the Rhys Davidses, K.N. Jayatilleke and Paul Williams have interpreted it as a princi- ple of causation, comparable to a scientific conception of causation. I argue instead that this formula implies that the Buddha held that causation is nothing more than the correlation of causes and effects, and that it commits the Buddha to a Humean regularity thesis about causation. I draw a distinction between the Buddhist and scientific concepts of causation, and then summarise an alternative approach made by more recent scholars such as Sue Hamilton, Noa Ronkin and Eviatar Shulman, who present dependent arising in terms of conditionality in the causal structure of subjective experience. I conclude by presenting the argument that the imasmi" sati formula does not express a principle of causation but is rather a formula for the method of discovering and presenting causation as conditionality in experience.

The Pāli expression khaggavisāṇakappo may either mean ‘like the rhinoceros’ or ‘like the horn of the rhinoceros’. It occurs in the refrain eko care khaggavisāṇakappo at the end of each stanza of the Khaggavisāṇasutta and its parallels, and the refrain has been translated by some as ‘one should wander alone like the rhinoceros’ but by some, including K.R. Norman, as ‘one should wander alone like the horn of the rhinoceros’. K.R. Norman has however set out his reasons for regarding ‘like the rhinoceros horn’ as the correct translation, and for ‘like the rhinoceros’ as wrong. The present article critically discusses Norman’s reasons, concluding that the expression khaggavisāṇa may be regarded as a deliberately ambiguous compound meaning both the rhinoceros and its horn, or perhaps as a single expression meaning ‘rhinoceros’. The zoological facts are considered, as well as the difficult etymology of khaggavisāṇa, its contextual meaning, its meaning in Jain parallels, and its discussion in Pāli commentaries. The article concludes that ‘like the rhinoceros’ is in fact a correct translation.

The early Buddhist exegetical text, the Nettippakarana, apparently uniquely, describes the stages of the path as ‘transcendental dependent arising’ (lokuttara paticca-samuppada), in contrast with the twelve nidanas, called ‘worldly dependent arising’ (lokiya paticca-samuppada). A close reading of the Nettippakarana in relation to another, related, exegetical text, the Petakopadesa, reveals that the latter interprets the same stages of the path in a different way. More broadly, while the Petakopadesa takes paticca-samuppada to refer only to the twelve nidanas, the Nettippakarana’s exegetical strategy takes paticca-samuppada to refer to an over-arching principle of conditionality, both ‘worldly’ and ‘transcendental’. This exegesis has proved popular with modern western Buddhist exegetes.

The episode of Brahmā’s request to the Buddha to teach has been regarded as problematic from early times, since it suggests that the Buddha was ini- tially lacking in compassion. Comparison of versions of the story shows it to be possibly pre-Aśokan in origin. A close reading of themes in the episode in relation to other incidents in the Buddha’s life described in the Pali canon show that it need not be taken as portraying an actual experience of the Buddha. The original purpose of the episode was not to describe the Bud- dha’s inner conflict but to show that Brahmā, representative of Brahmanical religion, was a follower of the Buddha. The episode was originally religious propaganda.