Diego Villegas Aleksov

The aim of this article is to outline some of the main works developed in moral philosophy, arguing how they have (or haven’t) dealt with the moral status of non-human animals. To achieve this objective, the paper is divided into three sections. First, I delimit the object of study “animals” and refer to some myths in relation to them. Secondly, I briefly outline the philosophical works of the main currents in moral philosophy. Finally, I introduce, as an alternative to traditional ethics, the postulates developed from the ethics of compassion.

RESUMEN El objeto de este trabajo es, por un lado, recopilar los principales estudios teóricos y filosóficos que han servido para diferenciar entre reglas regulativas y reglas constitutivas y, por otro, realizar una revisión de dichas propuestas para efectos de cuestionar la posibilidad de una distinción tajante entre ambos tipos de reglas. La primera parte del texto corresponde a una exposición de los postulados de los autores enunciados. En seguida, se formulan cuestionamientos a los criterios que se advierten en el apartado precedente. Finalmente, se expone la viabilidad de una distinción concluyente entre ambos tipos de reglas. ABSTRACT The aim of this article is, on the one hand, to compile the main theoretical and philosophical studies that has been used to differentiate between regulative norms and constitutive norms, and on the other hand, to make a review of these proposals to question the possibility of a sharp distinction between both types of rules. The first part of this work is an exposition of the postulates of the mentioned authors. The second part of the text introduces questions against the criteria noted in the previous section. Finally, the feasibility of a conclusive distinction between both types of rules is exposed.