Diana Mazzarella

Developmental work on ostensive communication calls for reconsidering existing theoretical accounts within a comprehensive framework of early pragmatics and its development. In this paper, we propose a new perspective on the ontogeny and development of ostensive communication as underpinned by a process of knowledge and representational redescription. By discussing relevant empirical data, we ground early pragmatics on in‐built principles of implicit knowledge that are redescribed during communicative development, shedding new light on the representations underlying infant ostensive communication and its development into rich pragmatic knowledge involving complex intentions and metarepresentations.

Humans are endowed with a suite of cognitive mechanisms that enable them to mitigate the risk of misinformation and underlie their epistemic vigilance. When direct access to the initial source of information is unavailable, individuals often rely on the vigilance of others to acquire beliefs. Moreover, monitoring the critical alertness of one’s interlocutors is essential for interpreting their communicative intentions, particularly in cases of deliberately conveying false information, such as lies or verbal irony. However, little is known about the human capacity to track others’ epistemic vigilance and use this information to guide belief formation and pragmatic interpretation. This study investigates whether children aged from 4 to 8 selectively trust vigilant over gullible informants. Our findings suggest that selective trust based on informant vigilance towards inaccuracy begins to emerge around the age of 6.

Young children are notoriously bad at understanding ironical statements, with irony comprehension emerging around the age of 6 and appearing resistant to task manipulation. What can explain this late emergence? We propose that children’s epistemic vigilance is a pivotal component of the constellation of socio-cognitive abilities underpinning irony comprehension. Epistemic vigilance enables children to detect the contextual incongruity of an ironical statement, discern that the ironical speaker is neither mistaken nor deceptive, and infer the critical, dissociative attitude expressed through verbal irony. By highlighting the role of epistemic vigilance, this account provides insight into the developmental puzzle of irony comprehension. It elucidates why its developmental trajectory diverges from that of other forms of figurative or humorous language and why it is closely linked to lie understanding and second-order false belief reasoning.

A distinctive feature of verbal irony is the expression of a dissociative attitude. Although attitude understanding represents a key element of irony comprehension and its development, the experimental research in this area remains fragmented and often yields mixed findings. This paper reviews the measures employed to target distinct aspects of irony understanding, including attitude recognition, and examines inconsistencies in their application. Furthermore, it explores how features of experimental stimuli — including contextual, verbal, and paraverbal cues — can affect children’s performance. Our analysis lays the foundation for refining the conceptualisation of the dissociation expressed by the ironical attitude and overcoming methodological challenges such as ensuring consistency in the design of measures and their alignment with experimental stimuli. Adopting a more rigorous and integrative approach has the potential to illuminate the developmental trajectory of ironical attitude comprehension and support the establishment of more systematic and reliable research in this domain.

This work investigates absolute adjectives in the not very construction and how their pragmatic interpretation depends on the evaluative polarity and the scale structure of their antonymic pairs. Our experimental study reveals that evaluatively positive adjectives (clean) are more likely to be strengthened than evaluatively negative ones (dirty), and that maximum standard adjectives (clean or closed) are more likely to be strengthened than minimum standard ones (dirty or open). Our findings suggest that both evaluative polarity and scale structure drive the asymmetric interpretation of gradable adjectives under negation. Overall, our work adds to the growing literature on the interplay between pragmatic inference, valence and semantic meaning.

In everyday communication, criticisms are important and commonly occurring face-threatening acts. In this paper, we investigate the way people deal with criticisms by conducting two experiments in French involving the production of, and response to, criticisms using a written Discourse Completion Test. In each experiment, we presented participants with scenarios in which we manipulated power relations (equal vs. hierarchical) and horizontal social distance (close or distant). We also assessed the roles of age and gender of the participants. Results indicate that power and distance significantly impact the formulation of criticisms but not that of responses to criticisms. Similarly, age and gender significantly interacted in the formulation of criticisms, with younger women being less direct, but older women being more direct compared to men. No effect was found on responses to criticisms. Taken together, these findings provide a more comprehensive perspective of the factors affecting the production of, and response to, criticisms from an experimental perspective, thus contributing to our understanding of this pivotal but understudied speech act.

Overconfidence is typically damaging to one’s reputation as a trustworthy source of information. Previous research shows that the reputational cost associated with conveying a piece of false information is higher for confident than unconfident speakers. When judging speaker trustworthiness, individuals do not exclusively rely on past accuracy but consider the extent to which speakers expressed a degree of confidence that matched the accuracy of their claims (their “confidence-accuracy calibration”). The present study experimentally examines the interplay between confidence, accuracy and a third factor, namely evidence, in the assessment of speaker trustworthiness. Experiment 1 probes the hypothesis that overconfidence does not backfire when a confident but inaccurate claim is justified: the trustworthiness of a confident speaker who turns out to be wrong is restored if the confidence expressed is based on strong evidence (good confidence-evidence calibration). Experiment 2 investigates the hypothesis that confidence can backfire if a confident and accurate claim is not justified: the trustworthiness of a confident speaker who turns out to be right is damaged if the confidence expressed is based on weak evidence (bad confidence-evidence calibration). Our results support both hypotheses and thus suggest that “confidence-evidence calibration” plays a crucial role in the assessment of speaker trustworthiness.

Presuppositions bypass epistemic vigilance, but it is unclear if this stems from their encoding or their not‐at‐issue status. In a truth‐value judgment task, participants evaluated false statements from a suspect (low reliability) or a witness (high reliability), varying in linguistic encoding (presupposition vs. assertion) and at‐issueness (at‐issue vs. not‐at‐issue). False information was detected faster and more accurately when at‐issue. False assertions were identified faster, while false presuppositions led to more errors when not‐at‐issue. The difference in response time between assertions and presuppositions was smaller for the unreliable source, suggesting that linguistic encoding and source reliability jointly influence false information detection.

Speakers can express a critical, dissociative attitude by being ironic. According to the Echoic account of verbal irony, this attitude targets a proposition that echoes a thought attributed to someone other than the speaker herself at the present time. This study investigated the role of echo in irony processing across the lifespan. Through a self-paced reading task, we assessed whether the degree of explicitness of the proposition echoed by the ironical statement and the age of the participant influenced irony processing. Our results show that, independently of age, ironic statements were costlier to process than literal statements, with aging further increasing difficulty. Crucially, our manipulation of the echo affected reading times: it was more complex to process irony when this echoed an implicature or an implicit expectation, particularly for older adults. This work corroborates the role of the echo in verbal irony providing insights into age-related changes in irony processing.

The present study investigated whether humans are more likely to trust people who are coordinated with them. We examined a well-known type of linguistic coordination, lexical entrainment, typically involving the elaboration of “conceptual pacts,” or partner-specific agreements on how to conceptualize objects. In two experiments, we manipulated lexical entrainment in a referential communication task and measured the effect of this manipulation on epistemic and practical trust. Our results showed that participants were more likely to trust a coordinated partner than an uncoordinated one, but only when the latter broke previously established conceptual pacts.

Given the risks of misinformation, addressees need to calibrate their trust towards communicators effectively. One way to do this is to evaluate the evidence speakers rely on (their evidential warrant) or claim to have (their evidential claims) when providing testimony. We review key findings in experimental psychology and experimental pragmatics to uncover the mechanisms underlying this form of trust calibration. This will ultimately shed light on the psychological foundations of principles that guide the evaluation of testimony in legal contexts, such as the law against hearsay.

Verbal communication leaves room for interpretative disputes. Speakers can argue about what they mean by their words and negotiate their commitments in conversation. This article examines the deniability of implicitly communicated contents and addresses the question of what makes an act of denial seem more or less plausible to the addressee. I argue that denials bring about a process of reconstruction of the context of interpretation of the speaker's utterance and I illustrate how considerations of cognitive utility are the key determinant for distinguishing plausible from merely possible deniability.

Any form of overt communication, be it gestural or linguistic, involves pragmatic skills. This article investigates the social–cognitive foundations of pragmatic development from infancy to late childhood and argues that it is driven by, among other things, the emergence of the capacities to assess the communicator's competence (e.g. perceptual access, epistemic states) and honesty. We discuss the implications of this proposal and show how it sheds new light on the developmental trajectory of a series of pragmatic phenomena, with a specific focus on the development of irony comprehension.

Sperber suggests that competent hearers can deploy sophisticated interpretative strategies in order to cope with deliberate deception or to avoid misunderstandings due to speaker’s incompetence. This paper investigates the cognitive underpinnings of sophisticated interpretative strategies and suggests that they emerge from the interaction between a relevance-guided comprehension procedure and epistemic vigilance mechanisms. My proposal sheds a new light on the relationship between comprehension and epistemic assessment. While epistemic vigilance mechanisms are typically assumed to assess the believability of the output of the comprehension system, I argue that epistemic assessment plays an additional role in determining this very output.

© The Authors 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] Lepore and Stone clearly state, ‘this book is first and foremost a philosophy book – its point is not to settle this or that resolution to a particular empirical issue, or to advocate for a specific theoretical framework of discourse interpretation. It is rather to sharpen intuitions and draw distinctions about language use’.1 It is thus with this perspective in mind that it is worth discussing their contribution and assessing its unequivocal merits and debatable shortcomings....The book pursues two ambitious goals: first, to establish the pervasive role of conventions of meaning in communication, and second, to highlight the heterogeneity of the imaginative practices involved in understanding figurative or evocative uses of language. The critical target of this endeavour is represented...