Diego Borbón

The academic debate on the governance of neurotechnology has progressively shifted from proposals to create new lists of so-called neurorights toward the reinterpretation of existing human rights, with freedom of thought attracting particular attention, among a broader set of candidate rights. This article examines whether freedom of thought can currently perform that anchoring role in Latin American jurisdictions. Drawing on a comparative analysis of constitutional texts, jurisprudence, and the Inter-American human rights system, the article argues that freedom of thought does not yet possess a clear, strong, and autonomous normative content in Latin American domestic law and in its regional human rights system. As a complementary and, in the region, more operative anchor, it argues that human dignity, which in several Latin American constitutional orders functions as an absolute autonomous fundamental right of direct application with extensive jurisprudential development, constitutes a more operationally effective legal basis for absolute prohibitions on the use of people as instruments or objects, and can protect them from coercive neurotechnological interventions. The article proposes that human dignity supplies the absolute floor against instrumentalization and coercion, while freedom of thought, as its doctrinal development advances, can complement that floor with the protection of the forum internum. It further contends that any rights-based strategy is structurally insufficient on its own, because rights depend on judicial interpretation that is inherently contextual and contingent, and therefore supports a multilevel governance approach combining the interpretation of existing rights, soft-law principles, and potential specific hard-law provisions.

Resumen La sentencia T-057 de 2025 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia aborda una de las cuestiones morales más complejas de la bioética contemporánea: si la eutanasia solicitada por un representante legal puede justificarse en el caso de un paciente que nunca ha tenido capacidad de decisión ni de comunicación. El caso se refería a Mateo, un adolescente de dieciséis años con epilepsia refractaria, distonía grave y discapacidad cognitiva profunda, cuya madre solicitó la eutanasia en su nombre. La Corte denegó la solicitud específica, inaplicando por inconstitucional la exclusión generalizada de los menores con discapacidad intelectual del acceso a la eutanasia, y ordenó la implementación de cuidados paliativos integrales y una reforma regulatoria. Este artículo examina el caso dentro del singular marco de muerte asistida judicial de Colombia—uno de los pocos sistemas a nivel mundial construidos íntegramente mediante decisiones judiciales sin legislación que lo habilite—y analiza el panorama internacional comparativo a través de seis perspectivas éticas: el principialismo, la ética del cuidado, los derechos de las personas con discapacidad, la bioética católica, el liberalismo secular y el derecho de los derechos humanos. El artículo también analiza brevemente la nueva Resolución 813 de 2026, que desde entonces ha excluido de la eutanasia a los pacientes que nunca fueron capaces de tomar decisiones, a pesar de las órdenes de la Corte Constitucional. Concluye con una evaluación matizada: un ordenamiento jurídico comprometido con la dignidad humana no puede condenar indefinidamente a un menor a un sufrimiento inmenso y visible sin prospectivas terapéuticas; sin embargo, tal postura exige una protección procesal extraordinaria para los derechos humanos y los derechos de los pacientes.

This chapter explores the intersections between free will skepticism, the emerging concept of neurorights, and the ethical implications of coercive nonconsensual moral neuroenhancements. Free will skepticism in general, and hard incompatibilism in particular, questions whether individuals have alternative possibilities and ultimate control—in the degrees required for free will and moral responsibility—in a deterministic or indeterministic universe. Then, upon the denial of free will, some might suggest that implementing coercive neurointerventions to prevent and correct deviant antisocial behavior is necessary or desirable. This discussion is crucial to neurorights, which aim to protect cognitive liberty and consent. However, this chapter argues that neurorights, as currently conceived, are inadequate and could be less protective and more regressive in terms of human rights. Therefore, a skeptical or a hard incompatibilist approach to free will should reconsider the debate on moral enhancements and neurorights, advocating for more humane perspectives aligned with penal neuroabolitionism, which advocates for the gradual abolition of criminal law and retributive punishment, while respecting human dignity, freedom of thought, bodily integrity, autonomy, and consent. This chapter rethinks future public criminal policies and radically challenges the way in which we currently fail to do justice.

This article critically analyzes proposals for the use of coercive medical interventions with neurotechnologies in criminal justice systems for moral enhancement purposes, considering their ethical and legal implications. It argues that although neurotechnologies could hypothetically improve certain aspects of the moral behavior of individuals involved in criminal proceedings, their non-consensual use raises significant dilemmas for the rights of defendants. After outlining the historical development of these proposals and the real-life capabilities of neurotechnologies, it is shown that their effects are limited, contextual, and potentially risky. The article reviews so-called neurorights as regulatory responses, noting that, as excessively relative rights, they could weaken existing protections and unduly expand the State's punitive power. The article concludes that the strongest defense against the idea of coercive neurointerventions lies in strengthening the absolute protection of human dignity and freedom of thought, as well as legally enforcing the protection of informed consent and bodily and mental integrity within the current human rights framework, without the need to create new lists of relative and problematic rights.

This paper addresses the different discussions that led to the creation of the NeuroRights Initiative and the proposal for a NeuroRight to equal access to mental augmentation. Then it presents some conceptual clarifications, and subsequently makes a detailed analysis of the proposal in light of posthumanism. In this sense, it studies how this NeuroRight may lead to inequality, loss of social diversity and pressures on sociocultural and religious diversity. It also studies the problems and challenges inherent to the implementation of this type of initiative. We propose that a NeuroRight to enhancement should not be incorporated and that equitable access to technologies should be limited to therapeutic purposes only.