Di Huang

This paper reconstructs Sartre’s theory of perception in Being and Nothingness and related texts through the lens of the representationalism/naïve realism debate. I argue that Sartre’s position can be best understood as a fundamentally relational view that incorporates certain insights of intentionalism, resulting in what I term an ‘intentional relationalism’. For Sartre, perception is simultaneously a real, immediate relation with the perceived object and a contentful, intentional exploration of that object. It has a two-dimensional structure, in which the dimension of relationality is explanatorily more basic. The paper discusses the intellectual lineage of this distinctive view in Sartre’s engagement with his philosophical predecessors and examines how he develops this approach through his theory of consciousness as nihilation.

本文探讨萨特的前期哲学中现象学存在论的伦理维度。借用伯纳德·威廉姆斯的道德心理学观念，本文将萨特的主体性哲学解读为一种非道德化的道德存在论，即这样一种有关主体性存在方式的描述性理论，它以一种与道德生活的自我诠释保持恰当怀疑距离的方式阐明道德生活，同时为伦理批判提供理论基础。在第一部分和第二部分，我通过对萨特和舍勒的对照解读分析萨特的道德存在论的理论来源及其理论特质、尤其是其非道德化特征的确切含义。这一分析将集中于价值和主体性的关联。第三部分探讨从萨特的道德存在论引出的伦理批判，尤其聚焦伦理生活的一种自发的自恋倾向，剖析其存在论根源并讨论其克服的可能性。 This paper discusses the ethical dimension of the early Sartre’s phenomenological ontology. Making use of Bernard Williams’s idea of moral psychology, I will interpret Sartre’s philosophy of subjectivity as a non-moralized moral ontology, i.e., a descriptive theory of the mode of being of subjectivity that aims at clarifying our moral life at a proper skeptical distance from the self-interpretation of that moral life and thereby lays the ground for ethical critique. In Part One and Part Two, I will compare Sartre’s theory to that of Scheler in order to show the background of Sartre’s moral ontology and to highlight its character as a non-moralized theory. My analysis will focus on the connection of value and subjectivity. Part Three will be devoted to the ethical critique deriving from this moral ontology. Mainly directed at a spontaneous narcissistic tendency of ethical life, our critique reveals the ontological origin of this tendency and discusses the possibility of its

本文在梅洛—庞蒂前期哲学“先验自然主义”的整体问题脉络中考察他在 “沉默的我思”名目下提出的主体性概念，并将其与萨特的“前反思的我思”比较。先验自然主义的要义是：意识的先验维度不离其自然根基。知觉二重性和运动的二重性表明，先验与自然之“不离”应被理解为双向奠基关系。对感觉和他人现象的考察则展示，主体性本身也不免于此二重性。然而，梅氏最终未能维持二重主体性中双向奠基关系的微妙平衡，而是将“我思”的明证性最终归结于知觉场域的事实存在的确定性，此即前人格的、与自然交融的“沉默的我思”。萨特的“前反思的我思”则是不可变格的第一人称视角，是主体性与世界、与自身的断裂。二者各具原初性，其关系乃双向奠基。 In this paper, I examine Merleau-Ponty’s conception of subjectivity – which he put forward under the title of “tacit cogito” – in the overall context of his early philosophy characterized by “transcendental naturalism” and compare it with Sartre’s notion of “pre-reflective cogito”. Transcendental naturalism holds that the transcendental dimension of consciousness is inseparable from its rootedness in nature. The “duality” of perception and of bodily movement, as discussed by Merleau-Ponty, shows that the inseparability of the transcendental and the natural should be understood as a two-way relation of foundation. Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of sensation and the other shows, furthermore, that subjectivity itself is not unaffected by this duality. However, Merleau-Ponty fails, in the end (in Phenomenology of Perception), in keeping the subtle balance in the two-way relation of foundation between the two sides of the dual subjectivity. He reduces, in the final analysis, the evidence of the “cogito” to the certainty of the factual existence of the perceptual field, that is to say, of the pre-personal “tacit cogito” in communion with nature. Sartre’s “pre-reflective cogito” is, on the other hand, the indeclinable first-person perspective, the rupture of subjectivity with the world and with itself. Each of the two is original in its way, and the relation between them is the two-way relation of foundation.

本文尝试在柏格森哲学中内思考时间的内在量度。绵延的不可测量性是柏格森哲学的标志性命题，但《时间与自由意志》中两种复多性的互斥对立似乎设定了一种全然无“度”的绵延，这不仅使得任何对时间的测量成为难以理解的操作，而且与该书中“量所呈现的质”这一核心概念相冲突。与此相对，《物质与记忆》提出的绵延存在差异化张力程度的理论修正了两种复多性的学说，从而赋予绵延以内在量度。但柏格森本人囿于其对数概念的空间化理解，未能明确指认这一变化。 This paper attempts to think the intrinsic measure of time within Bergsonian philosophy. The immeasurability of duration is a signature proposition of Bergson's philosophy. However, the stark opposition of the two multiplicities in Time and Free Will seems to postulate a duration without any intrinsic measure, which not only makes any measurement of time an incomprehensible operation, but also conflicts with the central notion of “quantity presented as quality” in the same book. In contrast, the theory of the differentiated degrees of tension in duration proposed in Matter and Memory modifies the doctrine of the two multiplicities, thus giving duration an intrinsic measure. However, Bergson himself, caught up in his spatialized understanding of the concept of number, fails to explicitly identify this change.

Against the intellectualist conception of subjectivity as a constituting power that transcends the temporal condition of our existence, phenomenology proposes to understand subjectivity in terms of temporality and temporality in terms of subjectivity. This paper explores how this mutual illumination works out for our intellectual consciousness. To address this question, the author revisits the debate between phenomenology and intellectualism, using Maurice Merleau-Ponty's critique of neo-Kantian intellectualism as a starting point. Two conclusions emerge from this revisiting: the original constitution of time is essentially incomplete, hence its nonintellectuality; intellectual activity must be complete, hence its irreducibility to the nascent time. To articulate the relation between temporalization and intellectual activity, the phenomenological conception of foundation as a two-way relation proves helpful. Intellectual activity is indeed founded on original temporalization, insofar as it is to be understood as active synthesis in the living present, but it also imposes a constraint on the mode of temporalization appropriate to such synthesis. We can speak of a temporalization of intellectual consciousness only insofar as we allow for an intellectualizing transformation of original temporality.

This paper is meant as a contribution to the longstanding debate among Husserl scholars regarding the relationship between time-consciousness and the I. From a genetic-phenomenological perspective, the I lives in the tension between passivity and activity. Exploring how the I relates to time-consciousness thus involves thematizing the interplay of passivity and activity at the most fundamental level of constitution. Specifically, it is necessary to determine whether there is an active form of temporalization. Acknowledging the ambiguities in Husserl’s late manuscripts on time, this paper takes an indirect approach to this question. Relying primarily on Husserl’s analysis of active synthesis in his transcendental logic, I argue that being intellectually active requires an active form of temporalization, which establishes the specific rhythm of egoic activity.

This paper examines Edmund Husserl's revised account of expression in his 1913–1914 revisions of the Logical Investigations. Rejecting the Investigations’ thesis that linguistic meanings are constituted in a distinctive class of essentially non-intuitive meaning intentions, Husserl develops a new conception of empty intention, a new analysis of the intuitively fulfilled discourse and a phenomenology of the indicative tendency. While these revisions have been acknowledged, their motivation, connection, and significance remain under-explored in the existing literature. By comparing the Investigations and the Revisions, this paper shows how these developments fundamentally alter Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between language, thought, and intuition. The revised account of expression illuminates the dynamic interaction of these elements in the process of meaning-making, offering a balanced account of the interplay of presence and absence in our use of words.

This paper reconstructs Sartre’s account of the “circuit of ipseity” as an integral theory of the experiential, agentive and normative aspects of self-consciousness. At the core of this theory is a conception of human (self-)consciousness as lacking, and the correlation between lacking and ideal. In Section 1, I show how this theory manages to satisfy the apparently incompatible requirements generated by the idea of a pre-reflective cogito. Section 2 discusses practical self-consciousness, in particular the agent’s consciousness of herself as self-determined in the projection and pursuit of ends, and how this is accounted for in Sartre’s theory by the correlation of lack and ideal. Section 3 first clarifies the Sartrean conception of the ideal by comparing it with Korsgaard’s, and then reconstructs Sartre’s account of practical normativity by showing how it can be read as emerging from a critical engagement with Heidegger.

Balancing a hermeneutic of trust with a hermeneutic of suspicion, this article develops a phenomenological description of imagination that highlights its alethic ambiguity. Imagination is an act of disclosure, without which the world of fiction and pure possibility cannot be constituted. Imagination is also an act of self-indulgence and narcissism, the source of much concealment and untruth. It is not the one or the other, but both at the same time, essentially ambiguous because of its phenomenological constitution. In this article, I will take some steps towards clarifying this essential ambiguity of the imagination by drawing on the insights of Husserl and Sartre. Beginning with Husserl’s parallel treatment of imagination and perception as intuitive, objectifying acts, I will argue, drawing on insights from Sartre, that there is an important discrepancy between them with respect to the role of desire. While the constitution of perceptual presence is inseparable from a desire for truth, the desire involved in the constitution of imaginary presence has an ambiguous character, both epistemic and magical. This duplicity of desire partly accounts for the ambiguity of imagination, which is all the more pronounced the more the imagination demands the full emotional involvement of the imagining subject.

In this article, I analyze the evolution of Husserl's view on the normativity of logic and the corresponding changes in his phenomenological analysis of judgment. Initially, in the Prolegomena, Husserl claimed that the laws of pure logic are ideal and acquire normative status only as a result of application. Later, however, he revised this position and claimed that the same laws are at once ideal and normative. Sections 1 and 2 present textual evidence for attributing such a change of position to Husserl, which is not generally acknowledged in the literature. Section 3 critically examines Husserl's early position, with specific attention to the model of instantiation. Sections 4–6 identify three key stages in the development of Husserl's theory of judgment that lead to the normative conception of pure logic: (1) the critique of the dissociation of ideal content and assertive force; (2) the rejection of the instantiation model of proposition and the development of a new account in terms of identification; (3) the genetic‐phenomenological interpretation of proposition and the elaboration of the three‐layer structure of pure logic.

In this paper, I explore Husserl’s view on the normativity of intentionality and its neutralization. Husserl reaches his mature, normative-transcendental conception of intentionality by way of critical engagement with Brentano’s position. As opposed to Brentano, Husserl does not conceive of the normativity of intentionality as deriving from the more basic character of polar opposition. Normativity comes first and it is an original, though not universal determination of intentionality which is expressed in the identificatory achievement of constitution. Even where it is absent, this absence makes itself felt since neutrality is never the simple omission of normativity but essentially its neutralizing modification. The discussion of neutrality-modification in Ideas I is, however, problematic, as I will argue by drawing upon Husserl’s research manuscripts. I aim to show that neutralization is not a single but a group of closely related intentional modifications and that ways of neutralization are best conceptualized as changes of attitude. I will then examine phantasy and aesthetic consciousness as involving two such neutralizing attitudes. What they have in common is a spirit of playfulness in contrast to the serious commitment to truth that characterizes original intentionality. The neutralization of normativity takes place in play.

There is an eminent tradition of thought that sees in the phenomenon of time something contradictory. This tradition has been recently revived by some contemporary proponents of dialethism – the view that there are true contradictions. In this paper, I will contribute to this line of thinking by tracing the first steps of a dialethic account of time-consciousness. In particular, I will argue that the experiential flow of time can be accounted for in the framework of an intentionalist approach to temporal perception if we conceive of time-consciousness as a quasi-multiplicity, i.e., a multiplicity of non-self-identical parts, hence the embrace of dialethism. Section 1 introduces dialethism, discusses Priest's dialethic theory of motion and time, and motivates the project of a dialethic account of time-consciousness. Section 2 introduces the intentionalist approach to time-consciousness and distinguishes pure intentionalism from sense-data intentionalism; both subscribes to a certain Principle of Simultaneous Awareness but interprets it differently. In Sect. 3, I offer an in-depth analysis of this principle and identify its core as the requirement of self-unification, i.e., the requirement that time-consciousness unifies itself in flowing without any higher-order act of unification. Section 4 then argues that pure intentionalism can satisfy this requirement by embracing dialethism. I conclude by noting how the dialethic account of time-consciousness incorporates a central extensionalist insight within an intentionalist outlook.

This article reconstructs Sartre’s theory of selfhood against the background of the contemporary debate between minimal-self theories and narrative-self theories. I argue that Sartre’s theory incorporates both an emphasis on the singular first-person perspective, which is characteristic of minimal-self theories, and an emphasis on the practical intelligibility of experience, which is characteristic of narrative-self theories. The distinctiveness of the Sartrean combination of these motifs consists in its idea of the necessary ideal-relatedness of consciousness. According to Sartre, the logical structure of the pre-reflective cogito requires the haunting presence of an ideal of self-coincidence, which determines for consciousness the meaning of its lived experiences. Consciousness exists as a question to itself due to this ideal-relatedness, and it answers this question by projecting its possibilities as creative and symbolic realizations of this ideal. Establishing the connection between Sartre’s theory of imagination and his theory of selfhood, I suggest that both the ideal and the possibility of consciousness are lived in the manner of the imaginary.

This paper approaches Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness from a mereological perspective. Taking as inspiration Bergson’s idea that pure durée is a multiplicity of interpenetration, I will show, from within Husserlian phenomenology, that the absolute flow can indeed be described as a whole of interpenetrating parts. This mereological perspective will inform my re-consideration of the much-discussed issue of Husserl’s self-criticism concerning the schema of content and apprehension. It will also reveal a fundamental similarity between Husserl’s conception of the absolute flow and Sartre’s conception of lived temporality. This paper consists of four sections. Section 2 presents the basic elements of Husserl’s mereology. Section 3 introduces the difficulty encountered by Husserl’s early account of time that makes use of the schema. I will examine Barry Dainton’s criticism of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness against the background of the older debate between Meinong and Stern, a debate that has informed Husserl’s own account. Section 4 distinguishes two common criticisms of the schema from Husserl’s own self-criticism, which is in turn divided into two steps. It is shown how the second step of this self-criticism implies the interpenetration of the absolute flow and responds to Dainton’s criticism. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes with some comparative remarks. I will show how Husserl’s notion of absolute flow, as mereologically interpreted, anticipates Sartre’s conception of consciousness as self-transcendence, as well as how it accommodates the apparently conflicting mereological intuitions of Aristotle and Bergson.

Normative notions are central to Husserl’s account of intentionality: intending an object is a normative achievement, essentially admitting of fulfillment or disappointment. So is teleology: intentional conscious life is inseparable from a horizontal orientation toward “ideas in the Kantian sense.” How are they related? Is teleology essential for intentionality as a normative achievement? Or, in Husserl’s way of putting it, do relative truths “demand” ideal truths? This article explores some reasons for agreeing with Husserl that this is indeed the case. In Sec. 2, I will identify a “normative turn” in Husserl’s account of the basic structure of perceptual intentionality and spell out the teleological character of this normative account. This sense of teleology is a minimal one. A more robust teleology, in the sense of an orientation toward infinite ideality, is then justified in Sec. 3 by virtue of its function in the constitution of genuine objectivity. In Sec. 4, I will turn to the noetic, especially the ego-oriented side of Husserl’s analysis, in order to clarify the normative force of infinite telos. All in all, I will argue that the normative and the teleological sides of the story are inextricably intertwined in Husserl’s account of intentional conscious life.

Both Husserl and Sartre speak of quasi-presence in their descriptions of the lived experience of imagination, and for both philosophers, accounting for quasi-presence means developing an account of the hyle proper to imagination. Guided by the perspective of fulfillment, Husserl’s theory of imaginary quasi-presence goes through three stages. Having experimented first with a depiction-model and then a perception-model, Husserl’s mature theory appeals to his innovative conception of inner consciousness. This elegant account nevertheless fails to do justice to the facticity and bodily involvement of our imaginary experience. Sartre’s theory of analogon, based on his conception of imaginary quasi-presence as ‘magical’ self-affection, embodies important insights on these issues. Kinesthetic sensations and feelings are the modes in which we make use of own body to possess and be possessed by the imaginary object, thus lending it a semblance of bodily presence.